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Chapter 1
Introduction
Merchant: In this chaos of opinions, which one is the most prudent?
Shareholder: To go in the direction of the waves and not ﬁght against the
powerful currents.
Joseph de la Vega, 1688
The ﬁeld of market microstructure studies trading mechanisms of ﬁnancial securities,
where latent demands are incorporated into asset prices (Madhavan, 2000; Biais, Glosten,
and Spatt, 2005; Hasbrouck, 2007). Following the emergence of modern ﬁnancial institu-
tions, trading mechanisms became subjects of study for several authors, notably Joseph
de la Vega’s early work of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1688. A modern scientiﬁc
literature, on the other hand, developed in the last four decades, roughly since the term
of market microstructure is coined for the ﬁrst time by Garman (1976). This disser-
tation contributes to this collective endeavor with analyses on two of the main roles of
ﬁnancial markets, price discovery and the provision of liquidity, and on the eﬀects of the
technological developments and sophistication in ﬁnancial markets.
Price discovery denotes the continual pricing of ﬁnancial securities considering newly
available information through the mechanism of demand and supply. Modern ﬁnancial
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markets are typically organized around order books recording limit orders, i.e. the desires
to buy or sell an amount of a security at a certain price. When all information is public,
the classic Walrasian mechanism provides a straightforward relationship between indi-
viduals’ consumption decisions and asset prices. However, this is hardly the case in the
complex world of ﬁnancial markets where transaction costs and information asymmetries
are prevalent. The limit orders often scatter around a range of prices, where the highest
volumes are usually quoted near the highest price to buy a security, the best bid, and the
lowest price to sell a security, the best ask, the gap between which constitutes the bid-ask
spread.
This dispersion of quotes and the bid-ask spread relate to another major role of ﬁ-
nancial markets, namely the provision of liquidity. Liquidity denotes the costs associated
with trading, either in monetary units, if one is willing to cross the spread, or in terms
of execution time, if one wants to wait for another party to cross the spread. Due to the
broadness of this concept, a plethora of liquidity measures are proposed by the literature
(Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009). Among the most straightforward ones are those
related to the trade volume and the bid-ask spread of the concerning security.
The bid-ask spread has been attracting particular attention, because it captures both
the uncertainty about the true value of a security and the amount of transaction costs
a party needs to endure to buy or sell a security. A strand of the literature investigates
the inﬂuence of the inventory management costs on the spread, including the aforemen-
tioned pioneering work of Garman (1976). Roll (1984) models the spread as unpredictable
pricing errors stemming from order handling and other costs. A third branch points to
adverse-selection costs caused by informed parties (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom,
1985; Glosten, 1994). These main approaches have been extended by the inclusion other
factors such as autocorrelation dynamics and remain open to cross-pollination, as shown
by many studies (e.g., Lin, Sanger, and Booth, 1995; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Madhavan,
Richardson, and Roomans, 1997).
The other aspect of liquidity, the trading activity measured by the trade volume,
has a rather ambiguous relationship with informed trading. Two classical models in the
literature point to opposite conclusions. In line with the positive eﬀect of adverse selection
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on the bid-ask spread, Foster and Viswanathan (1990) ﬁnds that informed traders drive
out uninformed ones, and thus decrease the overall trading activity, by imposing adverse
selection costs on them. In contrast, Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) propose a model where
uninformed traders choose to cluster with informed traders. In this model, the uninformed
traders still face adverse selection costs, but they also beneﬁt from the competition of
informed traders sharing the same information.
Technological developments have been posing new questions about the eﬃcacy of ﬁ-
nancial markets in these roles. Fully functioning electronic trading platforms started to
emerge nearly three decades ago, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Globex platform,
the subject of one of our studies, being one of the ﬁrst in 1992. Although several studies
demonstrate that the open limit order markets beneﬁt informed as well as uninformed
traders by the transparency, anonymity and control they provide and generate a liquidity
externality by aggregating all orders in one venue (Glosten, 1994; Pagano and Ro¨ell, 1996;
Biais, Foucault, and Salanie´, 1998), the current success of these electronic markets have
not been unanimously foretold (e.g., Venkataraman, 2001). Nowadays, trading pits sur-
vive only at a few markets, usually handling trades which are too large or too complicated
for the electronic newcomers (De Jong, Nijman, and Ro¨ell, 1995; Soﬁanos and Werner,
2000).
The last decade saw the kindling of a new debate on the eﬀects of technological change
in the microstructure of ﬁnancial markets. Firms specialized in high frequency trading
(HFT) dramatically altered the market landscape with the use of automatized trading
algorithms responding to shifts in the market dynamics within milliseconds. Many studies
ﬁnd HFT activity beneﬁts price discovery (Carrion, 2013; Brogaard, Hendershott, and
Riordan, 2014) with the downside that this advantage also imposes costs on the other
parties, as shown by both theoretical (Hoﬀmann, 2014; Foucault, Hombert, and Ros¸u,
2016) and empirical (Brogaard et al., 2014) studies. However the main utilisers of the HFT
technology do not seem to be aggressive traders, but passive yet smart liquidity providers
acting on both sides of the market, buying from or selling to traders willing to cross the
bid-ask spread (Menkveld, 2013; Hagstromer and Norden, 2013; Brogaard, Hagstromer,
Norden, and Riordan, 2014). This ﬁnding resonates with the observed positive eﬀects of
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HFT activity on measures of liquidity (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).
The upcoming three chapters of this dissertation contribute these literatures. The
ﬁrst two explore intraday variation in the unobserved market variables, measuring price
discovery and market liquidity. We achieve this investigation by exploiting the dynamic
modelling capabilities of Kalman ﬁltering methods (Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas,
2007; Frijns and Schotman, 2009). These two chapters relate to the contemporary trends
of market fragmentation and prevalence of electronic trading. The third one focuses
on the other major debate on technological development in the market microstructure
literature, namely the eﬀects of HFT activity. We analyze HFT activity during extreme
price movements, where it is a suspect of predatory trading.
The second chapter proposes a new methodology to examine price discovery in this
high frequency world. We explore intraday variation in the contribution to price discovery
across diﬀerent exchanges, where the same stocks trade simultaneously. We estimate a
structural model with time-varying parameters in state space form using Maximum Likeli-
hood and produce measures of informativeness for each market, the so-called information
shares (Hasbrouck, 1995; De Jong and Schotman, 2010). An extensive simulation study
provides evidence for the accuracy of this methodology. We analyze data for 50 S&P 500
stocks in 2013 and ﬁnd that the constancy of shares in price discovery, a frequently-held
assumption of the existing literature, is rejected. Tighter quoted spreads attract informed
trading from other exchanges. Exchange listing and industrial sector of a stock signif-
icantly aﬀect the dominant venues of price discovery in diﬀerent parts of the day and
following macroeconomic news announcements.
The third chapter studies why a majority of trades still happen during the pit hours,
i.e. when the trading pit is open, even after the pit ceased to be a liquid and informative
venue. We investigate the case of 30-year U.S. Treasury futures using a ten-years-long
intraday data set which contains the introduction of the CME Globex platform as an
example of sophistication in electronic trading. We use a structural model to estimate
the time-variation in potential factors of the clustering of trading activity around the pit
hours, namely price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact of trades.
We ﬁnd evidence for a feedback mechanism between trading activity and these factors.
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Across the sample period, price informativeness during the afterhours is a consistently
signiﬁcant factor attracting trade activity. Information asymmetry has a negative eﬀect
on afterhours activity, particularly during the crisis years. The negative eﬀect of price
impact on afterhours activity ceases to be a signiﬁcant factor from 2007 on, possibly due
to improvements in order execution algorithms and electronic trading facilities.
Lastly, the fourth chapter investigates the eﬀect of HFT activity around large price
moves. Our data set covers message-level NASDAQ data for 8,000 CRSP stocks from July
2007 to December 2013. A monthly average 3.4 extreme moves happen for each stock.
About half of the moves are transitory, i.e. they are followed by a reversal more than two-
thirds of the move size, and nearly a quarter of them are permanent, i.e. they experience
a reversal of less than one-third. We ﬁnd HFT activity contributes signiﬁcantly to price
discovery, given that it predicts the move size and direction nearly as good as non-HFT
trades, which comprise the bulk of the trade volume. HFT activity during the extreme
events also reduces the market quality deterioration, which may be stemming from the
relative eagerness of HFT ﬁrms to bet on mean-reversal and thus to soften the moves by
trading against them. However, from October 2011 on, we observe for transitory moves a
trend toward a stronger predictive power of premove HFT activity on the move size and
a stronger positive relationship with the magnitude of price reversals as well as with the
deterioration in three market quality measures, namely quoted spreads, market volatility
and execution-to-cancellation ratios.
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Chapter 2
Intraday Price Discovery in
Fragmented Markets
This chapter is a joint project with Dr. Michel van der Wel and Prof. Dick van Dijk of
Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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2.1 Introduction
Financial markets incorporate new information into asset prices by matching buyers
and sellers. They thereby facilitate the discovery of what the price of an asset should be.
Nowadays this “price discovery” process can take place across multiple exchanges and
instruments, as diﬀerent securities and derivatives based on the same underlying asset
may trade on several venues. In the case of such a multiplicity, there may be diﬀerences
in the share with which each market’s trades contribute to discovering the one true price of
the underlying asset. Knowledge of these so-called information shares of diﬀerent markets
would beneﬁt both investors concerned with price informativeness and adverse selection
risk as well as policy makers investigating the determinants of price eﬃciency. Existing
studies often assume the contributions of diﬀerent markets to price discovery are constant
at least over the course of the day. We analyze intraday variation in price discovery, and
consider which factors may explain such variation.
The measurement of price discovery requires isolating informative price movements
from noise. Observed price changes constitute the most obvious indicator of price dis-
covery. However, they form an imperfect measure as observed prices are susceptible to
transitory mispricing, caused by noise trading or temporary order imbalances, for exam-
ple. In contrast, when security prices absorb new information due to informed trading,
these price changes last permanently. Hasbrouck (1995) demonstrates that the above
implies the existence of co-integration relationships between security prices and develops
a framework exploiting these to distinguish permanent and transitory price changes. His
work initiated a booming literature on price discovery measures and information shares.
Early studies, like Hasbrouck (1995), eﬀectively assume the contributions of diﬀerent
trading venues to the eﬃcient price innovations to be constant over time, or at least for the
sample period used for estimation. However, changes in the characteristics of exchanges
and securities - such as increases in trade volume and electronization of trading mecha-
nisms - make this assumption implausible. Based on these motivations, the more recent
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literature mostly divides the sample into short sub-periods, and typically considers daily
measurements of information shares (Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004; Hasbrouck,
2003; Mizrach and Neely, 2008, among others).
In spite of providing a higher level of sophistication, measurements of information
shares at the daily frequency are unable to keep up with the current pace of ﬁnancial
markets and available data. Current information share methodologies are not able to
answer questions about diﬀerences in price discovery across diﬀerent parts of the day or
the digestion of public news, most of which happens in a matter of minutes, if not seconds.
A growing body of studies infer intraday variation in informed trading indirectly from the
dynamics in other market characteristics, such as liquidity, depth and volatility in limit
order markets (Ahn, Bae, and Chan, 2001), asymmetric information proxies and trade
volume before and after public announcements (Chae, 2005) or predictions of a model
with informed and uninformed traders (Lei and Wu, 2005).
In this paper we consider the possibility of examining intraday variation in information
shares directly. We propose a novel method to capture the intraday dynamics of price
discovery based on the structural time series model proposed by Hasbrouck (1993). In
this structural model, the observed security prices depend on a single underlying latent
true price. Diﬀerences between the observed prices and the latent price consist of two
components. On the one hand, these pricing errors are linked to the innovations to the
latent true price capturing lagged adjustment or over-reaction to information. On the
other hand, they stem from uncorrelated errors representing dynamics like noise trad-
ing. Following De Jong and Schotman (2010), information shares can be expressed as a
function of the structural model parameters, including the variances of the latent price
innovations and the uncorrelated errors. We extend this model by allowing the innova-
tion and noise variances to vary throughout the trading day using a ﬂexible Fourier form.
This speciﬁcation is appealing because the Fourier functions are able to capture a wide
range of continuous patterns. This model with time-varying variances naturally leads to
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time-variation in the information shares, thus enabling us to capture intraday variation
in the relative contributions of diﬀerent trading venues to price discovery. We estimate
this model with Maximum Likelihood (ML) using Kalman ﬁltering.
We examine the usefulness of our modeling approach by means of a simulation study
and an empirical application. In order to ensure the relevance of the simulation study
for empirical research, we use the estimates from our empirical study as a benchmark
and examine the eﬀects of various modiﬁcations. The simulation study compares our ML
estimates and GMM estimates following De Jong and Schotman (2010) for the case of
no time-variation and evaluates the precision of ML estimates when information shares
are time-varying. The simulation evidence demonstrates that our state space ML method
generates accurate estimates for a wide range of settings with varying number of obser-
vations, venues and parameters of the time-varying information share model.
Our empirical study provides convincing evidence for intraday variation in informed
trading. We examine 50 constituents of the S&P 500 index for the second half of 2013 using
a 1-minute sampling frequency. Nearly all trade activity of these stocks occurs on four
exchange groups, namely NYSE, NASDAQ, BATS and Direct Edge. The NYSE and the
NASDAQ groups provide overall the largest contributions to price discovery with average
information shares of 43.4% and 33.4%, respectively. The market open and close and
macroeconomic news announcements lead to increases in the variance of the latent price
process, capturing the overall informed trading activity, consistent with the U-shaped
intraday pattern for informed trading documented in the literature (see, e.g., Admati and
Pﬂeiderer, 1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; Slezak, 1994). Such informative events
also alter the shares of diﬀerent exchange groups in price discovery: NYSE is on average
10.9% more informative during the ﬁrst half hour of the day compared to the rest of
the day, while NASDAQ has a 43.5% larger information share during the last hour. The
FOMC announcements in the afternoon increase both the overall price discovery measured
by the variance of latent innovations and NYSE’s information share. Our statistical tests
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reject the hypothesis of constant price discovery during the midday, even when we exclude
days with macroeconomic news.
We seek to explain the variation of information shares using intraday market and
stock characteristics. Using a market share attraction model, we ﬁnd that the number of
trades, quoted spreads and volatility as well as market capitalization, exchange listing and
industry have signiﬁcant explanatory power for the dynamics of the relative information
shares. Tighter quoted spreads and lower volatility in an exchange consistently attract
informed trading activity from other exchanges. Although our sample of stocks trade in
multiple venues and the two main primary listing markets are very competitive in their
shares of trading activity, we ﬁnd that the services provided by exchanges listing the
stocks contribute signiﬁcantly to price discovery. Exchange listing has a strong inﬂuence
on the level of information shares: Being listed on NYSE instead of NASDAQ causes a
36.6% drop in the ratio of the NASDAQ information share to that of NYSE and even more
dramatic drops of 59.4% and 63.4% for BATS and Direct Edge, respectively. The leading
venues within stock groups in terms of industrial classiﬁcation are mostly in line with the
composition of the groups in terms of exchange listings. In particular, for ﬁnancial stocks
in our sample, all of which are listed on NYSE, non-NYSE exchange groups have about
half of their usual information shares.
Our work is related to a number of studies investigating price discovery by means of
state space methods. Upper and Werner (2007) estimate a reduced-form VECM repre-
sentation in the state space framework, while Frijns and Schotman (2009) and Korenok,
Mizrach, and Radchenko (2011) use directly the structural model of Hasbrouck (1993)
in state space form, albeit not allowing for intraday variation in information shares. A
closely related paper is Menkveld et al. (2007), who suggest a similar structural model in
state space form that allows for time-variation in parameters throughout the day. Our
set-up diﬀers in three important respects. First, in their case the comparison is for overall
variation in prices throughout the day for all markets an asset trades on, and not for
11
price discovery across markets. A result is that they study variance ratios for diﬀerent
parts of the trading day (a time series aspect), and not price discovery measures across
the various exchanges (a cross-sectional aspect) as we do. Second, their model is designed
for lower intraday frequencies such as an hour, as they assume that the innovation in the
latent eﬃcient price is fully incorporated into the observed prices at each period (which
is not plausible for higher intraday frequencies). Third, we study the higher-frequency
change in structural model parameters using a ﬂexible Fourier form, while they focus on
step functions to model time-variation.
The information share methodology of De Jong and Schotman (2010) that we use has
several advantages over other measures in the literature. Hasbrouck (1995) estimates the
contributions of each security to the variance of innovations in the latent price. Com-
parative studies, such as Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002), De Jong (2002) and
Lehmann (2002), ﬁnd this focus on variance more appropriate for price discovery measure-
ment than the common factor decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), as Harris,
McInish and Wood (1997; 2002) do. The proposal of De Jong and Schotman (2010) sim-
ilarly works at the variance level, but resolves two main concerns about the Hasbrouck
approach. Firstly, Hasbrouck information shares are not unique but they come in the form
of a range, often with a substantial diﬀerence between the upper and lower boundaries.1
Secondly, it relies on a reduced form estimation methodology which does not provide
estimates of structural parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the unob-
served components model and De Jong and Schotman (2010) information shares, followed
by our extension to capture intraday variation. Sections 2.3 provides simulation evidence
for our methodology. Section 2.4 reports the empirical results, including the analysis of
the determinants of the estimated intraday variation in information shares. Section 2.5
concludes.
1Grammig and Peter (2013) provide identiﬁcation restrictions using the distributional properties of
ﬁnancial price series to overcome the non-uniqueness problem.
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2.2 Measuring price discovery
This section presents the methodology to measure the contributions of diﬀerent trading
venues to price discovery. Its four parts elaborate on the structural model of Hasbrouck
(1993) and De Jong and Schotman (2010), the information shares suggested by De Jong
and Schotman (2010), our novel implementation of intraday time-variation under the state
space framework and testing for intraday variation, respectively.
2.2.1 The Unobserved Components Model
We use a version of the unobserved components model of Hasbrouck (1993) extended
by De Jong and Schotman (2010) as our structural model. In this framework, all observed
prices based on the same underlying asset (such as the observed prices on multiple ex-
changes of the same stock) are driven by one latent eﬃcient price process (the unknown
true price of that underlying stock). This latent price is deﬁned as the end-of-period value
of the asset conditional on all publicly available information at time t. Thus this price
process satisﬁes the semi-strong form of market eﬃciency in line with the range of infor-
mation it encompasses (Fama, 1970). Since all public information is impounded in this
latent price, the best prediction for the asset price in period t+1 is the price at time t and
therefore it is modeled as a random walk with stationary innovations rt. The observed
asset prices on diﬀerent exchanges deviate from this latent price with a stationary error
term as long-term or unbounded deviations are ruled out by arbitrage. These relations
can be represented as an unobserved components model as
pt = ιp
∗
t + ut,
p∗t = p
∗
t−1 + rt,
(2.1)
where pt is an N×1 vector of log observed prices pi,t, i = 1, . . . , N , ut is an N×1 vector of
stationary disturbance terms ui,t, p
∗
t is the scalar latent eﬃcient price, rt is the innovation
in the latent price with mean zero and variance σ2r and ι is an N × 1 vector of ones.
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The error terms ui,t capture microstructure eﬀects in the observed prices. It comprises
two components distinguished by their correlation with the eﬃcient price innovation rt.
First, ui,t has an information-correlated pricing error component αirt that captures dy-
namics such as adverse selection. The second component ei,t is uncorrelated with informa-
tion, but stems from factors such as noise trading or price discreteness. This idiosyncratic
noise ei,t has mean zero and N ×N covariance matrix Ω, allowing for correlation in this
noise component across observed prices. With these two components, the speciﬁcation
for the disturbance terms ui,t is
ut = αrt + et +Ψet−1, (2.2)
where α is an N × 1 vector of αi’s, et is an N × 1 vector of idiosyncratic noise ei,t,
and Ψ is an N × N coeﬃcients matrix. De Jong and Schotman (2010) propose the
inclusion of the lagged noise et−1 in the observed price dynamics in order to capture serial
correlation in high-frequency intraday returns. We provide a state space representation
of the unobserved components model in Appendix A.
2.2.2 De Jong-Schotman information shares
De Jong and Schotman (2010) propose a price discovery measure quantifying the
explanatory power of changes in each of the observed security prices for the innovations
in the latent price. For this purpose, the total price innovation in period t is deﬁned as
νt = pt − ιp∗t−1 = (ι+ α)rt + et +Ψet−1. (2.3)
We may then consider the regression of the innovation in the latent price on the total
innovations in individual prices, that is
rt = γ
′νt + ηt, (2.4)
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where ηt is the innovation in the latent price unrelated to innovations in market prices.
The regression coeﬃcient γ is given by
γ =
cov(rt, νt)
var(νt)
= Υ−1(ι+ α)σ2r . (2.5)
where cov(rt, νt) = (ι+ α)σ
2
r follows from Eq. (2.3) and Υ denotes the covariance matrix
of νt. From Eq. (2.3) we also have
Υ = σ2r(ι+ α)(ι+ α)
′ + Ω+ΨΩΨ′, (2.6)
Using Eq. (2.5), the goodness-of-ﬁt of the regression in Eq. (2.4) can be expressed as
R2 = 1− σ
2
η
σ2r
=
γ′Υγ
σ2r
= γ′(ι+ α) =
N∑
i=1
γi(1 + αi).
This leads De Jong and Schotman (2010) to propose an information share for the price
on the i-th market, denoted ISi, with a partial R
2 interpretation, namely
ISi = γi(1 + αi). (2.7)
Assuming the diagonality of the idiosyncratic noise matrix Ω and the coeﬃcients’
matrix of lagged noise Ψ, the information shares in Eq. (2.7) can be expressed as
ISi =
(1 + αi)
2/(ω2i + ψ
2
i ω
2
i )
1/σ2r +
∑N
j=1(1 + αj)
2/(ω2j + ψ
2
jω
2
j )
, (2.8)
where ω2i and ψi are diagonal entries of respectively the Ω and the Ψ matrices. As this
expression implies, the sum of these information shares, i.e. the R2 of the regression, is
not necessarily equal to one.
The information shares ISi deﬁned in Eq. (2.8) improve on Hasbrouck’s approach by
providing unique measures of price discovery estimated from a structural model, while
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keeping the focus on the variance of the latent innovations. Hasbrouck (1995) estimates
the reduced form of the unobserved components model and the resulting information
shares come in the form of a range between certain lower and upper bounds. The unique
identiﬁcation of Hasbrouck information shares requires a strong assumption like the di-
agonality of the residual covariance matrix, i.e. the shocks to the prices in the reduced
form system should be uncorrelated, which is violated in any empirical application to a
degree. Although the use of higher sampling frequencies reduces this correlation, Yan
and Zivot (2010) point out that information share estimates based on high frequencies
are more susceptible to distortions by transitory noise. The diagonality assumptions on
the Ω and Ψ matrices in order to obtain Eq. (2.8), on the other hand, are both plausible
and testable. The diagonality of Ω means that the idiosyncratic noise components of the
price changes in diﬀerent markets are uncorrelated. A diagonal Ψ matrix implies that
the mispricing in one exchange is not inﬂuenced by the previous period’s noise in another
exchange. These two diagonality assumptions are much weaker and the GMM framework
oﬀers tests to evaluate their validity.2
Computing the information shares ISi according to Eq. (2.8) obviously requires es-
timates of the parameters in the unobserved components model in Eq. (2.1) and Eq.
(2.2). De Jong and Schotman (2010) present a GMM approach to obtain these. The
auto-covariances of the observed returns provide the following moment conditions:
Γ0 = E[ΔptΔp
′
t] = σ
2
r ((ι+ α)(ι+ α)
′ + αα′)) + Ω + (Ψ− I)Ω(Ψ− I)′ +ΨΩΨ′, (2.9)
Γ1 = E[ΔptΔp
′
t−1] = −σ2rα(ι+ α)′ + (Ψ− I)Ω−ΨΩ(Ψ− I), (2.10)
2De Jong and Schotman (2010) provide an extensive discussion of this diagonality restriction compared
to two other commonplace types of restrictions used to identify structural parameters of such models.
The Beveridge–Nelson normalization excludes the noise process et and thus the noise covariance matrix
Ω in Eq. (2.2). By contrast, the Watson normalization sets the correlation term of innovation and noise
variances, α, to zero for one of the exchanges. Although more plausible, the Watson normalization requires
an obvious market to be designated as the central market, which we lack due to the close competition
between NYSE and NASDAQ. We use instead the diagonality restriction, as it also easily ensures the
positive semi-deﬁniteness of the time-varying noise covariance matrix.
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Γ2 = E[ΔptΔp
′
t−2] = −ΨΩ, (2.11)
where Δpt = pt − pt−1. These conditions identify the parameters required for the compu-
tation of information shares, namely σ2r , Ω and α.
Alternatively, the unobserved components model in Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) can
be estimated by ML using the Kalman ﬁltering. We consider this approach here, also
because the extended model with time-varying information shares introduced in Section
2.2.3 cannot be estimated with GMM. As the latent price p∗t follows a random walk and
to account for overnight price changes, we re-initialize p∗t every day with a diﬀuse prior
and exclude a number of initial observations from the likelihood maximization as these
may be unreliable due to the initial convergence of the Kalman ﬁlter.3
Kalman ﬁltering enables the identiﬁcation of a richer microstructure model. In partic-
ular, we allow for a higher lag order for the noise terms to have a more ﬂexible structure
for serial correlations. The error terms in Eq. (2.2) are redeﬁned as
ut = αrt + et +
L∑
j=1
Ψjet−1−j, (2.12)
where L is the number of noise lags. In this model, the information shares are given by
ISi,t =
(1 + αi)
2/(ω2i,t(1 +
∑L
j=1 ψ
2
i,j))
1/σ2,t +
∑N
j=1(1 + αj)
2/(ω2j,t(1 +
∑L
j=1 ψ
2
i,j))
, (2.13)
which collapses to Eq. (2.8) for L = 1.4 We decide on the number of lags by comparing
models diﬀering in this aspect using the Schwarz Information Criterion.
3In our empirical study, we exclude the ﬁrst three observations of every day in our state space ML
estimation from the likelihood calculation. In our simulation study, on the other hand, we exclude the
ﬁrst 11 observations for the sake of consistency within the section: In Section 2.3.3 we use a step function
with 10 steps as a benchmark and leaving 11 of 391 observations at the 1-minute frequency of the trading
day gives 380, which is a multiple of 10.
4The derivation is given in Appendix B.
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2.2.3 Intraday variation in information shares
Time-variation in the information shares ISi in Eq. (2.8) can be introduced by consid-
ering a time-varying parameter extension of the unobserved components model as given
by Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2). This can be attained by making at least one of the parameter
groups vary over time, namely α, Ψ, σ2r or Ω. The latter two variance terms have the
advantage of an established literature linking intraday volatility changes to changes in
informed trading. Intraday volatility is documented to follow an inverted J-shape or a U-
shape pattern during trading hours (Wood, McInish, and Ord, 1985; Lockwood and Linn,
1990). On the one hand, a number of asymmetric information models noted this pattern
as an empirical prediction for markets with informed and uninformed traders (Admati and
Pﬂeiderer, 1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; Slezak, 1994). On the other hand, Hsieh
and Kleidon (1996) document several dynamics unrelated to informed trading which aid
to the formation of this intraday volatility pattern. The main area of contention lies on
whether the start and the end of the day have higher levels of information absorption into
prices and if this is accompanied with larger or lower amounts of noise.
Given these theoretical and empirical claims for the intraday variation of informed and
noise trading, a natural way to model intraday variation in price discovery is making both
the innovation and the noise variances time-varying. We implement time-variation using
a combination of ﬂexible Fourier trigonometric functions and a polynomial (Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Das, 2001; Gallant, 1981). The variance entries ζ2i,t have the form
ζ2i,t = exp
(
ci +
P∑
p=1
θi,pt
p +
Q∑
q=1
(
δi,q cos
(
2πqt
T
)
+ φi,q sin
(
2πqt
T
)))
, (2.14)
where ζ2i,t represents the processes of σ
2
r and ω
2
i ’s, i.e. the diagonal entries of the Ω
matrix, t = 1, . . . , T , with T being the number of observations per day, P the order of the
polynomial part, and Q the total number of ﬂexible Fourier sets. We use an exponential
speciﬁcation for the variances to facilitate an unconstrained maximization procedure given
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that trigonometric functions can have negative values. The ﬂexible Fourier form can model
complex dynamics and smooth transitions. However using solely the ﬂexible Fourier part
would impose equality of the variances at the start and end of the day. This is avoided
by complementing it with the polynomial component. As in the case of the lag order L,
the order of the polynomial P and the number of ﬂexible Fourier sets Q can be decided
using the Schwarz Information Criterion.
The ﬂexible Fourier speciﬁcation has several advantages over alternative speciﬁcations
for capturing time-variation in parameters. A ﬁrst, simpler, alternative would be to use
step functions. A disadvantage of the step function approach is that it generates unlikely
jumps between consecutive time periods. Moreover, it introduces the challenge of choosing
the number of periods and optimizing period lengths, because assuming them to be equal
in length may be too restrictive. A second alternative is to use spline functions instead
of the ﬂexible Fourier form. Also here a challenge is that of ﬁnding the right number of
knots for the spline and the precise knot locations.
In this time-varying setting, we can evaluate the eﬀect of changes in the innovation
and noise variances on the information shares using Eq. (2.8). An increase in the inno-
vation variance σ2r boosts all information shares. Therefore both individual information
shares and the total explanatory power of observed trading venues are ampliﬁed. By
contrast, an increase in the noise variance ω2i,t of the asset’s price on exchange i reduces
the corresponding information share as well as the sum of all information shares, while
increasing the shares of exchanges other than i.
Finally, introducing time-variation in the error variances as in Eq. (2.14) obviously
implies that we can no longer use the GMM approach of De Jong and Schotman (2010) to
estimate the model parameters. The model, however, still keeps its state space represen-
tation, albeit with time-varying variances, and as such we can obtain parameter estimates
by means of ML combined with Kalman ﬁltering.
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2.2.4 Testing for intraday variation
In this section we provide a methodology to statistically test the existence of intraday
variation in price discovery. We propose a Likelihood Ratio test where the constant price
discovery model is a restricted version of the model with time-variation. In particular, the
restricted model has a constant ratio of noise and innovation variances, while this ratio
can vary in the unrestricted model. Lastly, we show how this test can be used to check for
constancy of information shares during speciﬁc parts of the day by deﬁning the intraday
patterns of noise and innovation variances as a concatenation of multiple ﬂexible Fourier
patterns.
Given the deﬁnition of information shares in Eq. (2.8), the constancy of the infor-
mation shares implies that the shares at time t are equal to the shares at time s, for all
s, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , that is, ISi,t = ISi,s, for all i = 1, . . . , N . Cancelling out the constant
terms this equality reduces to
ω2i,s/σ
2
,s +
N∑
j=1
(
ω2i,s/ω
2
j,s
) (1 + αj)2
1 +
∑Q
j=1 ψ
2
i,j
= ω2i,t/σ
2
,t +
N∑
j=1
(
ω2i,t/ω
2
j,t
) (1 + αj)2
1 +
∑Q
j=1 ψ
2
i,j
.
A straightforward and economically intuitive restriction in order to satisfy this equality
is to make the ratio of all variance terms constant across time points. Then the equality
will hold, since the only time-varying elements are the variance ratio terms ω2i,·/σ
2
,· and
ω2i,·/ω
2
j,·. This restriction can be imposed in the model by equating all polynomial and
ﬂexible Fourier parameters in Eq. (2.14), i.e. θi,p, δi,q and φi,q, to be identical across noise
and innovation variances, while allowing the variances to diﬀer by their constant terms
ci which provide the relative magnitudes. Thus the constant information shares case can
be formulated as a restricted version of the time-varying case, allowing for a Likelihood
Ratio test to assess this restriction.
As an extension of the above, we may also be interested in testing the constancy of
information shares during a speciﬁc part of the day, while allowing for time-variation
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during other parts. For this purpose, we can specify the time-varying variance processes
using a concatenation of multiple ﬂexible Fourier forms, as follows. Suppose the trading
day is divided into H parts, with the hth part containing Th time points. The speciﬁcation
in Eq. (2.14) can then be extended to deﬁne the variance i at time point th = 1, . . . , Th
as
ζ2i,h,th = exp
⎛
⎝ci,h +
Pi,h∑
p=1
θi,h,p
(
th
Th
)p
+
Qi,h∑
q=1
(
δi,h,q cos
(
2πqth
Th
)
+ φi,h,q sin
(
2πqth
Th
))⎞⎠
(2.15)
and the whole process across intervals is deﬁned as
ζ2i,t = ζ
2
i,h,th
for
h−1∑
j=0
Tj + 1 ≤ t ≤
h∑
j=0
Tj and th = t−
h−1∑
j=0
Tj,
where t = 1, ...,
∑H
j=0 Tj and T0 = 0. Note, however, that using multiple ﬂexible Fourier
patterns may result in undesired jumps in the variance at the points of concatenation.
To ensure continuity, the value of the variance at the terminal time point of the interval
k, tk = Tk, should be equal to the value at the period before the start of period k + 1,
tk+1 = 0. Using that cos(2xπ) = 1 and sin(2xπ) = 0 for all integers x, these values are
equal to
ζ2i,k,Tk = exp
⎛
⎝ci,k + Pk∑
p=1
θi,k,p +
Qi,k∑
q=1
δi,k,q
⎞
⎠
and
ζ2i,k+1,0 = exp
⎛
⎝ci,k+1 +
Qi,k+1∑
q=1
δi,k+1,q
⎞
⎠ .
Equating these two values we get an expression for ci,k+1 in terms of the other param-
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eters:
ci,k+1 = ci,k +
Pi,k∑
p=1
θi,k,p +
Qi,k∑
q=1
δi,k,q −
Qi,k+1∑
q=1
δi,k+1,q.
Thus making the constant terms after the ﬁrst period a function of other parameters
rather than parameters to be estimated separately ensures the continuity of the generated
intraday variance patterns.
2.3 Simulation study
In this section we provide simulation evidence for the ability of the proposed model-
ing framework to capture intraday variation in price discovery. Section 2.3.1 compares
GMM and state space ML results for the case without time-variation. In Section 2.3.2
we consider a data generating process (DGP) with time-varying information shares and
examine to what extent our model is able to detect such time-variation.5 Lastly, Section
2.3.3 explores various parameter conﬁgurations and the case where the DGP diﬀers from
the model that is actually estimated.
2.3.1 Comparison of GMM and state space ML methods
We design our simulations and choose parameter values in the DGP to mimic an
empirical setting in order to demonstrate the relevance of our results for empirical work.
As a benchmark case, we simulate observed prices of three trading venues and a latent
price process over 100 days with 391 intraday observations using Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2).
This corresponds to data sampled at a 1-minute frequency for a trading day between
9:30h and 16:00h. We take the noise covariance matrix Ω and the matrix of lagged noise
5Unlike our empirical study, we use three instead of four trading venues in the benchmark case of
the simulation study to alleviate the computational burden and present the results for the case with
four venues as a variation. The benchmark case with two dominant venues and a third venue with a
smaller share captures the close competition of NYSE and NASDAQ sidelining the other exchanges in
our empirical study.
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coeﬃcients Ψ as diagonal. The innovation variance σ2r is equal to 0.816, while the noise
variances in Ω take considerably smaller values of 0.016, 0.012 and 0.107. The elements of
the vector α have small negative magnitudes of −0.008, −0.022 and −0.006, such that the
eﬃcient price innovations are almost but not fully incorporated into the observed prices
in each period. Lastly, the diagonal elements of the Ψ matrix are set to 0.172, 0.087,
and 0.270, implying a modest degree of autocorrelation in observed price changes. We
generate 100 replications of these three observed price series and apply both estimation
methods using the true parameters as initial values.
Panel A of Table 2.1 compares the true information shares and the estimates obtained
with both GMM and the state space ML methods. The parameter settings of the DGP
imply that the second venue leads price discovery with a 53.9% information share. This
is followed by the ﬁrst venue with a share of 39.5%, while the third venue is much less
important with a 5.8% information share. The results show that on average both the
GMM and the state space ML methods provide fairly accurate estimates of the information
shares. At the same time, the state space ML method performs quite a bit better. The
mean estimates are close to the true values, with a maximum diﬀerence of 0.8% for the
GMM and only 0.2% for the state space ML case. Likewise, the estimates do not show
much variation across simulations, with the maximum standard deviation at 1.5% for
GMM and 1% for the state space ML method. The same conclusion also follows from
Panel B of Table 2.1, showing the average and standard deviations of the root mean
squared error (RMSE) for the model parameters and the three information shares. While
the average RMSEs are quite small for both methods, the state space ML approach shows
superior performance with a mean RMSE of 0.7% compared to 1.2% for GMM.
2.3.2 Capturing time-variation with the state space ML method
We now advance to testing our state space ML approach in the measurement of in-
traday variation in price discovery. Following Section 2.2.3, we allow for variation in the
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Table 2.1. Simulation Results of the GMM and State Space ML Methods in
the Constant Case Benchmark
The table shows summary statistics of the simulation results for the GMM and state space ML methods
with constant innovation and noise variances. Three stock series are generated for 100 days, each with 391
observations, using the unobserved components model of Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2). Panel A reports the
summary statistics for each information share. The ﬁrst column denotes the information shares for each
of the simulated stocks calculated using the data generating process (DGP) parameter values. For each
of the information share estimates the mean and standard deviations over all simulations are given. The
results are based on 100 simulations from the corresponding data generating process. Panel B provides a
more concise summary of the information share results and also provides information for the parameter
estimates. The presented data consists of the means (RMSE) and of the standard deviations (SD) of
root mean squared errors of the parameter estimates and the information shares. The results are based
on 100 simulations from the corresponding data generating process.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Information Share Estimates
DGP
GMM ML
Mean SD Mean SD
IS1 39.5 38.7 1.5 39.3 0.9
IS2 53.9 54.6 1.5 54.1 1.0
IS3 5.8 5.9 0.1 5.8 0.1
Panel B: General Summary Statistics
Parameters Information Shares
RMSE SD RMSE SD
ML 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.5
GMM 2.2 0.7 1.2 0.9
innovation and noise variances with the same pattern repeating each day. As before prices
for three trading venues are simulated for 100 days with 391 intraday observations. The
variances now ﬂuctuate following a ﬂexible Fourier form complemented with a polyno-
mial function, as given in Eq. (2.14). In the benchmark DGP, each variance speciﬁcation
consists of 10 ﬂexible Fourier sets and a polynomial of order 1. For brevity, we do not
report all parameter settings of the polynomials and ﬂexible Fourier sets, which have 94
parameters in total, displayed in Table 2.2. The mean of the innovation variance process
σ2r,t is 0.810 and the mean of noise variances in Ωt have smaller values of 0.019, 0.009 and
0.103. We take the noise covariance matrix Ωt and the matrix of lagged noise coeﬃcients
Ψ as diagonal like in the constant case. The diagonal elements of the Ψ matrix are 0.142,
0.122, and 0.210. Finally, the elements of the vector α again have small magnitudes of
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−0.01, −0.02 and −0.005. We now consider 25 replications, due to the additional com-
putation burden of the time-varying system with a large number of parameters and the
great amount of variations in settings we consider.
Table 2.2. Parameter Values for the Simulation Study
The table shows the parameter values for the time-varying model consisting of Eq. (2.1), Eq. (2.2) and
Eq. (2.14). The ﬁrst three columns give the parameter estimates for the respective exchange groups and
the fourth one refers to the process of the innovation variance σ2r . These are based on our estimations
using the Expedia stock data from July 2 until December 28, 2007.
NYSE NASDAQ REST
α -0.01029 -0.01961 -0.00508
Ψ 0.14194 0.12194 0.20984
ω21 ω
2
2 ω
2
3 σ
2
r
c 0.26570 -4.84778 -4.20136 -3.78099
θ1 -1.04352 1.57777 -2.89436 2.14248
δ1 0.48992 0.18142 -0.15738 -0.01820
φ1 -0.15776 0.59546 -0.37510 0.39463
δ2 0.12751 0.20959 -0.99779 0.30418
φ2 -0.00771 0.40373 -0.48992 0.63969
δ3 0.11698 0.33646 -1.15124 0.65764
φ3 0.09574 0.36646 0.62914 0.58655
δ4 0.10419 0.04929 -0.07339 0.21477
φ4 0.00502 0.26494 -0.28529 0.17648
δ5 0.04638 0.08667 -0.65573 0.48870
φ5 0.00831 0.02683 0.82151 -0.25795
δ6 0.01485 0.05297 -0.25810 -0.29911
φ6 -0.02557 0.19182 -0.14621 0.33802
δ7 0.01605 0.06739 -0.31784 0.26243
φ7 0.02305 0.19266 0.02455 0.26765
δ8 0.09063 -0.04767 -0.08683 0.24235
φ8 -0.01191 0.11695 0.80992 -0.03020
δ9 0.02632 0.01917 0.10254 0.17797
φ9 0.01017 0.20337 -0.71649 0.28193
δ10 0.02792 0.02218 -0.14725 0.03293
φ10 -0.03748 0.16085 0.36835 0.08079
Figure 2.1 displays the true intraday information shares as implied by the parame-
ter settings in the DGP (solid line), as well as the average estimates (dashed line), and
minimum and maximum estimates (thin solid lines) across the 25 replications. The mean
estimates are close to the true information shares throughout the entire day. Subtract-
ing the mean estimates from the true information share values at each time point and
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averaging the absolute values of these diﬀerences, we ﬁnd a rather small mean absolute
diﬀerence of 0.2%. The mean absolute diﬀerence of the lowest and highest estimates from
the true values is also modest at 2.8%.
We evaluate a number of variations in the DGP settings, with results shown in Table
2.3. Speciﬁcally, we consider varying the number of days in the sample, the number of
observations per day (the observation frequency), the number of series, the number of
ﬂexible Fourier (FF) sets, and the polynomial order. We mainly focus on lowering the
number of available observations in terms of the number of days and intraday observations,
because this is the direction where the results tend to worsen. Also an intraday pattern can
be just temporary and we would like to capture it from as little observations as possible.
In terms of the variance speciﬁcations we mostly investigate cases with more ﬂexible
Fourier sets and higher polynomial degrees, since this shows if the estimation procedure
can handle a large number of parameters. The number of series under consideration
reﬂects the usual amount of asset/exchange groups used in the literature. As in Panel
B of Table 2.1, we present means and standard deviations of RMSE’s for the parameter
estimates and the information share estimates.
First consider the RMSE results of the benchmark case, corresponding to the informa-
tion shares of Figure 2.1, to provide a context to evaluate the variations in Table 2.3. The
information shares have a mean RMSE of 1.3% with a standard deviation of 1.0%. We
observe an expected but limited decline of estimation accuracy compared to the constant
case of Section 2.3.1, where the mean RMSE is 0.7% with a standard deviation of 0.5%.
Table 2.3 shows that a decrease in the amount of data has only a limited worsening
eﬀect on the information share estimates. Reducing the number of days from 100 to 10
increases the mean RMSE of the information shares from 1.3% to 5.8%. Likewise reducing
the number of intraday observations from 771 to 71 raises the mean RMSE from 0.9%
to 4.4%. These results suggest that our method can still eﬀectively capture intraday
patterns even with a limited amount of data. Similarly, estimation results improve with
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Fig. 2.1. Simulation Results from the Benchmark Case of the Time-Varying Model
The ﬁgure shows summary statistics of the simulation results for information shares achieved by the state
space ML method with time-varying innovation and noise variances in the ﬂexible Fourier form. Three
stock series are generated for 100 days, each with 391 intraday observations. Each ﬁgure displays for the
corresponding simulated trading venue the true values, mean estimates and the upper and lower bounds
containing all the estimates of information shares. The results are based on 25 simulations.
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Table 2.3. Simulation Results of the Time-Varying Model
The table shows summary statistics of the simulation results from the state space ML method with time-
varying innovation and noise variances. In the benchmark case, we consider a ﬂexible Fourier type model
on innovation and noise variances with 20 sets, a polynomial of order one, 3 trading venues, 100 days and
with 391 observations. In the second column, the parameter setups corresponding to this benchmark case
are emboldened. In the ﬁrst column from top to bottom respectively the number of days, observations
per period, trading venues, the ﬂexible Fourier sets and the polynomial order are varied keeping others
constant. The presented data consists of the means (RMSE) and of the standard deviations (SD) of root
mean squared errors of the parameter estimates and the information shares. The results are based on 25
simulations from the corresponding data generating process.
Parameters Information Shares
RMSE SD RMSE SD
Days 10 10.5 10.1 5.8 4.1
25 4.6 3.7 3.1 2.2
50 3.2 2.5 2.2 1.6
100 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
Intraday Obs. 71 16.2 9.3 4.4 3.1
191 3.0 2.0 2.4 1.7
391 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
771 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6
Series 2 2.7 1.4 3.7 2.4
3 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
4 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.6
5 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.5
FF Sets 5 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.6
10 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
15 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2
20 2.7 2.8 1.8 1.4
Poly. Order 1 1.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
2 1.5 0.7 1.3 0.9
3 1.9 1.0 1.6 1.5
4 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.8
the number of observed price series. An increase from 2 to 5 series reduces the mean
RMSE’s from 3.7% to 0.6%.
Adding more ﬂexible Fourier sets or increasing the polynomial order in the variance
speciﬁcations increases both the complexity of the pattern to be estimated and the esti-
mation uncertainty, but this has only a weakly worsening eﬀect on estimation accuracy.
The increase of the polynomial order from 1 to 4 adds 12 parameters, but the mean infor-
mation share RMSE rises only from 1.3% to 2.0%. Similarly, the increase of the Fourier
sets from 5 to 20 adds a far larger number of 120 parameters, yet the RMSE increases
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only from 0.9% to 1.8%.
Table 2.4 explores three types of parameter value setups under the benchmark Fourier
model. In the ﬁrst setup, we magnify or shrink the noise variances, keeping the innovation
variances constant. In the benchmark case, the mean innovation variance is 18.3 times
higher than the mean noise variance. While a 10-fold shrinkage of the noise leads to a
nearly equal drop in the mean RMSE of the information shares, increase of noise has
a far less dramatic eﬀect. The mean RMSE remains nearly constant with 7.8% for the
benchmark opposed to 6.3% and 8.7% for 10-fold and 100-fold magniﬁcations, respectively.
However the standard deviations of RMSE’s increase from 5.6% to 20.3% and 26.7%,
signaling a wider distribution of RMSE’s across simulated data sets.
Table 2.4. Simulation Results with Parameter Variation
The table shows summary statistics of the simulation results for parameter variation using the ﬂexible
Fourier model as the data-generating and estimation model. We vary the ratio of the noise variances
to the innovation variance, the values of the correlation vector α, and the degree of ﬂuctuations in the
intraday patterns. We use the estimated from the empirical study, unless stated otherwise. The variation
in noise-innovation ratio is done by multiplying the empirical noise patterns by a given number. In the
benchmark case, denoted in the table as ”×1” the ratio of the mean noise to the mean innovation is 18.3.
In the α variation case we report below the assigned values to respectively the NYSE, the NASDAQ and
the REST group. In these two cases, the parameter setups corresponding to this benchmark case are
emboldened. We play with the amount of ﬂuctuations in the data by simulating the parameters of the
ﬂexible Fourier sets from uniform distribution with four diﬀerent ranges. The ﬂexible Fourier model we
use has 10 sets, observed through 3 securities over 100 days, each with 391 observations. The summary
statistics consist of the means (RMSE) and of the standard deviations (SD) of root mean squared errors
of the parameter estimates and the information shares. The results are based on 25 simulations from the
corresponding data generating process.
Parameters Information Shares
RMSE SD RMSE SD
Noise ×0.1 0.396 0.226 0.006 0.064
×1 0.118 0.268 0.078 0.056
×10 1.075 0.245 0.063 0.203
×100 43.918 1.325 0.087 0.267
α -0.01, -0.02, -0.05 0.118 0.268 0.078 0.056
-0.50, -0.50, -0.50 0.200 0.140 0.050 0.192
-0.90, 0.00, -0.90 0.139 0.128 0.000 0.003
-0.90, -0.90, 0.00 0.149 0.148 0.025 0.145
FF U[-0.1,0.1] 0.131 0.165 0.024 0.138
U[-0.5,0.5] 0.096 0.166 0.008 0.080
U[-1,1] 7.909 0.528 0.028 0.131
U[-2,2] 62.226 2.147 0.092 0.256
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The second setup displayed in Table 2.4 looks at the correlation terms of innovation
and noise variances, α. The slightly negative values of the α elements in the benchmark
case mean that a little less than the full latent price innovation is incorporated into the
observed security prices at each time point. We do not observe a sizable drop in accuracy,
if half of the latent price innovation is hidden from observed prices by halving α values.
To examine the interaction between noise and α values, we couple a high α with a low
and then with a high noise level. In each case, the high α value is zero, while the others
are set to -0.9. Both combinations lead to a dramatic improvement in the accuracy of
information share estimates, the low noise being better than the high. However in both
cases the parameter RMSPE statistics remain close to benchmark levels, signaling that
the clear dominance these combinations assign to one market is the main driver behind
the improvement. Even if the parameter estimates vary as much as in the benchmark case,
all variations give the full information share to one market, leading to high accuracy and
low variation in information share results. Therefore we can conclude that the parameter
estimates are not aﬀected by variations in α, although the resulting information share
estimates tend to improve when one market attains a clear lead over others.
In the last panel of Table 2.4 we examine eﬀect of the complexity of intraday variations.
We use the ﬂexible Fourier coeﬃcients δ and ψ to play with the level of ﬂuctuations.
Generating the values of these coeﬃcients used in the data generating process from a
uniform distribution with a wider support increases the intraday variation. The coeﬃcient
values of the benchmark are close to results from a support of [−0.5, 1]. Higher complexity
impairs the accuracy to a limited degree, as the widest support of [−2, 2] has a mean
RMSE of only 9.2% compared to 2.8% for [−1, 1] and 7.8% of the benchmark. Estimates
from the set-up with wider supports, which arguably lead also to unreasonable amounts
of intraday variation, do not converge in most cases.
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2.3.3 Capturing time-variation with a misspeciﬁed model
In this last part of our simulation study, we consider the eﬀects of diﬀerences between
speciﬁcations of the DGP and the model that is actually estimated. Firstly, we estimate
DGP’s with variances following a ﬂexible Fourier form using models in the same form, but
with correct and incorrect numbers of Fourier sets. Secondly, we introduce a state space
model with a step function speciﬁcation for the time-variation in variances and compare
the estimation accuracy across models with and without time-varying variances.
Table 2.5 displays the mean RMSE’s of the information shares under various cases
where the DGP diﬀers from the model. Panel A demonstrates that intraday variation in
the error variances can be quite accurately captured as long as the number of Fourier sets
in the model is at least as large as that of the DGP. We report nine setups with 5, 10 and
15 Fourier sets. For example, in the ﬁrst row of the table we consider data generated using
a ﬂexible Fourier speciﬁcation for the variances with 5 sets, and the columns represent
the RMSE of the information shares in models with 5, 10 and 15 ﬂexible Fourier sets,
respectively. The mean RMSE’s are below 8% as long as the estimation model uses an
equal or larger number of Fourier sets compared to the DGP. The model with 15 Fourier
sets has low mean RMSE’s of 2.8%, 3.0%, and 5.6% for DGP’s with respectively 5, 10
and 15 sets.
In practice, selecting the number of Fourier sets is an important part of the model
speciﬁcation. Here we examine the usefulness of the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)
for this purpose. We ﬁnd the SIC to be quite accurate, albeit having a small tendency
towards overﬁtting. For each simulation with a DGP containing 5, 10 or 15 Fourier sets,
we record the number of Fourier sets in the estimation model preferred by the Schwarz
criterion and report its mean across simulations in the last column of Panel A of Table 2.5.
The biggest diﬀerence between the number of parameters in the DGP and the estimation
model occurs for the case with 5 Fourier sets where on average 6.1 sets are selected by
the Schwarz criterion. The diﬀerence is even smaller for the other two cases: On average
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Table 2.5. Simulation Results for Misspeciﬁed Models
The table shows summary statistics of the simulation results for cases where the data generating process
(DGP) does not necessarily correspond to the estimation model. The settings of the DGP’s are given in
the leftmost column and those of the estimation models in the top row. In Panel A both the DGP and
the estimation model are of ﬂexible Fourier type, but have diﬀerent numbers of Fourier sets. Panel B
reports results for three DGP’s, where variances are modeled as a constant, as a 20-period step function
(SF), and as a Fourier model with 10 sets and a polynomial of order one (FF). These are estimated using
the GMM method for the constant case and using ML for three state space models, i.e. constant, step
function with 20 periods (SF) and Fourier with 10 sets and a polynomial of order one (FF). In each case
25 data sets are generated from the DGP and for each data sets the estimation model is started for 10
trials with random initial values. All simulated data sets span 100 days with 391 intraday observations
for 3 price series. On the rightmost column in Panel A we report the mean of the number of Fourier sets
preferred by the Schwarz criterion across simulations with DGPs of 5, 10 or 15 Fourier sets. The rest of
the presented numbers are the means of root mean squared errors of the information shares.
Panel A: Flexible Fourier with diﬀerent numbers of sets
Estimated Model Preferred
5 10 15 FF Num.
DGP 5 1.4 3.5 2.8 6.1
10 16.1 7.8 3.0 10.0
15 26.9 22.0 5.6 15.4
Panel B: Estimations across models
Estimated Model
Constant Time-Varying
GMM ML SF FF
DGP Constant 31.9 18.5 17.3 16.1
Time-Varying – SF 58.7 21.5 2.7 3.2
Time-Varying – FF 52.3 31.5 15.0 7.8
15.4 sets are preferred for the DGP with 15 Fourier sets and in all simulations the correct
number of parameters are chosen for the DGP with 10 sets.
Note that, in contrast to the previous sections we now use random parameter values
instead of the true ones to initialize the numerical likelihood optimization, because no
true initial values exist when the DGP and the model diﬀer. In order to guard against
the possibility of ending up in a local maximum of the likelihood function, we consider ten
diﬀerent sets of starting values for each replication.6 The eﬀect of using random initial
values instead of true ones can be observed from the results for the case where both the
6The initial values are drawn from a uniform distribution. The support is [-1, 1] for the elements of
α, [0, 1] for the elements of Ψ considering the positive autocorrelation of the data, and [-2, 2] for the
parameters of the ﬂexible Fourier form. The log innovation variances of the step function and constant
models have a support of [0, 2] and the log noise variances [-5, 0].
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DGP and the model have 10 Fourier sets, as this corresponds with the situation considered
in Section 2.3.2. The mean RMSE of the information shares increases from 1.3% using
true initial values to a substantially higher 7.8% for random initial values.
Panel B of Table 2.5 considers three diﬀerent DGP’s, namely a constant model, a step
function model and the ﬂexible Fourier model. For each DGP, we use GMM to estimate
a model with constant information shares, and the state space ML method to estimate
models with constant, step function and ﬂexible Fourier speciﬁcations for the variances.
We use the step function model as a simpler functional form for time-variation, where the
noise and innovation variances stay at diﬀerent constant levels for 20 periods per day.
The estimation models without time-variation display a low accuracy even for DGP’s
of their own kind. Whereas in Section 2.3.1 the GMM and the state space ML methods
have similar levels of accuracy in the case of no time-variation, the use of random initial
values gives a lead to the state space ML method with a mean information share RMSE
of 18.5% to 31.9%. The step function and Fourier models have even better results at
estimating the DGP without time variation giving mean information share RMSE’s of
17.3% and 16.1%, respectively.
The performance diﬀerence between the GMM and the state space ML methods widens
under time-varying DGP’s, although both constant estimation models are incapable of
fully capturing such patterns.7 The Fourier model can capture time-varying patterns
relatively better than the step function. Both the Fourier and the step function models
have low mean RMSE’s at estimating the step function DGP, with respectively 3.2% to
2.7%. However under the Fourier DGP, the Fourier model’s 7.8% mean RMSE is nearly
the half of the 15.0% mean RMSE of the step function.
7Part of the favorable performance of our methodology comes from the superiority of the ML estimation
over GMM when the estimation model is correctly speciﬁed. However the constant state space ML
estimates remain considerably more accurate than the GMM estimates even if the model is misspeciﬁed,
i.e. the DGP has time-varying variances and the estimation model has constant ones.
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2.4 Intraday variation of price discovery in S&P 500 stocks
We apply our methodology in an empirical setting involving prices of 50 S&P 500 stocks
observed at diﬀerent trading venues during the second half of 2013. Section 2.4.1 presents
some key properties of the data. Section 2.4.2 discusses the results from the state space
ML method. Section 2.4.3 investigates the stock- and exchange-speciﬁc determinants of
the intraday variation of the information shares.
2.4.1 Data and summary statistics
We examine the prices of S&P 500 stocks over 124 trading days from July 1 until
December 31, 2013. The stocks trade from 9:30h to 16:00h (New York time) at a number
of exchanges. Our high-frequency data set consists of all quotes on all these exchanges, as
obtained from the Trades And Quotes (TAQ) database. We use the midquote prices to
avoid the bid-ask bounce present in transaction prices. The TAQ database time-stamps
the quotes to the nearest second. We sample the data at the 1-minute frequency by using
the midquote at the end of each minute.
We use a selection procedure based on market capitalization in order to obtain a
representative sample of 50 stocks. We rank the constituents of the S&P 500 index on
December 31st 2013 according to their market capitalizations and select the stocks ranked
1st, 11th, 21st etc. In case of problems related to data availability or estimation, we
check the stock with the nearest market capitalization. This procedure provides us a
representative sample of 50 stocks not only in terms of size, but also concerning other
characteristics. Our sample has 38 NYSE-listed stocks, while the number of NYSE-listed
stocks in the S&P 500 index is 39.1 when the total number of stocks in the index is scaled
to 50. The sectoral distribution of ﬁrms in our sample is similarly close to that of all
index constituents for the seven sectors in our sample: Manufacturing (22 in our sample
vs 20.0 in the index), Utilities (8 vs 6.4), Finance (6 vs 8.3), Services (6 vs 5.7), Trade
(5 vs 5.5), Mining (2 vs 3.0) and Construction (1 vs 0.7). Table 2.6 reports the market
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capitalization, industrial classiﬁcation and the exchange listing of the 50 stocks we have
chosen from the S&P 500 index.
Next, we arrange the data into groups according to quote origin. This aggregation
of individual exchanges into groups aids both the model parsimony in estimation and
the interpretation of the results. We consider the four biggest exchange groups and the
remaining regional exchanges at the time: NYSE (TAQ codes A, N and P), NASDAQ
(TAQ codes B, Q, T and X), BATS (TAQ codes Y and Z), Direct Edge (TAQ codes J and
K) and the remaining exchanges (TAQ codes C, I, M and W). We generate the midquote
sequences at the 1-minute frequency for each exchange and pick the one with the smallest
bid-ask spread at the end of the sampling interval as the midquote of the exchange group.
For example in the case of the NYSE group, we generate the midquote sequence of each
of the three exchanges with codes A, N and P and pick the midquote of the exchange with
the smallest spread at the end of each minute as the midquote of the NYSE exchange
group.8 The last exchange group consisting of small regional exchanges hosts only 2.1%
of the total trade volume for our sample, as can be seen in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, and in
preliminary information share analyses generated expectedly dismal results even below
their share in the trade activity. Therefore we excluded them from the study.
Table 2.7 reports the averages of the number of trades and trade volumes for each
of the 50 stocks and Table 2.8 provides these statistics for various stock groups. For
all stocks, the leading market share in the number of trades and trade volumes belongs
to either NYSE or NASDAQ. In terms of trade volumes the exchange with the highest
market share is always the exchange where the stock is listed. However NASDAQ has a
higher number of trades than NYSE for 16 out of 38 NYSE-listed stocks, while leading
8An alternative method is picking the highest best bid and the lowest best ask of the group exchanges
and computing their midquote as the group midquote. However in our study this method led to a
considerable amount of cases where the best bid is higher than the best ask due to the price staleness at
some of the exchanges. Therefore we opted to pick the midquote corresponding to the smallest spread,
which ensures a non-negative spread and usually belongs the more liquid and thus more frequently
updated exchanges. Both the smallness of the spread and proximity of the most recent quote update
enhance the precision of the midquote itself.
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Table 2.6. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for 50 constituents of the S&P 500 index on December 31st, 2013.
Ticker Symbol Company Name Market Cap Listing Industry
AAPL Apple Inc 500,680,634 NASDAQ Manufacturing
ADBE Adobe Systems Inc 29,715,612 NASDAQ Services
ADT A D T Corp 8,165,389 NYSE Services
AEE Ameren Corp 8,773,682 NYSE Utilities
AIG American International Group Inc 75,163,263 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
AKAM Akamai Technologies Inc 8,425,452 NASDAQ Services
ATI Allegheny Technologies 3,847,399 NYSE Manufacturing
BK Bank of New York Mellon Corp 40,129,359 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
CA C A Inc 14,912,704 NASDAQ Services
CL Colgate Palmolive Co 60,332,879 NYSE Manufacturing
CMI Cummins Inc 26,412,703 NYSE Manufacturing
COP Conocophillips 86,553,244 NYSE Manufacturing
CTL Centurylink Inc 18,825,611 NYSE Utilities
DO Diamond Oﬀshore Drilling Inc 7,913,872 NYSE Mining
DPS Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc 9,775,327 NYSE Manufacturing
DTE D T E Energy Co 11,737,553 NYSE Utilities
FDO Family Dollar Stores Inc 7,391,052 NYSE Retail Trade
FDX Fedex Corp 44,889,020 NYSE Utilities
FIS Fidelity National Info Svcs Inc 15,628,019 NYSE Services
FLIR Flir Systems Inc 4,237,538 NASDAQ Manufacturing
GT Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co 5,914,800 NASDAQ Manufacturing
IP International Paper Co 21,750,836 NYSE Manufacturing
IVZ Invesco Ltd 16,135,392 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
JCI Johnson Controls Inc 34,738,103 NYSE Construction
JPM JP Morgan Chase & Co 219,837,373 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
KMX Carmax Inc 10,496,181 NYSE Retail Trade
KR Kroger Company 20,418,273 NYSE Retail Trade
LOW Lowes Companies Inc 51,820,827 NYSE Retail Trade
MJN Mead Johnson Nutrition Co 16,918,264 NYSE Manufacturing
MOS Mosaic Company New 14,049,637 NYSE Manufacturing
MRO Marathon Oil Corp 24,591,180 NYSE Manufacturing
MSI Motorola Solutions Inc 17,463,128 NYSE Manufacturing
MU Micron Technology Inc 23,011,500 NASDAQ Manufacturing
MWV Meadwestvaco Corp 6,569,108 NYSE Manufacturing
NKE Nike Inc 55,959,988 NYSE Manufacturing
NRG N R G Energy Inc 9,288,508 NYSE Utilities
OKE Oneok Inc New 12,826,926 NYSE Utilities
ORLY O Reilly Automotive Inc New 13,635,538 NASDAQ Retail Trade
PM Philip Morris International Inc 139,596,724 NYSE Manufacturing
POM Pepco Holdings Inc 4,777,851 NYSE Utilities
QEP Q E P Resources Inc 5,494,963 NYSE Mining
SIAL Sigma Aldrich Corp 11,187,190 NASDAQ Manufacturing
SYMC Symantec Corp 16,306,843 NASDAQ Services
TRV Travelers Companies Inc 32,962,717 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
TWC Time Warner Cable Inc 38,196,095 NYSE Utilities
UTX United Technologies Corp 104,420,832 NYSE Manufacturing
VLO Valero Energy Corp New 27,193,925 NYSE Manufacturing
WY Weyerhaeuser Co 18,397,607 NYSE Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
XLNX Xilinx Inc 12,253,982 NASDAQ Manufacturing
XRAY Dentsply International Inc New 6,898,704 NASDAQ Manufacturing
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Table 2.7. Summary Statistics of Trading Activity
This table reports summary statistics of the trading activity in ﬁve exchange groups for the period of
July-December 2013. We provide the mean number of trades and trade volumes and their distribution
across the exchange groups for 50 S&P 500 stocks.
Ticker Ann. Number of Trades Trade Volume
Symbol Return Total. NYSE NSDQ BATS DE Rest Total. NYSE NSDQ BATS DE Rest
AAPL 86.0 49,530 21.5 43.6 14.6 19.4 0.9 7,007,650 20.4 42.5 12.6 21.2 3.4
ADBE 58.1 16,121 32.1 30.5 19.2 17.2 1.0 2,298,914 42.5 26.2 15.4 14.8 1.2
ADT 49.8 16,057 26.5 30.4 27.1 14.7 1.3 3,031,996 43.1 24.1 20.2 11.5 1.0
AEE 25.9 15,235 29.3 34.0 18.9 16.2 1.6 2,578,035 43.1 27.9 13.9 13.6 1.6
AIG 23.7 52,741 24.2 36.5 22.7 15.3 1.2 11,134,156 37.8 30.2 15.9 13.5 2.6
AKAM -0.9 18,427 37.4 30.2 14.2 17.3 1.0 2,875,779 49.2 24.1 10.8 14.9 1.1
ATI 43.4 13,010 33.6 30.3 13.9 21.5 0.7 1,785,250 43.3 26.1 11.3 18.4 0.8
BK 26.2 12,503 38.1 31.4 14.3 15.0 1.2 1,878,909 49.9 25.7 10.7 12.7 1.0
CA 108.9 11,512 37.0 33.6 12.8 15.9 0.7 1,532,132 42.1 29.9 11.1 15.3 1.6
CL 48.1 10,746 37.6 32.9 12.5 16.2 0.8 1,410,731 41.7 29.3 10.7 15.0 3.2
CMI 129.5 70,916 15.5 34.9 25.7 22.6 1.3 25,138,135 14.9 39.8 23.0 19.5 2.7
COP 66.4 16,236 17.0 45.7 18.9 16.9 1.5 2,303,065 15.5 50.5 16.4 16.0 1.6
CTL 29.5 13,450 29.9 31.3 22.0 15.2 1.5 2,272,877 45.6 24.6 16.1 12.5 1.2
DO 61.9 7,145 41.4 28.1 11.8 18.0 0.7 899,407 46.3 24.5 10.1 18.1 0.9
DPS -17.6 15,324 25.6 33.9 21.8 17.0 1.7 2,744,866 39.8 27.9 15.4 15.3 1.6
DTE 11.0 8,364 38.0 30.8 12.9 17.3 0.9 1,062,110 43.7 27.8 11.4 16.0 1.1
FDO 30.8 14,246 32.3 32.4 20.2 13.5 1.7 2,281,533 44.0 27.6 15.7 11.3 1.3
FDX -21.2 20,077 31.1 30.0 14.6 23.0 1.3 3,345,721 40.0 25.4 11.0 20.0 3.6
FIS 35.0 7,977 35.5 31.3 15.7 16.2 1.3 1,098,794 43.7 26.8 12.6 14.6 2.4
FLIR 10.1 5,503 30.9 32.1 12.5 22.6 1.9 717,349 38.9 28.5 10.5 20.5 1.6
GT 1.4 6,163 36.9 32.4 12.6 16.4 1.8 785,354 43.4 28.2 10.7 15.4 2.2
IP 127.5 7,128 37.2 31.8 13.1 16.6 1.3 943,138 43.2 27.3 11.0 15.3 3.1
IVZ 13.2 7,245 28.6 35.3 15.9 19.0 1.2 976,684 37.9 30.4 13.3 17.3 1.1
JCI 19.1 12,703 28.2 35.9 20.9 13.8 1.2 1,985,964 38.7 31.1 16.6 12.4 1.1
JPM 38.0 3,936 15.7 51.1 17.2 14.5 1.4 486,487 14.9 55.0 15.3 13.6 1.2
KMX 0.2 11,258 31.6 32.9 15.2 18.3 1.9 1,642,795 38.4 29.3 12.3 17.2 2.8
KR 20.6 5,064 16.3 49.4 16.8 16.1 1.4 645,865 15.9 52.1 14.8 15.8 1.3
LOW -31.1 6,006 40.7 29.5 12.4 16.3 1.1 767,383 46.1 25.8 10.6 16.4 1.0
MJN 32.6 18,823 32.2 28.5 22.3 16.0 1.0 2,883,464 44.1 23.0 16.8 14.9 1.3
MOS 27.7 33,219 24.7 33.8 24.2 16.1 1.3 6,088,594 34.4 28.0 18.1 16.3 3.3
MRO 44.7 26,485 26.6 35.1 20.9 15.8 1.6 4,352,269 37.1 30.7 16.2 14.3 1.7
MSI 101.9 15,131 30.5 36.9 15.7 15.5 1.4 2,465,498 44.5 29.2 11.8 13.2 1.2
MU 24.2 10,076 35.6 24.1 19.3 20.2 0.7 1,302,009 43.6 21.5 16.3 17.9 0.7
MWV 2.8 20,731 28.8 31.0 22.7 15.9 1.6 3,402,445 42.3 25.2 17.2 13.6 1.7
NKE 17.6 15,033 30.1 35.5 17.1 15.8 1.5 2,241,117 39.8 30.7 13.8 14.2 1.5
NRG 9.8 23,405 14.9 38.2 25.9 19.7 1.3 4,278,350 14.2 43.6 22.9 17.8 1.5
OKE 41.4 11,576 15.5 43.2 26.4 13.6 1.3 1,743,323 14.2 49.3 22.8 12.5 1.2
ORLY 33.6 3,105 16.0 51.7 13.1 18.5 0.7 370,316 15.0 55.2 11.7 17.2 0.9
PM 20.1 9,720 17.0 45.6 18.7 16.9 1.8 1,270,706 16.4 47.7 16.4 17.6 2.0
POM 5.1 6,384 37.7 32.5 12.1 16.6 1.1 832,845 41.7 28.5 10.2 15.4 4.2
QEP 12.8 3,815 38.4 30.8 14.7 14.3 1.7 525,301 48.2 25.9 11.8 12.5 1.6
SIAL 134.3 15,445 19.8 40.4 20.2 18.6 1.1 2,542,583 18.5 44.2 17.1 18.5 1.7
SYMC 82.1 6,953 32.5 30.5 17.0 18.7 1.4 922,754 40.7 26.6 14.0 17.6 1.2
TRV 113.9 28,847 25.7 33.6 21.0 18.2 1.5 4,652,865 35.9 28.7 16.4 17.1 2.0
TWC 25.3 3,681 19.6 52.6 13.3 13.6 0.9 431,667 18.6 54.2 12.0 13.5 1.7
UTX 31.6 14,086 16.9 44.3 23.0 14.5 1.3 1,897,997 16.3 47.9 19.8 14.6 1.4
VLO 1.8 5,297 40.2 30.4 14.1 14.6 0.7 632,983 46.0 26.9 12.2 14.2 0.7
WY 18.1 8,367 34.9 30.5 14.5 18.4 1.7 1,172,442 42.5 25.9 11.6 16.3 3.7
XLNX 51.8 5,007 38.5 29.1 15.0 15.5 1.9 687,741 48.2 24.4 11.9 14.1 1.5
XRAY -6.8 7,044 29.8 28.2 26.8 14.0 1.2 1,216,200 44.9 22.2 19.9 12.0 1.1
37
Table 2.8. Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the trading activity in ﬁve exchange groups for the period of
July-December 2013. We provide the mean number of trades and trade volumes and their distribution
across the exchange groups for various aggregations of our data set of 50 S&P 500 stocks. The second
column reports the number of stocks used for each aggregation group.
Group # Number of Trades Trade Volume
Name Total. NYSE NSDQ BATS DE Rest Total. NYSE NSDQ BATS DE Rest
All 50 14,937 26.6 35.1 19.6 17.5 1.3 2,630,891 31.9 33.1 16.7 16.3 2.1
by Listing:
NYSE-Listed 38 13,688 30.7 32.5 18.8 16.7 1.3 2,195,484 41.0 27.5 14.7 14.9 1.9
NASDAQ-Listed 12 18,892 17.4 40.9 21.3 19.2 1.2 4,009,679 16.0 42.7 20.2 18.7 2.4
by Market Cap:
Market Cap 1 12 23,265 28.1 34.9 19.1 16.7 1.1 3,856,654 37.3 30.0 15.0 15.5 2.2
Market Cap 2 12 19,675 24.6 34.2 21.3 18.6 1.4 4,258,259 27.2 34.5 19.0 17.2 2.1
Market Cap 3 12 10,178 26.1 36.2 19.1 17.2 1.3 1,538,353 29.7 36.1 16.5 15.9 1.9
Market Cap 4 14 7,817 28.0 36.0 17.4 17.1 1.4 1,121,811 33.6 33.9 14.6 16.1 1.9
by Industry:
Manufacturing 22 16,610 25.9 35.1 18.9 18.8 1.2 3,121,782 27.9 34.7 17.3 17.8 2.2
Utilities 8 9,625 32.2 33.2 17.6 15.9 1.2 1,430,337 41.2 28.4 14.2 14.5 1.7
Finance 6 23,596 26.8 33.6 22.6 15.7 1.3 4,402,720 39.0 28.1 16.7 13.9 2.3
Services 6 12,867 19.6 40.1 21.3 17.4 1.5 1,987,663 20.0 43.1 18.8 16.4 1.7
Trade 5 11,233 29.3 34.7 18.7 15.7 1.5 1,735,002 39.4 29.8 14.9 14.0 1.9
Mining 2 7,187 37.4 30.1 13.6 17.5 1.4 969,913 43.9 25.9 11.2 16.3 2.7
Construction 1 15,131 30.5 36.9 15.7 15.5 1.4 2,465,498 44.5 29.2 11.8 13.2 1.2
in all of its 12 listed stocks. While NASDAQ’s 33.1% share in the trade volumes is only
slightly above the 31.9% share of the NYSE, it has a 8.5% lead in terms of the number
of trades.
Figure 2.2 shows the intraday distribution of four market quality measures averaged
across trading days for each exchange group: The number of trades, trade volume, quoted
spreads and volatility measured by the square root of the mean squared midquote change
at each minute. The number of trades and trade volume show the familiar U-shaped
pattern that is well-documented in the literature. NASDAQ has the largest number of
trades, followed by the NYSE. The NYSE is comparable to NASDAQ in terms of trade
volume, implying larger average trade sizes in the NYSE compared to NASDAQ. By
contrast the quoted spreads and volatility follow an inverted J-shaped pattern, peaking
at the market open but not increasing towards the market close. The NYSE has the largest
spreads, followed by BATS and NASDAQ which are quite close to each other. The NYSE
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also has a larger volatility at the start of the day until about 11:00h. We observe two
types of jumps in the intraday patterns of these variables. All share the jumps at 10:00h
due to macroeconomic announcements and at 14:00h following FOMC announcements.9
Another type of jumps speciﬁc to the number of trades and trade volumes occur at hour
and half-hour transitions.
2.4.2 Estimation Results
We estimate the unobserved components model given by Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2)
using the GMM method and the version allowing for higher degrees of serial correlation by
substituting Eq. (2.2) with Eq. (2.12) using the state space ML method. In the state space
case we deﬁne three intraday periods implementing the concatenation presented in Eq.
(2.15): the market open (9:30h-10:30h), the midday (10:30h-15:00h) and the market close
(15:00h-16:00h). Although the GMMmethod does not provide time-varying estimates and
the simulation study ﬁnds the state space ML estimation to be more accurate, the GMM
method still presents a valuable point of comparison in an empirical setting, especially due
to its weak distributional assumptions. These methods have diﬀerent data requirements
and treatment of overnight returns. The covariance matrices that serve as the input for
the GMM method are computed via log price diﬀerences and exclude overnight returns.
In contrast, the state space ML estimation uses directly the log prices and excludes not
only overnight returns but also the ﬁrst 3 of 390 intraday observations when calculating
the likelihood.
We select the model speciﬁcation (in terms of the number of lags in Eq. (2.12) and the
polynomial order and number of Fourier terms in Eq. (2.14)) based on both statistical
tests for model selection and the dependence of the ﬁnal results on the model. We start
with the most basic setup without any polynomial and ﬂexible Fourier terms and noise
9In our data set, Treasury budget announcements are also released at 14:00h. However, as will analyze
in more detail in Section 2.4.2, FOMC announcements generate probably all of the market volatility at
this time. Therefore we use FOMC announcements and the 14:00h news interchangeably.
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Fig. 2.2. Market Quality Variables
The ﬁgure displays intraday averages of four market quality measures for each exchange group. The
averages are computed using the data for 50 S&P 500 stocks in the period of July-December 2013.
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lags, i.e. a model where L is zero in Eq. (2.12) and P and Q are zero in Eq. (2.14).
We use 10 estimation trials with random initial values and choose the estimates with
the largest likelihood. We then increase L, P and Q, while checking if the direction of
increase leads to an improvement in the Schwarz Information Criterion. All variances
in the same intraday interval share the same P and Q, which decreases the amount of
possible estimations and is also required for our testing framework presented in Section
2.2.4. We ﬁnd that for most stocks in our sample the estimated variance patterns tend to
stabilize when the number of Fourier sets reaches Q = 5. Including more Fourier terms
leads to negligible changes in the information share estimates.10 Therefore we limit Q
to be at most 10 to avoid overﬁtting11 and to alleviate the computational burden.12 For
the cases reaching this maximum we check the eﬀect of further increasing the number
of Fourier terms on the information shares to rule out any signiﬁcant dependence of the
results on the speciﬁcations of the model.
Table 2.9 reports the parameter and information share estimates from both methods,
providing daily means for time-varying variables. The elements of α and the diagonals of
the Ω and of Ψ matrices have similar qualitative rankings and close magnitudes across the
two estimation methods. The estimates point to several interesting properties of the price
discovery process. The small estimates of α suggest that price innovations are almost
fully incorporated within a minute. Also the noise in observed price changes is relatively
small compared to genuine innovations, with the innovation variance being about 20 times
larger than the mean noise variance. Lastly, the estimates of the diagonal elements of Ψ
imply only a modest level of autocorrelation in the one-minute returns.
10Details on the chosen model speciﬁcation for each stock can be found in Table 2.10.
11The simulation study concerning model misspeciﬁcation in Section 2.3.3 ﬁnds a small tendency of
the Schwarz Information Criterion to choose overﬁtted models, though such overﬁtted models also tend
to have a higher estimation accuracy.
12The estimation has considerable computational requirements. Providing an average ﬁgure for com-
putation time across all estimations was not possible, because we used a computer cluster consisting of
many machines with varying speciﬁcations. However we estimated a smaller sample on a machine with
an Intel Core i5-2410M (2.30GHz) processor to provide a representative ﬁgure. Each estimation trial of a
model with three intraday periods using 10 ﬂexible Fourier terms and a polynomial of order one in their
variance speciﬁcations took 23.5 hours on average.
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The diﬀerences in the information shares across the estimation methods stem mainly
from the estimates of the idiosyncratic error variances in Ω. The negligible eﬀect of
the diﬀerences in the estimates of the innovation variance σ2r can be observed from the
sum of information shares, which is very similar across methods. As Eq. (2.8) shows,
elements of α are summed with one in the expression for the information shares. Thus the
diﬀerences of α estimates across methods have a negligible inﬂuence on the information
shares, because they are very close to each other and to zero. Similarly, the diagonal
elements of the Ψ matrix are squared to compute the information shares, reducing their
overall impact to almost nil. Therefore we observe that the (diﬀerences in) information
shares are inversely proportional to the (diﬀerences in) noise variance estimates.
We present the results for the Philip Morris International (PM) stock as an example
in Figure 2.3. The NYSE acts as the primary listing exchange for PM and, similar to 37
of the other 49 stocks, the listing exchange leads the daily average contributions to price
discovery. The intraday information share panel in Figure 2.3 shows that the NYSE has
a considerable lead in price discovery: The average information share of the NYSE group
is 58.2% compared to NASDAQ’s 32.8%. Our GMM estimates give a similar lead to the
NYSE with 62.1% versus 28.2%. The NYSE achieves this large lead although it does not
dominate the trade activity of PM shares. Unlike most other cases its trading activity
is not dominated by the exchange of its listing: 47.7% of its trade volume occurs on
NASDAQ, while the rest is almost equally distributed between the other three exchange
groups.
The inﬂuence of listing in contributions to price discovery and the remarkable infor-
mativeness of the NYSE, in spite of its lower share in trade activity, are part of a general
pattern in our data set. As reported in Table 2.9, the NYSE accounts for 49.7% of the
price discovery for stocks listed on it, while NASDAQ leads with a 39.7% information
share among its listing group. This causes an overall lead of the NYSE across the whole
sample with 43.4% over NASDAQ’s 33.4%. This follows from the lower noise variances
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Fig. 2.3. Variance and Information Share Estimates for the PM Stock
The ﬁgure displays innovation and noise variance estimates and computed information shares for the PM
stock.
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of exchanges when a stock is listed in it, as depicted in Figure 2.4. The ﬁgures across
diﬀerent industry groups follow from their compositions in terms of exchange listings. The
GMM method gives qualitatively similar results with a 5–10% diﬀerence in estimates.
We observe considerable ﬂuctuations in the estimates of variances and information
shares, but several level diﬀerences are worth highlighting. The innovation and noise
variances of the PM stock follow a U-shaped pattern. This pattern has a sound theoretical
basis, as the informed trading literature documents such a U-shaped intraday innovation
variance with a large peak at the start of the day (Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1988; Foster and
Viswanathan, 1993; Slezak, 1994). This pattern experiences expected information-related
bumps at announcement times for macroeconomic news: the considerable jump at the
FOMC announcements at 14:00h and a smaller jump at 10:00h which is more visible for
other stocks as depicted in Figure 2.4. The noise variance of NASDAQ rises after 14:00h
for both listing groups to levels even above BATS and Direct Edge, showing the inability
for NASDAQ to remain informative at pricing FOMC news. The resulting information
share estimates presented in Figure 2.5 display an increase in the NYSE informativeness
at 14:00h for both listing-groups, albeit at diﬀerent levels.
For the PM stock, the NYSE has a clear leadership at the market open, while the
market close has a tighter competition between the two leading exchanges. Across all
stocks, the NYSE group has a 48.5% information share during the ﬁrst half hour of
the trading day compared to NASDAQ’s 30.7% share, while during the last half hour
NASDAQ leads with 46.0% over 36.0%. This pattern is again highly dependent on the
listing, as can be seen in Figure 2.5: NASDAQ dominates both the market open and close
periods within its listing group and the NYSE’s larger share stems from its competitive
position in the afternoon even for the NASDAQ-listed stocks and its dominance among
the NYSE-listed stocks.
In order to test whether these intraday variations in price discovery are statistically
signiﬁcant, we use the methodology outlined in Section 2.2.4. We examine particularly the
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Fig. 2.4. Variance Estimates for All Stocks and Listing Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday innovation and noise variance estimates for all stocks and for two
listing groups. Out of 50 stocks, 38 are NYSE-listed and 12 are NASDAQ-listed. For each exchange
group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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Fig. 2.5. Information Share Estimates for All Stocks and Listing Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday information share estimates for all stocks and for two listing groups.
Out of 50 stocks, 38 are NYSE-listed and 12 are NASDAQ-listed. For each exchange group we average
the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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midday period (10:30h-15:00h), because as the literature suggests and as we have shown in
this study market open and close experience the pricing of a larger magnitude of informa-
tion compared to the rest of the day. Thus, the midday can be hypothesized to be a calmer
and less competitive period. Table 2.10 reports the Lagrange Ratio test statistics for eval-
uating the hypothesis of constant information shares in the midday (10:30h-15:00h). For
each security we report the number of ﬂexible Fourier sets at the three parts of the day,
the log-likelihood of the non-constant model estimation, the Lagrange Ratio test statistic,
the number of parameters in the non-constant model and the number of restrictions in the
constant model. In each case the hypothesis of constancy is rejected at 5% signiﬁcance
level. Since our results indicate a strong inﬂuence of macroeconomic news announcements
on the shifts of informativeness across exchanges, we also run this test excluding all days
with news announcements during the midday period. Even in that case, the hypothesis
of constant price discovery during the midday is rejected.
The inﬂuence of macroeconomic news is worth further elaboration, given the coinci-
dence of spikes in the innovation variance with their usual release times. We look into
the case of the 38 NYSE-listed stocks due to the demonstrated capabilities of the NYSE
at pricing new macroeconomic information. For this subset of stocks, we estimate the
same structural model representing one latent price process observed in four stock ex-
changes with noise terms. The data set is divided into three subsamples based on the
existence of major macroeconomic news announcements: 20 days with news at 10:00h,
4 days with news at 14:00h and 100 days without news at neither 10:00h nor 14:00h.13
While a wide range of news items are released on the 20 days with 10:00h news, all of
the four cases of 14:00h news belong to FOMC meeting announcements. This focus on
major indicators makes our results comparable to the literature on macroeconomic news
and provides a starting point for examining the eﬀects of these major indicators as well
13An alternative setup to estimate the eﬀect of news announcements would allow for discontinuities
in the variance patterns. We do not employ such a methodology in this study, but the concatenation
of multiple ﬂexible Fourier patterns presented in Section 2.2.4 provides a straightforward approach to
incorporate discontinuities at predetermined times.
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Table 2.10. Summary Statistics for the Lagrange Ratio tests
This table presents the summary statistics for the Lagrange Ratio test for the constancy of information
shares in the midday (10:30h-15:00h). For each security we report the number of ﬂexible Fourier sets at
the three parts of the day, the log-likelihood of the non-constant model estimate, the test statistic, the
number of parameters in the non-constant model and the number of restrictions in the constant model.
Ticker Num. of FF sets Log LR-test Num. of Num. of
Symbol Open Midday Close Likelihood Statistic Parameters Restrictions
AAPL 10 8 2 23427.3 934.3 228 68
ADBE 10 9 5 121350.1 839.0 268 76
ADT 10 9 9 187025.1 467.6 308 76
AEE 10 10 10 121037.6 571.3 328 84
AIG 10 10 8 259864.0 503.4 308 84
AKAM 10 8 7 101741.1 873.6 278 68
ATI 10 10 3 113051.6 851.3 258 84
BK 10 9 5 119181.8 537.9 268 76
CA 9 8 5 -5453.0 791.8 248 68
CL 10 10 8 -65247.3 1062.3 308 84
CMI 10 6 3 134016.1 862.8 218 52
COP 10 9 5 121929.1 813.2 268 76
CTL 9 10 7 125175.7 226.4 288 84
DO 10 10 5 -25635.3 507.0 278 84
DPS 9 7 6 204732.6 679.3 248 60
DTE 10 10 5 -8476.4 576.4 278 84
FDO 10 10 2 108984.5 167.4 248 84
FDX 10 9 8 32372.4 336.3 298 76
FIS 10 10 10 55914.8 951.2 328 84
FLIR 9 10 4 42180.5 132.7 258 84
GT 8 9 3 -39149.6 971.3 228 76
IP 10 9 10 -74609.8 185.7 318 76
IVZ 10 9 3 58300.0 776.6 248 76
JCI 10 10 8 44112.9 617.3 308 84
JPM 10 9 9 -33025.4 325.6 308 76
KMX 10 9 4 18876.1 679.2 258 76
KR 8 10 3 -2862.1 239.2 238 84
LOW 9 6 5 -11754.5 749.8 228 52
MJN 9 6 3 178319.3 678.2 208 52
MOS 9 10 4 173453.0 173.0 258 84
MRO 9 9 4 162460.2 163.9 248 76
MSI 10 10 4 113215.1 269.6 268 84
MU 9 10 2 99902.3 136.7 238 84
MWV 8 8 2 148352.8 533.2 208 68
NKE 9 9 2 96540.2 939.8 228 76
NRG 10 8 2 204572.3 715.4 228 68
OKE 10 10 5 151923.3 637.2 278 84
ORLY 10 10 4 -18807.9 980.9 268 84
PM 10 9 3 6131.4 205.3 248 76
POM 9 8 9 -21848.6 1006.1 288 68
QEP 8 9 5 -18615.8 215.6 248 76
SIAL 9 10 9 20779.0 634.1 308 84
SYMC 10 10 2 169184.9 260.2 248 84
TRV 9 10 4 -28656.6 676.4 258 84
TWC 10 10 5 69107.2 121.6 278 84
UTX 10 8 3 74038.5 864.7 238 68
VLO 9 10 4 -47454.2 965.8 258 84
WY 8 8 7 108469.7 1014.8 258 68
XLNX 10 10 2 -14690.7 1104.0 248 84
XRAY 10 10 3 -18114.1 622.2 258 84
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as other macroeconomic news items in more detail.14
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 display the intraday patterns of the noise and innovation vari-
ances, and information shares, respectively, for these three subsamples. The 14:00h bump
is fully explained by the FOMC announcement, while the 10:00h bump endures even after
excluding days with major macroeconomic announcements at that time. After excluding
FOMC announcements, the third subsample without major news releases still contains all
of the Treasury Budget announcements during our sample period. However, we observe
a very ﬂat pattern at 14:00h, which indicates that the Treasury Budget announcements
do not have much impact on the stock markets.15 By contrast, the estimates for the
third subsample still exhibit a bump at 10:00h, demonstrating that the exclusion of ma-
jor macroeconomic news announcements does not fully smooth out the variance bump
around the release time. As in the case of the Treasury Budget, some of such minor
indicators may not be inﬂuential. However, others have a sizable eﬀect on the market
dynamics, shown by the persistence of the 10:00h variance bump in spite of the exclusion
of most well-known news releases. This result highlights the potential importance of even
minor macroeconomic indicators and the necessity of carefully conditioning the analysis
on expected news events.
For a more detailed examination of the eﬀects of major macroeconomic news releases,
we use the estimates from the third subsample without news as a benchmark. The rela-
tive diﬀerence of the estimates using the data sets with news set against this benchmark
presents a straightforward descriptive statistic that gives insight into the eﬀect of the
macroeconomic announcements at shaping intraday volatility patterns. Note that this
statistic measures how much larger the eﬀect of major indicators is relative to the re-
14 We use the major news releases categorized as ‘market moving indicators’ by the Econoday website.
This category consists of 21 indicators, including GDP, FOMC decisions, industrial production, inﬂation,
the employment situation and home sales. A detailed list is available at:
http : //mam.econoday.com/resource ctr why.asp
15Note that this is not a result of the Treasury Budget announcements being in line with market
expectations. We have data about the range of the market forecasts and the median forecast in two of
the ﬁve Treasury Budget announcements and, in both cases, the realization is not only away from the
median, but also outside the forecast range.
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Fig. 2.6. Macroeconomic News and Variance Estimates of NYSE-listed Stocks
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday innovation and noise variance estimates for 38 NYSE-listed stocks
using three subsamples based on the existence of macroeconomic news announcements: 20 days with
news at 10:00h, 4 days with news at 14:00h and 100 days without news at 10:00h and 14:00h. For each
exchange group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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Fig. 2.7. Macroeconomic News and Information Share Estimates of NYSE-listed Stocks
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday information share estimates for 38 NYSE-listed stocks using three
subsamples based on the existence of macroeconomic news announcements: 20 days with news at 10:00h,
4 days with news at 14:00h and 100 days without news at 10:00h and 14:00h. For each exchange group
we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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maining indicators released at the same time. The eﬀect of these major news releases
on the market can be simply measured by comparing pre- and post-release volatility and
information share ﬁgures within the results of each subsample.
News announcements at 10:00h considerably increase variances as well as the NYSE’s
share in price discovery around the release time. The innovation and noise variances are
respectively 25.4% and 31.5% to 48.3% larger than the benchmark at the release time. The
peak point of this relative diﬀerence for the innovation variance during the ﬁrst hour of the
trading day is also reached at 10:00h, while the peaks of the noise variances occur in the
minutes after the release time. The existence of 10:00h news interrupts the trend towards
the equalization of the NYSE and NASDAQ information shares after the dominance of
the NYSE during the market open. The peak of the relative diﬀerence for information
shares during the ﬁrst hour is reached by the NYSE at 10:03h with 15.1%, which coincides
with a trend of underperformance for price discovery in NASDAQ bottoming at 10:06h
with -22.1%.
The FOMC announcements generate larger ﬂuctuations in variances and, to a lesser
degree, in information shares, beneﬁtting again the NYSE to the detriment of NASDAQ.
At 14:00h innovation and noise variances are respectively 14.5 times and 5.0 to 47.6 times
larger than the benchmark without news announcements and all of them keep rising in
the following minutes. The NYSE gains an even larger lead in price discovery compared
to the 10:00h news: At 14:00h the NYSE information share is 32.3% larger than the
benchmark, whereas the NASDAQ information share is 46.8% smaller. The NYSE tends
to expand its share in the following minutes at the expense of NASDAQ. Although the
estimation error due to the small sample size may have played a role in their magnitude,
the variance estimates during FOMC announcements remain comparable to the large
innovation variances during the market open, while dwarﬁng the variances across the
trading day, and they reﬂect the market sensitivity to FOMC announcements especially
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during the taper tantrum16 of summer 2013 and its aftermath.
We now turn to the results by industry groups. The intraday variance estimates for
the four biggest industry groups, namely Manufacturing, Utilities, Finance and Services,
are depicted in Figure 2.8.17 All conﬁrm the U-shaped pattern with 10:00h and 14:00h
jumps related to macroeconomic news. The biggest 14:00h jump occurs in the Finance
group: The maximum innovation variance reached within the half hour after 14:00h is
178.6% larger than the prior average between 12:30h and 13:30h. This is followed by a
114.0% jump in the Utilities group. Parallel to the increase in innovation variance, all
exchanges across all industry groups experience hikes in noise variances around the two
news release times. In all groups except for Manufacturing NASDAQ has the biggest
relative increases in noise at 14:00h. The NYSE has the lowest relative increases only for
the two smaller groups of Finance and Services, but in absolute terms it has the smallest
maximum noise around 14:00h.
As can be seen in Table 2.9, there are considerable diﬀerences across industry groups
in terms of the mean information shares, but qualitatively all groups except Services share
the lead of the NYSE over NASDAQ followed by BATS and Direct Edge. The leadership
of NASDAQ in the Services group may be driven by the listing eﬀect, given that 4 out of
6 stocks in Services are listed on NASDAQ. The intraday patterns of information shares
displayed in Figure 2.9 also resemble the listing-based diﬀerences in Figure 2.5 in terms
of the dominant exchanges at the open, midday and close and in terms of the eﬀect of
macroeconomic news to the informativeness of exchanges. In particular, the low NYSE
noise variance around 14:00h leads to a remarkable increase of the NYSE information
shares around this time.
16The taper tantrum refers to the period of market uncertainty, following Fed chairman Ben Bernanke’s
comments in May 2013 about a possible reduction in the rate of its bond purchases, a part of the Fed’s
quantitative easing program.
17The association of stocks with industry groups is achieved using their Standard Industrial Classi-
ﬁcation (SIC) codes. Codes from 1000 to 1499 are grouped under Mining, from 1500 to 1799 under
Construction, from 2000 to 3999 under Manufacturing, from 4000 to 4999 under Utilities, from 5000 to
5999 under Trade, from 6000 to 6799 under Finance, and from 7000 to 8999 under Services.
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Fig. 2.8. Variance Estimates for Industry Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday innovation and noise variance estimates for four industry groups with
the highest numbers of stocks: Manufacturing (22), Utilities (8), Finance (6) and Services (6). For each
exchange group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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Fig. 2.9. Information Share Estimates for Industry Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday information share estimates for four industry groups with the highest
numbers of stocks: Manufacturing (22), Utilities (8), Finance (6) and Services (6). For each exchange
group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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Lastly, we analyze intraday price discovery in terms of market capitalization. We
divide the 50 stocks into four groups, where the ﬁrst three groups have 12 stocks each and
the fourth group with the smallest ﬁrms has 14 stocks. Figure 2.10 displays the average
variance patterns for the resulting groups. Noise variances tend to be higher for smaller
stocks, while the innovation variances are much more similar. The main exception to this
tendency among the two biggest exchange groups is the peak of NYSE noise variance
for the third market capitalization group. As can be seen in Figure 2.11, this leads to a
higher NASDAQ share in price discovery for this group. As in the case of the Services
industry group, this may be a consequence of listing decisions, because the third group
has the highest share of NASDAQ-listed stocks (5 out of 12).
Taken all together, we observe a signiﬁcant amount of intraday variation in the infor-
mativeness of the four exchange groups. The averages of our time-varying information
share estimates coincide with the GMM estimates of constant information shares, putting
the NYSE in the lead for all stocks and NASDAQ (the NYSE) for the stocks listed on
NASDAQ (the NYSE). The NYSE’s contribution to price discovery increases consider-
ably during major macroeconomic news releases at 10:00h and 14:00h, mainly to the
detriment of NASDAQ’s. The exclusion of days with these prominent news items does
not necessarily ﬂatten the innovation variance patterns at release times, possibly signalling
the importance of some of the minor macroeconomic indicators. NASDAQ information
shares tend to be larger within its listing group at the market open and close. The NYSE
also leads the price discovery at the market open within its listing group, but its share
at the close does not surpass NASDAQ’s. Lastly, our tests reject the constancy of infor-
mation shares during the midday even when we exclude the days with macroeconomic
announcements.
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Fig. 2.10. Variance Estimates for Market Capitalization Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday innovation and noise variance estimates for four market capitalization
groups. We rank our stocks according to their market capitalizations of December 31st 2013. We divide
them into four groups, where the ﬁrst three groups have 12 and the 4th group with the smallest ﬁrms has
14 stocks. For each exchange group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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Fig. 2.11. Information Share Estimates for Market Capitalization Groups
The ﬁgure displays mean intraday information share estimates for four market capitalization groups. We
rank our stocks according to their market capitalizations of December 31st 2013. We divide them into
four groups, where the ﬁrst three groups have 12 and the 4th group with the smallest ﬁrms has 14 stocks.
For each exchange group we average the minute-level intraday estimates across stocks.
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2.4.3 What drives the intraday variation in information shares?
We conclude our empirical analysis by exploring which market features can explain the
intraday variation of the information shares of the four exchange groups. This analysis
provides more detailed statistical inference on the eﬀects of the stock characteristics we
examined in the previous section by grouping the 50 S&P 500 stocks in various dimensions.
We use a market share attraction (MSA) model (Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988) to relate
the dynamics of the estimated information shares to the number of trades, quoted spreads,
volatility, and market capitalization, controlling for dummies of exchange listing, industry
and time-of-the-day. For each of the ﬁrst three variables we consider the average value
in minute t across all days in the sample. For the quoted spread we take the average
diﬀerence between the bid and ask within the minute. For volatility we use the square
root of the mean of squared 1-minute returns.
MSA models provide an eﬀective framework to investigate the relationships between
information shares and market variables. Just like the changes of market shares in rela-
tion to the ability of companies to attract customers, the ability of a trading venue to
attract informed trading shapes its information share. MSA models also oﬀer a gain in ef-
ﬁciency over separate regressions, as we can consider the determinants of the information
shares for all exchanges simultaneously and in a consistent manner, as explained below.
Note however that this method estimates elasticities between variables rather than causal
relationships and therefore some care needs to be taken for interpreting the ﬁndings.
MSA models are based on the notion of a latent ‘attraction’ of a brand or company
or, in our case, a trading venue. The attraction of exchange i at time t is deﬁned as
Ai,t = exp (μi + εi)
I∏
j=1
K∏
k=1
f(xk,j,t)
βk,j,i (2.16)
where xk,j,t is the value of the k
th explanatory variable of exchange j at time t, βk,j,i
denotes the eﬀect of this explanatory variable on the attraction of exchange i, I is the
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number of exchanges and K is the number of explanatory variables for each exchange.
The function f(·) denotes a particular transformation of the explanatory variable xk,j,t.
We return to this below. The model is completed by setting the observed information
share of exchange i at time t equal to its relative attraction, that is,18
ISi,t =
Ai,t∑I
j=1Aj,t
. (2.17)
We limit ourselves to the two most popular speciﬁcations of the function f(·) in
Eq. (2.16). These are the identity function, i.e. f(xk,j,t) = xk,j,t, and the exponential
transformation, i.e. f(xk,j,t) = exp(xk,j,t). The ﬁrst speciﬁcation results in the so-called
Multiplicative Competitive Interaction (MCI) speciﬁcation, while the latter leads to the
Multinomial Logit (MNL) speciﬁcation. These two speciﬁcations diﬀer in terms of the
implied elasticities of the information shares with respect to the explanatory variables.
Under the MCI speciﬁcation the elasticity of information share i to the kth explanatory
variable of exchange j at the minute t is given by
eMCIk,j,i,t =
∂ISi,t
∂xk,j,t
xk,j,t
ISi,t
= βk,j,i −
I∑
r=1
ISr,tβk,j,r, (2.18)
while the elasticity for the MNL speciﬁcation is
eMNLk,j,i,t =
∂ISi,t
∂xk,j,t
xk,j,t
ISi,t
=
(
βk,j,i −
I∑
r=1
ISr,tβk,j,r
)
xk,j,t. (2.19)
Due to the multiplication with xk,j,t in Eq. (2.19), the MNL speciﬁcation is restricted
to have small elasticities for values of the explanatory variable close to zero, whereas the
MCI speciﬁcation does not impose such a constraint.19
18Note that this implies that the information shares always sum to unity at each point in time. This
need not necessarily hold for the information shares of De Jong and Schotman (2010) as deﬁned in Eq.
(2.8), although in our empirical application the mean of the sum of information shares is very close
to unity with 98.5%. We therefore normalize the information share estimates for the remainder of the
analysis.
19Further elaborations on these two models can be found in Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) and Cooper
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In order to estimate the model parameters, we may take one of the exchanges as the
benchmark (labeled “b”). We then rewrite the model that results from combining Eq.
(2.16) and Eq. (2.17) as
log(ISi,t)− log(ISb,t) = μ˜i +
I∑
j=1
l∑
k=1
β˜k,j,ixk,j,t +
I∑
j=1
K∑
k=l+1
β˜k,j,i log(xk,j,t) + ε˜i, (2.20)
where μ˜i = μi − μb, β˜k,j,i = βk,j,i − βk,j,b and ε˜i = εi − εb, and we have assumed that the
ﬁrst l explanatory variables enter the model with an MNL speciﬁcation and the remaining
K− l explanatory variables are included with an MCI speciﬁcation. The complete system
has (I − 1) · (1 + I ·K) parameters, which can be estimated by OLS (Fok, Franses, and
Paap, 2002). Note that only diﬀerences of the coeﬃcients βk,j,i can be identiﬁed. As
shown by Cooper and Nakanishi (1988), this is however suﬃcient to completely identify
the elasticities given in Eq. (2.18) and Eq. (2.19).
As we have noted, the MNL speciﬁcation implies a restriction on the elasticity to be
small for explanatory variables values close to zero. Although it may be more restrictive in
terms of this aspect, the MNL speciﬁcation also has the advantage of allowing zero values
of explanatory variables, because we do not use the natural logarithm of the MNL variable
in the estimation equation (2.20) unlike the MCI case. The number of trades theoretically
ﬁts well with the implications of the MNL speciﬁcation, because changes in the number
of trades, when it has a small value, probably would not cause a considerable change in
the information share of the relevant exchange. By contrast, small levels of spreads can
be caused by heightened inter-exchange competition and changes around those levels can
have major eﬀects on the contributions to price discovery. Similarly, as we discussed in
the previous section, changes in small noise variances can drive the major shifts in the
information shares. For the modelling of the market capitalization, at least the necessity
for having small elasticities at smaller values is not self-evident. Therefore we use the
(1993).
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MNL speciﬁcation for the number of trades and the more general MCI speciﬁcation for
the quoted spreads, volatility and market capitalization.20
We analyze the eﬀects of the listing, industry and time-of-the-day dummies directly
from this regression. The estimated dummy coeﬃcients β˜l capture eﬀects on the log ratio
of an exchange to the benchmark exchange. Thus the eﬀect on the relative information
share of the exchanges βˆl can be computed as
βˆl = exp β˜l − exp 0 = exp β˜l − 1. (2.21)
We consider the NYSE as a natural benchmark, especially for estimating the eﬀect of
exchange listing, given its prominent position in price discovery.
This methodology provides elasticities for each minute of the day, as can be inferred
from the t subscript in the elasticity formulas Eq. (2.18) and Eq. (2.19). The intraday
variation is a function of the level of information shares. We present the daily means in
our analysis. We test for the signiﬁcance of the mean elasticities by approximating their
distribution using 10,000 simulations from the asymptotic distribution of the regression
coeﬃcients β˜k,j,i.
The elasticities of information shares to quoted spreads display the most robust re-
sults, as can be seen in Panel A of Table 2.11. Each exchange’s information share has a
signiﬁcantly negative elasticity to its own quoted spread, while having (often signiﬁcant)
positive elasticities to other exchanges. A well-documented response to signs of informed
trading would be the widening of the spread in order to avoid adverse selection costs (e.g.,
Neal and Wheatley, 1998), which would imply that information share of an exchange has
a positive elasticity to the spreads in that exchange. Given that we consistently ﬁnd op-
posite signs, we can hypothesize that this eﬀect is overwhelmed by tighter quoted spreads
reducing transaction costs and attracting informed trading. While there is an almost one-
20The use of the MNL speciﬁcation for the market capitalization does not generate qualitative changes
in our results.
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to-one eﬀect for the NYSE and NASDAQ, the information shares of BATS and Direct
Edge increase by about twice the percentage drop in the spreads. This may be related to
the smaller shares of these two exchange groups in price discovery, leaving considerable
room for improvement, i.e. marginal returns on market quality improvements are larger.
By controlling for volatilities of other exchanges in the MSA regression, the volatility
variables mainly capture the idiosyncratic noise of each exchange. Thus the structure
of volatility elasticities resembles the quoted spread results, but is weaker both in terms
of statistical signiﬁcance and robustness. Each exchange’s information share has a sig-
niﬁcantly negative elasticity to its own volatility, except for the insigniﬁcant ﬁgure for
Direct Edge. The cross-eﬀects tend to be positive, when they are signiﬁcant, except for
the negative elasticity of BATS information share to Direct Edge volatility.
The number of trades fail to provide a coherent pattern. Further analysis of the
number of trades by disaggregating various trade size groups, available upon request,
does not provide a clear pattern either. We have observed in the previous section that the
dominance of NASDAQ in the number and to a weaker extent in the volume of trades does
not directly correspond to a large share in price discovery. The ability to execute orders in
smaller slices using algorithmic trading could have made inferences on information based
on trade sizes unreliable.
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We observe in Panel B of Table 2.11 that listing on the NYSE instead of NASDAQ
has a considerable negative eﬀect on the information shares of all other exchanges relative
to the NYSE. Surprisingly, however, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant at 5% level for the rela-
tive information share of NASDAQ. This result stems from the inclusion of the Services
dummy, because in all other variations of the regression the eﬀect turns out to be highly
signiﬁcant. Four of six stocks within this industry group are listed on NASDAQ and they
observe some of the biggest leads of NASDAQ over the NYSE in terms of price discovery
(on average 29.6%). This is reﬂected by the strikingly large positive eﬀect of the Services
dummy on the relative NASDAQ informativeness, indicating a tripling of NASDAQ in-
formation share relative to the NYSE under NASDAQ-listing. Thus controlling for this
aﬃliation captures a sizable proportion of the listing eﬀect.
For the industry (time-of-the-day) dummies, we report the estimates from regressions
where all other industry (time-of-the-day) dummies are excluded. This allows us to mea-
sure the eﬀect of the concerning industrial aﬃliation (time of the day) compared to all
others, instead of taking an arbitrary industry (time-of-the-day) as a benchmark. The
results are already transformed from the regression estimates using Eq. (2.21).
Exchange groups tend to be signiﬁcantly more informative for speciﬁc industries. Out
of 21 dummy coeﬃcients for relative information shares for seven industries 12 turn out
to be statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level. Only Mining, the second smallest group, has
no signiﬁcant relationships. For each industry, signiﬁcant eﬀects on relative information
shares also have the same sign. As the benchmark is the information share of the NYSE,
this implies that other exchanges may share industrial specializations, while the NYSE
has no real competitor for its industrial specializations.
The NYSE particularly excels at incorporating innovations in ﬁnancial stocks. All
of the six ﬁnancial stocks are listed in the NYSE and for all non-NYSE exchanges the
change in relative information shares is statistically signiﬁcant. We estimate about 50%
lower information shares for non-NYSE exchanges relative to the NYSE in this sector.
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This probably goes hand-in-hand with the NYSE’s aptitude at pricing macroeconomic
news, considering that especially the 14:00h news causes the biggest increases for ﬁnancial
stocks.21
Macroeconomic news announcements generate sizable shifts in terms of both overall
market volatility and the shares of exchange groups in price discovery. Jumps at 10:00h
and 14:00h disturb the relatively smooth inverted J- or U-shaped intraday pattern for most
of our variables. All of our market quality variables measuring the trading activity, spreads
and volatility, displayed in Figure 2.2, and the intraday innovation variance estimates in
Figure 2.4 experience these two jumps.
We use time dummies to capture the changes in price discovery at announcement
times. Panel C of Table 2.11 points to signiﬁcant time-related changes in the structure of
price discovery even after controlling for other intraday and stock-related factors. While
around 10:00h news we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant change from the average pattern giving
the NYSE a lead over NASDAQ, the news at 14:00h causes a signiﬁcant shift of price
discovery towards the NYSE from all other exchanges.
We see also distinct patterns for the market open, close and the midday. The market
open does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the average allocation of information shares. From
the end of early morning news until the afternoon news, price discovery shifts from the
NYSE particularly to BATS and Direct Edge, with signiﬁcant positive changes in relative
information shares for all periods from 10:15h to 13:15h except for 11:15h to 11:45h. And
lastly, towards the market close we observe a signiﬁcant shift from the NYSE towards
NASDAQ.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel approach to measure the contribution to price discovery
made by diﬀerent trading venues, with an explicit focus on capturing intraday dynamics
21Note that time dummies control for inﬂuences of the two main intraday periods with macroeconomic
news releases, while estimating the eﬀects of the industry groups.
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in information shares. We use a state space representation of the unobserved components
model of Hasbrouck (1993) and De Jong and Schotman (2010). We introduce intraday
time-variation in De Jong and Schotman (2010) information shares by allowing for time-
varying volatilities of the eﬃcient price innovations and idiosyncratic noise, using ﬂexible
Fourier speciﬁcations.
Our simulation study displays the capability of our method in capturing intraday
dynamics of price discovery for typical data sets used in the market microstructure litera-
ture. Across a wide range of settings and parameter conﬁgurations it consistently provides
accurate estimates of the model’s structural parameters and the associated information
shares.
In our empirical analysis we examine 50 S&P 500 stocks during the second half of 2013
using a 1-minute sampling frequency. We gather the exchanges on which these stocks are
traded in four groups by quote origin: NYSE, NASDAQ, BATS and Direct Edge. We
observe that most of the new information is incorporated into prices via the ﬁrst two
groups, particularly by the NYSE. However events such as the opening and the closure
of the market and macroeconomic news announcements lead to major shifts in the con-
tributions of each exchange to price discovery. In particular, the NYSE’s share in price
discovery widens during major macroeconomic news releases at 10:00h and 14:00h. Statis-
tical tests show that the contributions to price discovery in the midday also do not remain
constant. Among various market quality measures, we ﬁnd narrower quoted spreads and
smaller volatility in an exchange group lead to more informed trading. Exchange listing
also turns out to be a major inﬂuence on information shares favoring the exchange where
the stock is listed.
Our state space ML methodology advances the information shares literature to the
investigation of intraday dynamics. In present-day ﬁnancial markets the incorporation
of news into prices takes minutes, if not seconds, and also access to high frequency data
gets easier. These factors provide a fertile ground for the application of our methodology
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to contemporary issues in price discovery. Due to its ability in estimating structural pa-
rameters, this method can easily be extended to incorporate richer market microstructure
dynamics and applied to various settings where a number of observed security prices share
an underlying asset.
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Appendix A: The state space representation of the unobserved
components model
In the state space form, the unobserved components model given in Equations (1) and
(2) can be represented by these two equations:
pt = [ιN×1 α Ψ]
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t
rt
et−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+Gεt, where G = [0N×1 IN ] and εt =
⎡
⎢⎣ rt+1
et
⎤
⎥⎦ , (2.22)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t+1
rt+1
et
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 01×N+1
0N+1×1 0N+1×N+1
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t
rt
et−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+Hεt, where H =
⎡
⎢⎣ ι2×1 02×N
0N×1 IN
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
(2.23)
with ιn×m an n×m vector of ones, 0n×m an n×m matrix of zeros, Ψ is an N ×N matrix
and IN is an N × N identity matrix.22 The variance parameters are uniquely identiﬁed
using the covariance matrix of the stacked disturbances
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦ εt, which comprises the
innovation and noise variances:
E
⎡
⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦ εtε′t
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦
′⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2r ι2×2 02×N 02×N
0N×2 Ω Ω
0N×2 Ω Ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
22As the noise terms et and the innovation rt are in diﬀerent equations, we could have avoided combining
them under εt. However this formulation is in line with the model entry requirements of the SsfPack by
Koopman, Shephard and Doornik (1998) used in this paper. Oftentimes a model bears more than one
equivalent state space representation.
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Appendix B: Proof of the information share formula
We deﬁne Θ = Ω +
∑L
j=1ΨjΩΨ
′
j and assuming the diagonality of Ω and Ψj matrices
Θ is also a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements ω2i
(
1 +
∑L
j=1 ψ
2
i,j
)
. To compute the
inverse of Υ = σ2r(ι+α)(ι+α)
′+Ω+
∑L
j=1ΨjΩΨ
′
j, we use the Sherman-Morrison formula
Υ−1 = Θ−1 − Θ
−1σ2r(ι+ α)(ι+ α)
′Θ−1
1 + σ2r(ι+ α)
′Θ−1(ι+ α)
.
Then γ is deﬁned as
γ = Υ−1(ι+ α)σ2r =
Θ−1(ι+ α)σ2r
1 + σ2r(ι+ α)
′Θ−1(ι+ α)
.
And the information shares are deﬁned as
ISi = γi(1 + αi) =
(Θ−1(ι+ α))i
1/σ2r + (ι+ α)
′Θ−1(ι+ α)
(ι+ α)i, i = 1 . . . N,
which can be rewritten in the form given in the text, because Θ−1 is a diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements 1/
(
ω2i
(
1 +
∑L
j=1 ψ
2
i,j
))
.
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Chapter 3
Why do the pit hours outlive the
pit?
This chapter is a joint project with Dr. Michel van der Wel and Prof. Dick van Dijk of
Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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3.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, electronic communication networks (ECNs) have evolved
from auxiliaries of the trading pit to the dominant venues of trading. Besides cutting
trading costs associated with human intermediaries, ECNs also bring the prospect of
round-the-clock trading in a single venue and thereby further opening ﬁnancial markets
to global participation. However one aspect of pit trading, namely high trading activity
during the traditional pit trading hours, remains surprisingly resilient. Although ECNs
have extended potential trading hours to nearly the whole day, the pit hours still enjoy
most of the trade volume as well as price the bulk of daily information. We investigate
the factors behind the persistence of the high trading activity during the pit hours in a
long and recent data set of 30-year U.S. Treasury futures.1
This concentration of trading activity during the pit hours may be driven by the infor-
mativeness and liquidity provided by pit traders or releases of domestic macroeconomic
news, which happen almost always within the pit hours and constitute the main source of
information in the U.S. Treasury market (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003;
Green, 2004). However, this phenomenon may also be the result of a liquidity externality
during the pit hours or, conversely, an illiquidity externality during the rest of the day,
referred to as ‘afterhours’ in the following. The concentration of trading activity on a
portion of the day diminishes adverse selection and search costs and generates an exter-
nality as additional trading activity within this portion boosts the beneﬁts for all parties
(Pagano, 1989; Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000). The traditional pit hours serve as a
natural focal point for such an activity clustering. Nevertheless, this eﬀect also leads to
a market failure for the ECN during the afterhours, because its low liquidity leaves after-
hours traders vulnerable to larger transaction and adverse selection costs. As afterhours
traders mainly comprise of non-domestic parties with less discretion on the timing of their
1Trading in the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond is possible for the whole day, rotating between venues in
New York, Tokyo and London. Pit trading for the futures contract occurs during the interval of 08:20h-
15:00h EST, while the electronic market is always open, except for a progressively declining amount of
evening hours.
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trades, this unintended discrimination harms the eﬃciency of global risk management and
may generate biases in the transmission of global risks into the pricing of U.S. Treasury
securities.
Our data set, spanning from 2004 to 2013, allows for examining a number of aspects
of the activity clustering around the pit hours. The sample period contains the recent
upsurge in electronic trading systems with the implementation of the Reg NMS frame-
work2 in the U.S. and the parallel sophistication of ECN platforms, in particular the
introduction of the Treasury futures to the CME Globex platform in 2008. This marks
the transformation of the trading pit from a signiﬁcant provider of price discovery to a
redundant venue with little trading activity, leading to the CME decision to close the
trading pits for U.S. Treasury futures by July 2015. In spite of this dramatic reduction in
pit activity, the share of the pit hours in ECN trade volume has declined only from 87.6%
in 2004 to 73.4% in 2013. The large jump in trading activity - downwards for the pit and
upwards for the ECNs - at the start of 2008 allows us to examine the characteristics and
determinants of afterhours trading under two diﬀerent settings.
We test two alternative hypotheses to explain the activity clustering around the pit
hours. We ﬁrstly examine the eﬀect of macroeconomic news announcements and the
beneﬁts of trading during the pit hours. Trading activity increases rapidly with the pit
open and similarly drops after the pit close. This pattern is even more ampliﬁed on days
without macroeconomic new releases near these times, discounting these news releases as
an explanatory factor for the clustering. If pit trades are relatively informative or provide
a signiﬁcant amount of liquidity, market participants may prefer to trade during the pit
hours at more informative prices and with lower trading costs. Although the trading pit
hosts only a small portion of the daily trading activity, our analysis shows that it has
a considerable share in price discovery, especially during the early years of our sample.
2The regulatory agency for U.S. exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission, implemented
Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in 2007 to enhance the linkage across exchanges and
to improve trade eﬃciency. This regulation is widely regarded as a cornerstone in the proliferation of
electronic trading systems.
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In 2004 pit trades account for 32.0% of the variation in permanent price innovations,
while only 10.0% of the trades during the pit hours are executed in the pit itself. With
the introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008, the informativeness of the pit drops to
11.5% and pit activity declines so rapidly that proper inference is not possible for later
years. As this fast decline of the pit does not aﬀect the activity clustering around the pit
hours, we reject informativeness of pit trading as a signiﬁcant factor for the persistence
of this clustering.
As an alternative explanation, we postulate a feedback mechanism between trading
activity on the one hand and price informativeness and trading costs on the other hand.
Using a modelling framework capturing the intraday variation in price informativeness,
information asymmetry and price impact of trades, we examine the existence and evolu-
tion of this feedback mechanism. Although imputed adverse selection costs disincentivize
trading with a better-informed party, Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) show that liquidity
traders can cluster with informed traders as long as their adverse selection costs are out-
weighed by their beneﬁts from informative prices generated by the competition between
informed traders. Barclay and Hendershott (2004) present empirical evidence for a mu-
tually reinforcing relationship between the low afterhours trading activity and the two
factors related to trading costs, namely adverse selection and price impact, which we also
evaluate in this study. Taken all together, under this mechanism price informativeness
has a mutually reinforcing relationship with liquidity, whereas information asymmetry
and price impact of trades are reduced by and also repel liquidity.
We examine the dynamics of the afterhours market for such a feedback mechanism.
Investigating the afterhours provides insights on whether and to what degree the afore-
mentioned factors prevent or support the low trading activity during the afterhours and
thus the activity clustering around pit hours. We ﬁnd statistically and economically
signiﬁcant eﬀects in line with the postulated mechanism. Percentage changes in price in-
formativeness have a positive and nearly one-to-one relationship with changes in trading
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activity. By contrast, changes in information asymmetry and price impact have a negative
relationship with afterhours trading activity. We observe a strengthening in the negative
eﬀect of information asymmetry during the crisis years, accompanying a temporary re-
versal of the small trend towards the reduction of the share of pit hours in daily trade
volume. The reduction in trading activity for each one percent increase in information
asymmetry moves from a pre-crisis average of -2.6% to an average of -20.8% from the
second half of 2008 to 2010 and drops to -1.2% afterwards.
The results concerning the eﬀect of the price impact of trades alleviates some of the
main concerns related to this illiquidity externality during the afterhours. We estimate
that, after a rise during the crisis years, from 2012 on the price impact starts dropping
below its pre-Globex low in 2006-2007 and in the meantime the magnitude gap between
the night hours and the highly liquid hours just before the market open also diminishes.
Similarly, price impact loses its signiﬁcant eﬀect on trading activity clustering from the
second half of 2007 on. Therefore market participants trading outside pit hours, especially
during the night hours, would face less price impact and the incentives to postpone trading
to the pit hours would be reduced. The spread of algorithmic trading with the introduction
of the Globex Platform is a likely explanation for this change. Although not aﬀecting the
magnitude of the clustering, the introduction of the Globex Platform more than halves
the average trade size and leads to a more even distribution of the trade size across the
day. This reduction in average trade size signals the use of algorithmic trading methods
to execute big orders with a series of small trades.
In terms of econometric methodology, we provide a uniﬁed framework to estimate
structural parameters as time-varying processes. We assume a latent price process, in
which price changes originate either from the surprises in the ﬂow of buyer- or seller-
initiated trades, namely the order ﬂow, or from price innovations unrelated to the trading
process. The surprises encompass the pricing of private information signals, measuring
the information asymmetry (Madhavan et al., 1997). As we control for the price changes
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generated through the private information signals with the surprise term, the innovation
process captures the pricing of public information. The latent price is observed with noise.
We distinguish the price impact of trades from the rest of noise sources. We model the
innovation and noise variances as well as the information asymmetry and the price impact
of trades as time-varying processes. This framework improves upon estimation methods
for diﬀerent aspects of afterhours trading by various reduced-form methods and accounts
for the time-variation in the structural parameters.
Several studies use structural models to analyze afterhours trading processes. Aside
from diﬀerences across speciﬁc models, these generally assume the structural parameters
to be constant over a time frame, while our methodology allows for the estimation of
parameter variation at the frequency of the data inputs as in Ozturk, Van der Wel,
and van Dijk (2014). Barclay and Hendershott (2004) investigate the activity clustering
during the afterhours by decomposing the eﬀective spread into adverse selection and ﬁxed
components with the Lin et al. (1995) model and ﬁnd the trading costs generated by
low trading activity during the afterhours as a major factor for the persistence of pit
hours trading. He, Lin, Wang, and Wu (2009) analyse dynamics of round-the-clock price
discovery in the U.S. Treasury futures market with the Madhavan et al. (1997) model
and ﬁnd that the information asymmetry as well as price informativeness peaks in the
preopen. We also use a version of Madhavan et al. (1997), as it is more amenable to using
only trade data.
Our estimation methodology is closely related to a growing literature in the application
state space modelling of market microstructure issues. Frijns and Schotman (2009) and
Korenok et al. (2011) estimate the Hasbrouck (1993) model, which we use to measure
price discovery during the pit hours, using Kalman ﬁltering. Korenok et al. (2011) also
use the Madhavan et al. (1997) model to incorporate order ﬂow dynamics. Hautsch, Hess,
and Veredas (2011) examine the eﬀect of macroeconomics news on innovation and noise
components of volatility. In contrast to these models using intraday data, Hendershott
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and Menkveld (2014) investigate price pressures with a state space model using daily data,
thereby avoiding modelling issues like adverse selection based on short-term information.
As an alternative methodology to these applications of Kalman ﬁltering, Jondeau, Lahaye,
and Rockinger (2015) estimate intraday variation in the model parameters using the
particle ﬁlter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the meth-
ods we use and formalizes our hypotheses. Section 3.3 shows descriptive statistics of
our 30-year U.S. Treasury futures data set. Section 3.4 investigates the determinants of
the activity clustering around the pit hours by measuring pit informativeness and the
dynamics of the afterhours. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section we ﬁrstly present our hypotheses. In the second subsection, we out-
line the information share methodology that we use. In the last subsection, we present
a structural microstructure model with time-varying parameters, estimated using state
space methods.
3.2.1 Hypotheses
To structure our analysis, we present two hypotheses regarding the activity clustering
around the pit hours. The ﬁrst hypothesis poses the informativeness of pit trading as a
cause for the preference of trading during the pit hours. The second hypothesis relates
to the feedback loop between trading activity and variables related to informational and
transaction costs and price informativeness.
Hypothesis 1: The trading pit constitutes an important venue for price discovery. Trad-
ing activity clusters around the pit hours, because traders beneﬁt from more informed prices
emerging from the trading pit.
The relative informativeness of the prices in the trading pit can pose a straightforward
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reason why the pit hours still attract the bulk of trade volume. A large literature shows
that pit traders manage to avoid adverse selection problems through longstanding rela-
tionships and reputation and attract mainly uninformed and liquidity-oriented traders
(Seppi, 1990; Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm, 1992; Madhavan and Cheng, 1997; Bat-
talio, Ellul, and Jennings, 2007). Contrasting with this largely uninformative order ﬂow
into the trading pit, the executions of pit traders seem to propagate price discovery. Soﬁ-
anos and Werner (2000) note that the ﬂoor brokers act like “a smart order book” cutting
the order into pieces and executing it strategically over an extended period of time. They
condition their trades on the limit order book as well as the hidden liquidity arriving di-
rectly to the trading pit and beneﬁt from order imbalances (Grossman, 1992; Madhavan
and Smidt, 1993; Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz, 2006). This quality infuses the pit or-
der ﬂow with a high predictive power on the asset’s future price (Hasbrouck and Soﬁanos,
1993; Madhavan and Soﬁanos, 1998; Kavajecz, 1999; Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari, 2006).
We analyse the contribution of the trading pit to price discovery using the informa-
tion share methodology of De Jong and Schotman (2010), which we’ll detail in the next
subsection. This method relies on a structural model related to our model for afterhours
trading. The ﬁrst hypothesis implies a considerable amount of price discovery in the
trading pit and a positive relationship between the trading activity during the pit hours
and the information share of the trading pit.
Hypothesis 2: Trading activity has a positive relationship with price informativeness
and negative ones with trading costs related to information asymmetry and price impact.
The activity clustering persists due to the beneﬁts of trading at already-liquid times of the
day, namely more informed prices and less adverse selection and price impact costs.
A mutually-reinforcing relationship between trading activity and other microstructure
factors during the afterhours may result in a persistent trading activity diﬀerence between
parts of the day. The model of Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) implies that the clustering
of liquidity and informed traders may be sustained by beneﬁtting both parties: While the
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informed traders enjoy the reduced impact of their trades, the liquidity traders beneﬁt
from the competition between traders with similar information. Information shared by
market participants, like public news announcements, would not require trading to be
priced, as all parties would agree on a new price level for the security in the light of the new
information. By contrast, in order to avoid alarming non-informed traders, information
possessed by fewer traders would be priced over time, leaving a trace of unexpected price
innovations in the order ﬂow. Another implication of this clustering of informed and
liquidity traders is the reduction of the price impact of trades for all parties. In the
case of the low liquidity levels persistent in the afterhours, transaction costs generated by
price impact of trades would drive away trading activity and would be further increased
due to reduced trading activity. Following the theoretical results of Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1988), we hypothesize that trading activity has a positive relationship with the magnitude
of price informativeness and negative ones with the degree of information asymmetry and
the price impact of trades.
Several empirical studies support the postulated relationships of trading activity to-
ward price informativeness and information asymmetry. News announcements provide a
strong evidence for a positive relationship between trading activity and new public in-
formation (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hautsch et al., 2011). By contrast,
the aversion of non-informed market participants to trades with informed parties where
they may endure adverse selection costs constitutes one of the main dynamics of trading
models at least since the ‘no-trade theorem’ of Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Barclay and
Hendershott (2004) propose the higher information asymmetry during the afterhours as
an explanation for the lower liquidity during this time period.
The relationship between trading activity and price impact of trades remains rather
contentious. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and Hasbrouck (1991) provide an early
rebuttal to Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) by showing that the highly-liquid market open
period also exhibits larger price impact for trades. Extending on the methodology of
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Hasbrouck (1991), Dufour and Engle (2000) and Chung, Li, and McInish (2005) also
ﬁnd that trading activity measured by the interval between trades increases price impact.
On the other side, Barclay and Hendershott (2004) posit the higher impact of trades
due to the low liquidity during the afterhours as one of the main pillars of an illiquidity
externality. Analyzing intraday data, Jondeau et al. (2015) demonstrate that more liquid
stocks experience less price impact.
We test the second hypothesis with time-varying estimates of price informativeness and
trading costs, coming from the model presented in the third subsection. We divide our
ten-years-long data into half-yearly series, generating 20 subsamples, each with a 5-minute
sampling frequency for observations. For each half-year, the regression of trade volume
on the measures of the price informativeness, the information asymmetry and the price
impact gives the eﬀects of these three variables on trading activity. Our hypothesis implies
the regression coeﬃcient to be positive for the price informativeness and negative for the
other two variables. A cross-sectional regression for each 5-minute period during the
afterhours across years constitutes another test for the signiﬁcance of these relationships
across the afterhours. We test this mechanism for the afterhours, because we want to
examine the factors sustaining the low afterhours trading activity.
3.2.2 Information Shares
The ﬁrst hypothesis requires the measurement of informativeness of trading in the
pit compared to the ECN. We accomplish this using the information share methodology
of De Jong and Schotman (2010). In this framework, the observed prices of an asset
in diﬀerent venues, in this case in the trading pit and the ECN, are driven by a latent
eﬃcient price process. This latent price is modeled as a random walk with stationary
innovations. The observed asset prices deviate from this latent price with a set of station-
ary error terms as long-term or unbounded deviations are ruled out by arbitrage. The
error terms capture microstructure eﬀects in the observed prices. They comprise two
82
components distinguished by their correlation with the eﬃcient price innovation. First,
the information-correlated pricing error component captures dynamics such as adverse se-
lection. The second component is uncorrelated with information, but stems from factors
such as noise trading or price discreteness.
These relations can be represented as
pi,t = p
∗
t + αit + ei,t + ψiei,t−1, i = ECN,P it,
p∗t = p
∗
t−1 + t,
(3.1)
where pi,t is the log observed price, p
∗
t is the latent eﬃcient price, t is the innovation in the
latent price with mean zero and variance σ2 , the coeﬃcients αi capture over/underreaction
to the innovations t, ei,t are the zero-mean noise disturbances with covariance matrix Ω
and are uncorrelated with the innovations in the latent price as well as other noise ej,t,
i = j, and the coeﬃcients ψi capture serial correlation in the noise. This would simplify
to the Roll (1984) model under no over/underreaction in prices to information (αi = 0),
the exclusion of the lagged noise terms (ψi = 0) and the replacement of the noise terms
et with the eﬀective spread.
De Jong and Schotman (2010) propose a price discovery measure quantifying the
explanatory power of changes in each of the observed security prices for the innovations
in the latent price. The total price innovation of each venue in period t is deﬁned as
νi,t = pi,t − p∗t−1 = (1 + αi)t + ei,t + ψi, tei,t−1, i = ECN,P it. (3.2)
To measure informativeness of the venues, we may then consider the regression of the
innovation in the latent price on the total innovations in individual prices, that is
t = γ
′νt + ηt, (3.3)
where ηt is the innovation in the latent price unrelated to innovations in market prices.
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De Jong and Schotman (2010) decompose the goodness-of-ﬁt of this regression into
information shares which show how much of the price innovations is explained by the
total innovations in each market. Ozturk, Van der Wel and Van Dijk (2014) show that
the information shares are deﬁned as
ISi =
(1 + αi)
2/(ω2i (1 + ψ
2
i ))
1/σ2 +
∑N
j=1(1 + αj)
2/(ω2j (1 + ψ
2
i ))
(3.4)
and their sum gives the goodness-of-ﬁt of the regression, which does not necessarily equal
to one. We use the GMM methodology to estimate the model parameters required for
the computation of these information shares.3
We evaluate Hypothesis 1 by measuring annual information shares of the trading pit
and the ECN in order to examine the pattern of price discovery over time. This allows
a comparison with the time series pattern of the pit activity as well as the clustering of
the ECN activity around the pit hours and an examination of the strength of their inter-
relationships. The informativeness of the trading pit should be to be proportional to the
amount of pit activity, through which information is compounded into prices. However,
given the literature surveyed in the previous subsection, the pit is expected to have a
larger share in price discovery compared to its share in the total trade activity. Hypoth-
esis 1 requires the informativeness of the trading pit, as measured by the information
shares of (3.4), and the persistence of the activity clustering around the pit hours to be
closely related.
3Ozturk et al. (2014) estimate this model both via GMM, assuming the constancy of model parameters,
and via Maximum Likelihood with Kalman ﬁltering, as we do for the more sophisticated model of the
following section, which allows for time-variation in the model parameters and thereby produces time-
varying information shares. The GMM result is comparable to the average of the time-varying information
shares. Given the similarity of the resulting information shares and that in this analysis intraday variation
in the information shares is not a point of interest, we use the GMM methodology due to its lower
computational requirements.
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3.2.3 Structural Model with Intraday Variation
In order to estimate the variables related to the second hypothesis, we extend the
model presented in the previous section with richer market microstructure dynamics. In
the latent price process, we diﬀerentiate price innovations incorporated with and without
trading. Changes in the beliefs of market participants about asset prices can emerge
either from public news or through the signals in the order ﬂow indicating information
asymmetry. We express this diﬀerence in the structural model by including the surprise in
the order ﬂow as a determinant of the changes in the latent price, constraining innovations
to changes based on commonly shared information which does not require trading to be
priced. Thus the latent price process is deﬁned as
p∗t = p
∗
t−1 + θt (qt − E[qt|qt−1]) + t (3.5)
where p∗t is the latent eﬃcient price, qi,t is the order ﬂow, (qt − E[qt|qt−1]) is the surprise in
the order ﬂow, θt is the unexpected order ﬂow coeﬃcient and t is the public information
component of the price innovation with mean zero and time-varying variance σ2t .
As we estimate this model only in the afterhours, as per the focus of Hypothesis 2,
the observed price process consists of solely the ECN data and the model undergoes three
major modiﬁcations. The main change is the introduction of a measure of price impact of
trades. In particular, we replace αi, the under/over-reaction coeﬃcient of observed prices
to latent price innovations, with the price impact coeﬃcient δ. This new variable captures
the reaction of observed prices to the whole order ﬂow rather than just its informative
component. Following prior empirical studies, we model the eﬀect of trade volume as a
concave function rather than a linear one (e.g., Kempf and Korn (1999)). As a minor
modiﬁcation, we allow for more lags of noise to capture the serial correlation in the data
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created by transitory noise. Thus observed prices follow the process
pt = p
∗
t + δtqt + et +
J∑
j=1
ψjet−j (3.6)
where J is the number of noise lags, et are noise terms with mean zero and time-varying
variance ω2t and δt is price impact coeﬃcient. Lastly the order ﬂow is modelled as an
autoregressive function
qt =
R∑
j=1
ρjqt−j + ηt, (3.7)
where R is set to six using information criteria results.
We estimate Eq. (3.5) and (3.6) by Maximum Likelihood using Kalman ﬁltering.4
This estimation method also allows for incorporating more complex dynamics into the
model. We model the variance of public price innovation σ2t , the noise variance ω
2
t as well
as the coeﬃcients of unexpected order ﬂow θt and of the price impact δt as time-varying
processes. As in Ozturk et al. (2014), we implement time-variation using a combination
of ﬂexible Fourier trigonometric functions and a polynomial function. The time-varying
parameters have the form
c+
P∑
p=1
κp(t (mod N))
p +
Q∑
q=1
(
ξq cos
(
2πqt
N
)
+ ζq sin
(
2πqt
N
))
, (3.8)
where t denotes time with t = 1, . . . , T , T being the number of all observations, N is
the number of observations per day, P the order of the polynomial part, and Q the total
number of ﬂexible Fourier sets. We use the exponent of this speciﬁcation for the variances
to facilitate an unconstrained maximization procedure given that trigonometric functions
can have negative values. The ﬂexible Fourier form can model complex dynamics and
smooth transitions. However using solely the ﬂexible Fourier part would impose equality
of the variances at the start and end of the day. We avoid this by complementing it with
4The state space representation of the model is given in the appendix.
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the polynomial component.
This model provides estimates of three variables, which we require in order to evalu-
ate Hypothesis 2: Price informativeness measured by the public innovation variance σ2t ,
information asymmetry measured by the coeﬃcients of unexpected order ﬂow θt and the
price impact coeﬃcient δt. We use these variables to evaluate the existence of the postu-
lated feedback mechanism relating them to trading activity measured by trade volume.
Hypothesis 2 requires these variables to have signiﬁcant explanatory power on the changes
in trade activity, measured by trade volume.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we ﬁrstly introduce some summary statistics of our data set and then
provide evidence for the activity clustering around the pit hours.
3.3.1 Data
We employ a data set of intraday transaction prices and volumes of 30-year U.S.
Treasury bond futures contracts spanning a 10-years-long period from 2004 to 2013.5
The trades are time-stamped at the second level. We sign the trades using the tick test.6
Trading takes place both in the trading pit and in the ECN. The original trading venue of
the contract, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), introduced electronic trading in mid-
2003, which moved in January 2008 to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Globex
platform after the merger of CBOT and CME in July 2007.
The extended trading hours of the ECN allows for the simultaneous incorporation
of price movements in the underlying security, the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond, to the
5The 30-year Treasury bond was discontinued from February 2002 to February 2006 and the futures
contract was priced using the substitutes provided by the U.S. Treasury: The Long-Term Average Rate
until June 2004 and afterwards an extrapolation factor to compute an estimated 30-year rate using the
20-year Constant Maturity rate.
6We did robustness checks for a number of time intervals using the considerably more computationally
intensive method of Hasbrouck (2004). This provided very similar results for the 5-minute aggregates we
use in the estimation of the state space model.
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futures price. The bond itself trades round-the-clock in Tokyo (19:30h-03:00h EST),
London (03:00h-07:30h EST) and New York (07:30h-17:30h EST). The trading pit of the
futures contract is open from 08:20-15:00h EST. The electronic market for the futures
closes during our sample period at 17:00h EST, but its opening time has moved from
20:00h EST in 2004 to 18:00h EST in 2013.
Figure 3.1 shows the movement of the 30-Year U.S. Treasury futures price during
our sample period. The contract price experiences dramatic changes during the ﬁnancial
crisis. The ﬁrst big jump in December 2008 corresponds to the reduction of the federal
funds target rate by the Fed. In the ﬁrst half of 2009, the price returns to its level before
the jump in December 2008. In mid-2010 the European debt crisis and stock market
volatility lead to a ﬂight to safety causing another appreciation in the Treasury futures
price. While this movement starts to reverse in late 2010, S&P’s downgrade of U.S. debt
in August 2011 results in even more demand for U.S. debt, triggering new highs for the
last years of our sample.
The introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008 transforms the relationship between
electronic and pit trading fundamentally and irreversibly. Table 3.1 presents yearly sum-
mary statistics for our data set. The pit hours statistics in Panel A show that from the
start of the ECN on, the trading pit has a relatively small share in the number of trades
with 1,232 pit trades compared to 11,124 ECN trades in 2004. Pit trading practically
disappears after the introduction of the Globex in 2008, reducing the annual average of
the daily number of pit trades from 310 in 2007 to 69 in 2008. By 2013, merely 6 trades
per day occur in the pit. Figure 3.2 displays the number of trades executed in the trading
pit compared to the ECN over time in more detail. In early 2008, a discrete drop in pit
trading accompanies a jump in ECN activity. Given the lack of a parallel increase in ECN
trade volume, the main driver behind the surge in amount of trades in the ECN seems to
be the rise of algorithms to cut larger trades in smaller pieces and disperse the execution
of these pieces across the day. As Table 3.1 shows, the ECN trade volume during the pit
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Fig. 3.1. The Movements of the 30-Year U.S. Treasury Futures Price
The ﬁgure shows the value of the 30-Year U.S. Treasury Futures over the 4108 trading days from 2004
to 2013. The left axis is the price in USD and the bottom axis gives the days. The data is sampled at
5-minute frequency.
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hours plummets from the peak of 286,336 in 2007 to 148,358 in 2009 and rises back to
240,779 in 2013.
3.3.2 Activity clustering
The intraday distribution of the trading activity in the ECN, presented in Figure 3.3,
highlights the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the pit hours. A 10-minute interval during the pit
hours hosts on average to 2.0% of the daily trade volume. This average activity ﬁgure is
10 times lower for a similar interval outside the pit hours.
The trading activity tends to rapidly rise near the pit open and drop after the pit
close. The share in the daily trading activity doubles from 1.1% to 2.2%, comparing the
10-minute intervals before and after the pit open at 8:20h. Similarly, the pit close at
15:00h leads to a reduction in activity shares from 2.2% to 1.5%. In order to exclude
the eﬀect of nearby macroeconomic news announcements on these activity changes at the
pit open and close times, Figure 3.3 also documents the trading activity shares excluding
days with an announcement 30 minutes before or after the open and close times. In both
cases we observe a more salient jump. The share of a 10-minute interval in the daily
trading activity rises from 1.2% to 2.7% with the pit open and drops from 2.2% to 1.5%
after the pit close.
This substantial share of the pit hours in the trading activity survives the severe decline
in the number of pit trades, especially after 2007. Figure 3.4 shows that the pit hours
consistently attract a plurality of the ECN trade volume over the years. The share of the
pit hours in ECN trade volume declines only from 87.6% in 2004 to 73.4% in 2013. This
modest trend of trading activity diﬀusion to the afterhours stops during the early years of
the ﬁnancial crisis, restarting again from 2010 on. This short interlude during the crisis
years may be the result of the increasing importance of macroeconomic announcements
made during the pit hours and a stronger preference for trading in more liquid times of
the day.
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Fig. 3.2. Number of Trades in the Pit and Electronic Markets
The ﬁgure shows the 22-day moving average of the daily number of trades of the 30-Year U.S. Treasury
Futures in the pit and the electronic markets from 2004 to 2013. The left and right axes give the number
of trades for the trading pit and the ECN, respectively, and the bottom axis gives the days.
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Fig. 3.3. Intraday Distribution of Trade Volume in the ECN
The black line shows the percentage share of the total trade volume for 10-minute-long intervals across the
trading day. The red (green) line displays how much the share of each 10-minute interval diﬀers from the
overall average presented with the black line for days without macroeconomic news announcements less
than 30 minutes before or after the pit open (close) time of 8:20h (15:00h). The pit hours (8:20h-15:00h)
are marked wit a grey background.
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Fig. 3.4. The Distribution of ECN Trade Volume across Intraday Intervals
The ﬁgure shows the intraday distribution of the ECN trade volume for the 30-Year U.S. Treasury Futures
from 2004 to 2013. The ratios of intraday periods are computed using 22-day moving averages of the
trade volume ﬁgures.
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics
We report for various intraday intervals the mean number of trades and trade volumes as well as the
means and the standard deviations of 5-minute returns in basis points.
Panel A: Pit and ECN Statistics for the Pit Hours (8:20h-15:00h EST)
Pit ECN
Tr. Vol.a Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev. Tr. Vol. Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev.
2004 1232 -0.129 11.622 191019 11124 0.015 6.173
2005 671 0.103 7.530 235934 10655 0.012 4.792
2006 559 -0.100 6.063 256834 8167 -0.002 4.270
2007 310 -0.318 6.815 286336 8471 0.014 4.799
2008 69 0.381 14.554 220149 20509 0.045 7.704
2009 14 -0.617 15.698 148358 21836 -0.022 8.351
2010 9 0.189 12.742 208236 27794 0.024 6.097
2011 7 -0.281 14.626 234472 45446 0.117 6.664
2012 5 -0.134 12.265 225187 68412 0.017 4.976
2013 6 -0.392 12.403 240779 63771 -0.036 5.048
Panel B: ECN Statistics for the Afterhours
Tokyo hours (ECN Open-03:00h EST) London hours (03:00h-6:20h EST)
Tr. Vol. Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev. Tr. Vol. Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev.
2004 4245 389 -0.038 2.537 4439 342 0.027 2.493
2005 6249 407 -0.011 1.874 7443 437 0.009 2.471
2006 8397 401 0.012 1.734 10754 432 -0.036 2.287
2007 10076 512 0.008 2.011 12836 532 0.003 2.649
2008 7089 1126 0.018 2.845 9862 1188 0.076 3.725
2009 4454 1093 -0.006 2.585 6354 1254 0.000 3.771
2010 7912 1772 0.017 2.507 11852 2138 0.034 3.511
2011 9383 2491 0.005 2.813 16177 4161 -0.029 4.114
2012 10268 3459 0.000 2.181 21501 7794 0.037 3.453
2013 12707 3968 0.022 2.273 22273 6868 -0.022 3.150
Preopen (6:20h-8:20h EST) Postclose (15:00h-17:00h EST)
Tr. Vol. Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev. Tr. Vol. Num. of Tr. Mean Std. Dev.
2004 7424 524 0.004 3.025 11028 618 0.102 2.876
2005 12528 663 -0.030 3.002 14706 623 0.069 2.476
2006 15469 576 -0.013 2.676 15451 471 0.005 2.180
2007 18458 693 0.068 3.355 24186 737 -0.046 3.133
2008 15337 1800 0.003 5.212 24418 2291 0.099 5.427
2009 9660 1723 -0.083 5.044 16369 2220 -0.032 4.930
2010 15379 2451 -0.079 4.336 22376 2579 0.016 3.406
2011 19388 4388 0.025 4.882 24141 4321 0.015 4.564
2012 24063 7733 -0.032 3.887 24796 6437 0.012 2.935
2013 26840 7026 -0.074 3.672 25521 6222 -0.010 3.075
aWe do not have trade size data for pit trades and therefore we are not able to compute the trade volume
statistics for the trading pit.
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This mild diﬀusion of trading activity to the afterhours happens unevenly across af-
terhours periods. Panel B of Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of four afterhours
periods: Tokyo hours (ECN Open-03:00h EST), London hours (03:00h-6:20h EST), pre-
open (6:20h-8:20h EST) and postclose (15:00h-17:00h EST). Compared to other parts of
the day, the ECN trade volume during the pit hours has the lowest relative increase during
our 10-years-long sample period. While the pit hours volume grows by 26.0%, the trade
volumes in the Tokyo hours, the London hours, the preopen and the postclose increase
by 199.3%, 401.7%, 261.5% and 131.4%, respectively. However the changes in absolute
values amount to less spectacular 21.0% more increase during the afterhours compared to
the pit hours: The total trade volume increase during the afterhours from 2004 to 2013
is 60,204 contracts, compared to a magnitude of 49,760 for the pit hours.
Building on the premise that the introduction of the Globex platform in January
2008 seals the fate of pit trading, as shown in Figure 3.2, we split the sample period
into pre-Globex (2004-2007) and Globex (2008-2013). Figure 3.5 contrasts the intraday
distribution of ECN trade volume and trade size for these two periods. Although the
clustering of the trade volume during the pit hours is virtually the same in the two
periods, the average trade size is more than halved during the Globex period and gets
more even across the day. The reduction in average trade size signals the introduction of
aforementioned algorithmic trading facilities to execute big orders with a series of small
trades. The small increases at both 2:00h EST and 3:00h EST relate to the changing
hours of the London market open for a few days in each year due to daylight saving time
diﬀerences.
Lastly, we use modiﬁed versions of two frequently-used measures of liquidity and price
discovery to compare the pre-Globex and Globex periods. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure (AIL) and weighted price contributions (WPC) are adapted to measure illiquidity
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Fig. 3.5. Intraday Distribution of Trade Volume and Trade Size in the ECN
The ﬁgure shows the percentage share of the total trade volume and mean trade sizes for 10-minute-long
intervals across the trading day for two time intervals: from 2004 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2013. The
pit hours (8:20h-15:00h) are marked wit a grey background.
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and price discovery in 10-minute intervals across the day. They are deﬁned as
AILt =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Δpn,t
pn,tV oln,t
,
WPCt =
N∑
n=1
|Δpn|∑N
n=1 |Δpn|
Δpn,t
Δpn
,
(3.9)
where Δpn,t = pn,t − pn,t−1, pn,t is the price at intraday time t of day n with t = 1, ..., T
and n = 1, ..., N , Δpn = pn − pn−1, pn is the price at the pit close (15:00h EST) of day n
and V oln,t is the ECN trade volume for the intraday interval from time t− 1 to t at day
n.
Figure 3.6 compares the intraday distribution of liquidity and price discovery with
these preliminary indicators. In line with the mild diﬀusion of trade volume to the after-
hours in Figure 3.5, the Amihud illiquidity measure drops for the afterhours, but remains
far larger than the pit hours illiquidity. The average illiquidity of the pit hours measured
by the average price change generated by the same amount of dollar-volume increases by
61.5% from pre-Globex to Globex years, mainly due to a surge at the start of the ﬁnancial
crisis. However the pit hours remain 5.7 times more liquid than the London and preopen
hours (a drop from 18.2 times in the pre-Globex years), 1.9 times more liquid than the
postclose hours (a decline from 3.7 times) and 27.5 times more liquid than the Tokyo
hours (a drop from 96.2 times).
The WPC statistics in Figure 3.6 indicate a small trend towards the dispersion of
price discovery to the afterhours in line with the changes in trading activity. The total
contributions of the pit hours decrease from the 77.0% share of the pre-Globex years to
67.4% for the Globex years. The total contributions at the London and preopen hours
increase from 12.5% to 18.3% and that of the Tokyo hours from 5.0% to 10.0%. Unlike
other afterhours periods, the share of postclose hours in price discovery experiences a drop
from 5.5% to 3.5%. We also note a slight shift of informativeness from day open to day
close parallel to the shift in trade volumes in Figure 3.5.
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Fig. 3.6. Intraday Amihud Illiquidity and Weighted Price Contributions of the ECN
The ﬁgure shows the mean Amihud illiquidity measures and weighted price contributions for 10-minute-
long intervals across the trading day for two time intervals: from 2004 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2013.
The pit hours (8:20h-15:00h) are marked wit a grey background.
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All in all, we document that a large portion of trades happen during pit hours, while
there is only a modest trend towards the dispersion of trading activity to the afterhours.
The introduction of the Globex platform certainly improved the conditions of the after-
hours for trading. However this improvement mostly remains an amelioration over the
past conditions of the afterhours rather than catching up with the advantages of the pit
hours. In particular, relative to the pre-Globex period the same total dollar-volume gen-
erates signiﬁcantly less price change during the afterhours, but this price change remains
still at least double of that generated during the pit hours. Afterhours prices become
mildly more informative as the share of the daily price change generated by the after-
hours increases from a quarter to a third. Only in the average trade sizes we ﬁnd an
equalization across diﬀerent times of the day, which reduces the ability to trade with
relatively bigger sizes in the pit hours without signalling one’s trading objectives.
3.4 Why does the trading activity cluster around the pit hours?
In this section we test the two hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2.1. We ﬁrstly check
the informativeness of pit trading over time, as trading with more informative prices may
be a reason for ECN participants to choose to trade during the pit hours. Secondly,
we investigate how price informativeness and costs related to adverse selection and price
impact aﬀect trading activity during the afterhours.
3.4.1 Is pit trading informative?
In this section we examine Hypothesis 1 by measuring the share of the trading pit in
price discovery using the methodology presented in Section 3.2.2 and relating its changes
to the shifts in activity clustering. Table 3.2 reports the information share results for the
pit and the ECN over the years. We estimate the parameters of the structural model
represented by Eq. (3.1) using GMM and compute the information shares of both venues
as in Eq. (3.4). The trading pit accounts for 32.0% of price discovery in 2004 compared
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to 65.1% for the ECN. This ﬁgure drops to 21.8% already in 2007, while the share of the
ECN increases to 73.9%. In line with the reduction of the number of trades in the pit, in
2008 the information share of the pit further declines to 11.5%, whereas the ECN sustains
its dominance with a share of 69.8%.7 From 2009 on, the price staleness in the pit due to
the pit hosting only 14 trades per day, as shown in Table 3.1, impedes inferences on price
discovery.8
Table 3.2. Yearly Information Shares for the Pit and the ECN
We report the yearly information shares estimated using data sampled at 5 minute frequency. The
information share estimates are in percentages.
Information Shares
ECN Pit
2004 65.1 32.0
2005 71.2 25.0
2006 65.5 28.1
2007 73.9 21.8
2008 69.8 11.5
These results attest to the informativeness of pit trading compared to its share in the
number of trades as well as its rapid demise with the sophistication in electronic trading.
From 2004 to 2007, in spite of the shift in the ratio of the number of trades during the pit
hours from seven-fold to 22-fold in favor of the ECN, the share of the pit in price discovery
is reduced relatively milder, from one-third to one-ﬁfth. Even when the more dramatic
change caused by the introduction of the Globex platform in 2008 increases the ratio of
the number of trades to 243-fold in favor the Globex, the pit still retains an information
7In a simulation study, available upon request, we tested the eﬀect of price staleness on the mea-
surement of price discovery. This study implies that the increase of the price staleness in the pit data
would decrease estimation accuracy, in particular by underestimating the pit information share. Thus
the sizable information share of the trading pit even after the reduction in pit trades starting with 2008
is probably not an overestimate.
8The measurement of information shares requires the cointegration of the price series of the pit and the
ECN, whereby the common stochastic trend represents the underlying eﬃcient price process. Due to the
severe reduction of pit activity with the introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008, the pit data exhibit
an increasing amount of staleness, i.e. lack of price change due to the lack of trade price updates. This
leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of cointegration between the price series of the pit and the ECN
for an increasing majority of days. A similar problem emerges with the statistical testing of the validity
of the model for the data. From 2009 on, Hansen’s J-test starts rejecting the null hypothesis of model
validity for the data at the 5% signiﬁcance level, even after excluding days which fail the cointegration
test.
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share of more than 10%. However, for the later years even if the few remaining pit trades
continue to be very informative in line with the past evidence, their rarity should bring
down the contribution of the trading pit to price discovery. Therefore the informativeness
of the trading pit should have substantially declined over the second half of the sample,
even if not proportional to the drop in the number of pit trades.
The substantial reduction in pit activity and price discovery from 2008 on does not
cause a similar shift in trading activity clustering around the pit hours. As shown in
Figure 3.4, the modest trend towards the diﬀusion of trading activity to the afterhours
actually halts in 2008. The ﬁnancial crisis may have acted as a strong counterforce by
increasing the importance of macroeconomic news announcements during the pit hours.
However when this possible eﬀect subsides during the recovery of the later years and the
trading pit is reduced to a symbolic venue with less than 10 trades per day during the last
four years of our sample, we still do not observe a decline of the same order of magnitude
for the activity clustering.
In summary, we reject Hypothesis 1 that market participants’ preference for trading
during the pit hours is due to the informativeness of pit trading. The pit has a considerable
share in price discovery compared to its share in trading activity at least in the ﬁrst half
of our sample. However the rapid shrinkage of pit activity after the implementation of
the Globex ECN is not accompanied by a shift in the activity clustering.
3.4.2 What determines trading activity during the afterhours?
In this section we use the estimates from the structural model presented in Section
3.2.3 to evaluate whether the low trade activity during the afterhours is determined by a
feedback mechanism postulated in Hypothesis 2. Firstly we present the intraday estimates
of price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact of trades. Then we
provide a preliminary analysis by comparing the dynamics of the variable estimates and
trading activity across four afterhours periods. Lastly we test whether the eﬀects of the
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three variables on trading activity conform with our second hypothesis.
Figure 3.7 presents the dynamics of trade volume and the estimates of the public
information variance from the structural model presented in Eq. (3.5) and (3.6). We
estimate the model 20 times for separate six-months sub-periods. Trade volumes follow
a similar pattern across years, as in Figure 3.5: Trading is very limited until the opening
of the London market at 3:00h EST (or 2:00h EST depending on the day-light saving
time diﬀerences) and shows a dramatic rise from 7:00h EST on. The level of this pat-
tern changes in line with the annual averages of trade volumes presented in Table 3.1.
The estimates of public innovation variance σ2t , which we use as a proxy for the price
informativeness, follow a similar pattern, but with diﬀerent levels. While trade volume
peaks during the ﬁrst halves of 2007 and 2013, innovation variance peaks in the second
halves of 2008 and 2011. Thus trading activity peaks at the end of stable periods like
the last half-year before the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 or the U.S. recovery after
the ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, the innovation variance climaxes during the heights of
crises like the dramatic reduction of the target interest rate by the Fed in December 2008
or the downgrade of U.S. debt by Standard and Poor’s in August 2011. Therefore, in a
given day, the amount of price innovation tends to be proportional to the amount trade
activity; however, trades become more informative during volatile crisis periods.
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Figure 3.8 displays the other three time-varying parameter estimates. The levels of
the coeﬃcients of the unexpected order ﬂow θt and the price impact δt move in line with
the innovation variance σ2t , peaking at the second halves of 2008 and 2011. However, in
contrast to the innovation variance σ2t , the noise variance ω
2
t and the coeﬃcients of the
unexpected order ﬂow θt and price impact δt follow a ﬂatter pattern. The two coeﬃ-
cients display a clear downwards slope towards the market open in line with the negative
relationship with the rising trade volume, as predicted in Hypothesis 2.
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The shares of the innovation and noise variances in the total price variance highly de-
pend on the time of the day. As we have mentioned, the innovation variance σ2t measures
the contribution of public information because we control for the eﬀect of private infor-
mation signals in the evolution of the latent price process in Eq. (3.5). The estimated
public information variance, presented in the bottom plots of Figure 3.7, accounts for
30.8% of the realized volatility of 5-minute returns in the night hours, 12.1% in the pre-
open and 66.0% in the postclose. The increase of the contribution of public information
from the preopen to the postclose is in line with most models on market microstructure
indicating such a decline in information asymmetry over the trading period (Kyle, 1985;
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Easley and O’Hara, 1992).
By contrast, the proportion of the noise variance, presented in the bottom plots of Figure
3.8, to the total variation, measured by the realized volatility of 5-minute returns, stays
at a similar level during the preopen and the postclose, respectively 7.2% and 7.3%, but
nearly doubles its share during the night hours with 13.2%. With the introduction of
the Globex Platform in 2008, these shares move almost proportionally across all intraday
time periods: The portion of the public information in the total price variation increases
on average 29.0% across the day, whereas that of the noise variance drops by 75.6%.
The price changes stemming from the price impact of trades and the private infor-
mation signalled by the unexpected order ﬂow account for the remainder of the price
volatility, as can be seen in Eq. (3.5) and (3.6): Taking the public information and noise
variances into consideration, 55.9% of the price variation during the night hours, 81.0%
of the preopen and 26.7% of the postclose variation occurs due to these two factors. The
full eﬀect of the the price impact (private information signals), i.e. the product of the
estimated coeﬃcient with the order ﬂow (surprise) data, causes on average a price change
of 0.25 (0.18) standard deviations during the night hours, 0.26 (0.24) during the premove
and 0.18 (0.12) during the postclose.
For a preliminary analysis of the afterhours dynamics, we take the averages of the pa-
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rameter estimates for the four afterhours periods deﬁned in the previous section: Tokyo
hours (ECN Open-03:00h EST), London hours (03:00h-6:20h EST), preopen (6:20h-8:20h
EST) and postclose (15:00h-17:00h EST). The ratios of noise variances to innovation vari-
ances, exhibited in Figure 3.9, indicate that prices during each of these afterhours periods
become more informative around the implementation of Reg NMS and the introduction
of the Globex platform. In all six-month subperiods the noisiness of prices decreases
monotonically from the ECN open to the pit open due to the rise of innovation variances.
During the Tokyo hours the noise variance even exceeds the innovation variance for ﬁve
out of eight pre-Globex half-years. We ﬁnd the preopen period to be almost always more
informative than the postclose period as in Barclay and Hendershott (2003) and He et al.
(2009).
Figure 3.10 presents the afterhours averages for the unexpected order ﬂow coeﬃcient,
which is a measure of information asymmetry. By contrast to the noise-to-innovation
ratios, the ﬁnancial crisis has a far bigger eﬀect compared to the concurrent advances in
electronic trading. Although information asymmetry reaches its lowest levels at the end
of our sample period, it peaks instead of diminishing in 2008 and 2009. The intraday
picture exhibits a recurring pattern of monotonic decline in information asymmetry from
the ECN open to the ECN close for the afterhours. The ﬁrst half of 2007 and the second
half of 2011 constitute the sole exceptions with small increases in the preopen compared
to the London hours. This ﬁnding provides further support to the decline in information
asymmetry over the trading period, combined with the aforementioned increase of the
contribution of public information to the total price variation from the preopen to the
postclose.
The price impact of trades constitutes a major obstacle for the proliferation of trad-
ing. Therefore the sustainability of activity clustering during the pit hours relies on the
resilience of the price impact during the afterhours. The mean price impact coeﬃcients
during afterhours periods, shown in Figure 3.11, peak in 2008 and 2009 and return to
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Fig. 3.9. Noise-to-Innovation Ratios During Afterhours Periods
The ﬁgure shows the mean noise-to-innovation ratios in four afterhours periods. The ratios are computed
by dividing the noise variance ω2t to the innovation variance σ
2
t and taking their averages for each after-
hours period. The parameters are estimated using the model presented in Section 3.2.3 for 20 half-yearly
intervals from 2004 to 2013.
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Fig. 3.10. The Magnitudes of Unexpected Order Flow Coeﬃcients During Afterhours
Periods
The ﬁgure shows the mean of the unexpected order ﬂow coeﬃcient θt in four afterhours periods. The
parameters are estimated using the model presented in Section 3.2.3 for 20 half-yearly intervals from 2004
to 2013.
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their prior level in 2010. We see a downward shift in price impact only from 2012 on.
In the ﬁrst half of 2012, the price impact coeﬃcient drops again to its pre-Globex low in
2006-2007 and reduces even further from the second half of 2012 on. The gap between
night hours and preopen values also decreases in the last years. The overall decrease in
price impact and the decrease of the diﬀerences across afterhours periods constitutes some
evidence for the decline of the price impact barrier against trading during the afterhours.
The feedback mechanism postulated in the second hypothesis requires the three market
variables to have a signiﬁcant explanatory power on the trade activity. In order to test
this, we regress the changes in the afterhours trade volume on the changes in the proxies
of price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact. As the regressors are
estimates themselves, we use the Murphy and Topel (1985) method to calculate correct
standard errors. Table 3.3 reports for each half-year the results of separate regressions for
each variable and a regression using all three variables. Price informativeness emerges as
the most signiﬁcant factor explaining intraday changes in trading activity. It has a strong
positive relationship with trading activity as postulated and its eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 5%
level in 13 out of 20 regressions. The coeﬃcient displays little ﬂuctuation across years
and indicates that a percentage change in price informativeness relates to a percentage
change of the same magnitude for trading activity.
The results for information asymmetry and price impact express a weaker relationship
with trading activity. Out of the 20 regressions, the eﬀect of information asymmetry is
insigniﬁcant at 5% level for four separate regressions and 11 combined ones. Price impact
has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect for 11 regressions of both types. In the signiﬁcant cases the
signs of the coeﬃcients are almost always in line with the negative eﬀect posited by the
second hypothesis. The few exceptions are either very small in terms of magnitude, as
is the case for two positive coeﬃcients of information asymmetry in separate regressions,
or emerge due to the interaction between price impact and information asymmetry in
combined regressions. Including the coeﬃcients of the unexpected order ﬂow (information
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Fig. 3.11. The Magnitudes of Price Impact Coeﬃcients During Afterhours Periods
The ﬁgure shows the mean of the price impact coeﬃcient δt in four afterhours periods. The parameters
are estimated using the model presented in Section 3.2.3 for 20 half-yearly intervals from 2004 to 2013.
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Table 3.3. Regressions to Test for activity clustering
We report the coeﬃcient estimates for the regressions of trade volume on each of the variable estimates separately.
Both the independent and dependent variables are in log diﬀerences. The Time column gives the half-year period
the trade volume data and the time-varying estimates are based on. The IV, UOF and PI columns give coeﬃcient
estimates of public innovation variance, unexpected order ﬂow coeﬃcient and price impact coeﬃcients. These are
followed by the mean adjusted R2 of the separate regressions and the adjusted R2 of the combined regression. The
superscript ∗∗∗ marks signiﬁcance at level 1%, ∗∗ at level 5%, and ∗ at level 10%. As the regressors are estimates
themselves, we use the Murphy and Topel (1985) method to calculate correct standard errors.
Separate Regressions Combined Regression
Time IV UOF PI adj. R2 IV UOF PI adj. R2 N
2004a 1.4∗∗∗ −0.6∗∗∗ −1.3∗∗∗ 4.0 1.1∗∗∗ −0.2 −0.6∗ 5.9 164
2004b 0.3 −7.8∗∗ −4.2∗∗∗ 1.1 −0.1 2.2 −4.8∗∗∗ 2.7 164
2005a 1.2∗∗∗ −3.9∗∗ −3.6∗∗∗ 4.0 0.8∗∗ 5.3∗∗ −5.2∗∗∗ 5.9 164
2005b 0.8∗∗ −0.6∗∗∗ −2.0∗∗ 2.6 0.3 −0.6∗∗∗ −2.0∗∗∗ 5.1 164
2006a 0.8∗∗∗ −0.4∗∗ −6.0∗∗ 2.5 0.8∗∗∗ 0.0 −4.9∗∗ 5.6 176
2006b 0.6∗∗ 0.0 −2.2∗∗ 0.5 0.5∗∗ 0.0 −1.8∗∗ 1.0 176
2007a 0.4∗∗ −4.4∗∗ −1.3∗∗ 0.5 0.2 −4.8∗∗∗ −1.4∗∗∗ 1.0 176
2007b 0.4∗∗∗ −0.1 −0.2 1.1 0.3∗∗ 0.8 −1.0 3.4 176
2008a 1.6∗∗∗ −0.3∗∗ −0.9 2.2 1.7∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗ 0.4 5.2 182
2008b 0.6∗∗ −25.3∗∗∗ −2.8 2.2 0.4 −19.5∗∗ −0.2 3.2 182
2009a 0.6∗∗∗ −31.4∗∗∗ −1.3 3.4 0.5∗∗∗ −30.0∗∗∗ 1.5∗ 8.4 182
2009b 1.2∗∗∗ −20.8∗∗∗ 0.2 3.9 0.9∗∗∗ −21.2∗∗∗ −2.9∗∗∗ 10.3 182
2010a 1.3∗∗∗ −12.6∗∗∗ −0.4∗ 4.8 1.2∗∗∗ −4.0 0.0 11.5 182
2010b 1.0∗∗∗ −13.7∗∗∗ −1.0 5.0 1.0∗∗∗ 2.5 −1.4 11.6 182
2011a 0.7∗∗∗ 0.4 0.3 2.1 1.0∗∗∗ 1.1 −0.2 9.1 182
2011b 0.1 0.0∗∗ 0.1 −0.1 0.0 −0.2∗∗ 0.9∗ 0.3 182
2012a 1.4∗∗∗ −0.7∗∗ 0.0 5.6 1.4∗∗∗ −0.1 0.4 14.1 188
2012b 1.1∗∗∗ −4.2∗∗ −0.3 4.2 1.0∗∗∗ −5.0∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗ 12.8 188
2013a 1.6∗∗∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 5.6 1.5∗∗∗ 0.0 0.0 11.9 188
2013b 1.0∗∗∗ 0.1 −0.9 3.8 1.0∗∗∗ −0.2 −0.7∗∗ 11.5 188
asymmetry) and the total order ﬂow (price impact) in one regression may not be very
sensible, because they share the eﬀect of the adverse selection in prices: Information
asymmetry measures the informative component of adverse selection and price impact
includes the under- and overreaction to this informative component. One may very well
capture the eﬀect of the other, if the uninformative component of the price impact is
relatively small, making the coeﬃcient estimates diﬃcult to interpret.
The eﬀects of information asymmetry and price impact display a strong time-dependence.
The negative relationship of information asymmetry with trading activity peaks during
the crisis years, from the second half of 2008 on. In the ﬁrst half of 2009 a one percent
change in information asymmetry causes a trading activity drop with a magnitude more
than 30%. This increased negative eﬀect subsides starting with 2011. In the case of the
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price impact the signiﬁcance rather than the magnitude of the relationship shifts over
time. Starting with the second half of 2007 the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of price impact on
trading activity disappears with a few exceptions. This can again be related to the rise
of algorithmic trade execution systems allowing the execution of large orders in small
batches, which reduces the price impact costs for electronic trading. Thus price impact
of trades ceases to be a signiﬁcant reason for not trading in relatively illiquid periods.
We can test these relationships also cross-sectionally for each 5-minute interval of
the afterhours. Figure 3.12 reports the coeﬃcient estimates generated by regressing the
changes in trade volume on the contemporaneous changes in the estimates of public inno-
vation variance, unexpected order ﬂow coeﬃcient and price impact coeﬃcient. Although
we have a small number of observations per regression (19 at best), for 51, 50 and 61 out
of the 184 5-minute intervals we ﬁnd the regression coeﬃcients to be signiﬁcant at 5%
level for the price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact regressions,
respectively.
The signs of the statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients are in line with the time
series regressions and the second hypothesis. In all cases we observe a less than one-
to-one eﬀect of percentage changes in the three variables on trading activity. Although
the postclose period has the highest share of signiﬁcant cases, the eﬀects of information
asymmetry and price impact are negligibly small for the year-to-year changes, mainly due
to the large increases they experience during the crisis years.
In summary, we ﬁnd nuanced but positive evidence for the second hypothesis. Price
informativeness during the afterhours has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with trading
activity. The negative relation between information asymmetry and trading activity has
risen particularly during the ﬁnancial crisis. Price impact requires a more reﬁned inter-
pretation, because its negative relation with trading activity loses its signiﬁcance from
the second half of 2007 on.
113
F
ig
.
3.
12
.
T
h
e
C
o
eﬃ
ci
en
t
E
st
im
at
es
fo
r
th
e
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
ti
on
al
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
T
h
e
ﬁ
g
u
re
sh
ow
s
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s
g
en
er
a
te
d
b
y
re
g
re
ss
in
g
th
e
ch
a
n
g
es
in
tr
a
d
e
vo
lu
m
e
on
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
in
n
ov
at
io
n
va
ri
a
n
ce
,
u
n
ex
p
ec
te
d
o
rd
er
ﬂ
ow
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
an
d
p
ri
ce
im
p
a
ct
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
fo
r
ea
ch
5-
m
in
u
te
in
te
rv
a
l
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
a
ft
er
h
o
u
rs
.
R
es
u
lt
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l
a
re
em
b
o
ld
en
ed
.
A
s
th
e
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
s
th
em
se
lv
es
,
w
e
u
se
th
e
M
u
rp
h
y
a
n
d
T
o
p
el
(1
9
8
5
)
m
et
h
o
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
co
rr
ec
t
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
114
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the factors behind the concentration of trading around
the pit hours. For the case of the U.S. Treasury futures, about three quarters of trades
happen during this 400 minutes of a trading day. We document only a mild secular trend
towards the erosion of this clustering. We ﬁnd the largest trade volume increases during
the trade hours of the London market for U.S. Treasury futures and the largest drops
in Amihud (2002) illiquidity during the Tokyo market hours. The recent ﬁnancial crisis
stops this trend at least for a while, probably because of the increasing importance of
macroeconomic announcements made during the pit hours and a stronger preference for
trading in more liquid times of the day.
We ﬁnd the informativeness of pit trades to be an unsatisfactory explanation for
clustering of trading activity during pit hours. The trading pit indeed has a sizable share
in price discovery before the introduction of the Globex Platform in 2008. However the
substantial reduction of pit trading after 2008 does not cause a signiﬁcant change in the
mild erosion trend of the trading activity share of the pit hours. The last few years make
this conclusion clearer as the dynamics generated by the ﬁnancial crisis subside.
We use a structural model estimated with state space methods to analyze afterhours
trading. Public information variance displays a strong time-varying pattern similar to
trade volumes, increasing near open and close times of diﬀerent markets ad towards the
pit hours. We observe ﬂatter patterns, but considerable diﬀerences across afterhours
periods for the coeﬃcients of the order ﬂow and the unexpected order ﬂow, measuring
price impact and information asymmetry respectively. The preopen stands out as the most
informative afterhours period, while the postclose has the least information asymmetry.
Discounting for the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis, we observe a progressive decrease during
the afterhours for information asymmetry, price impact of trades and the amount of noise
in prices, attributable to the improvements in electronic trading.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm price informativeness and costs related to information asym-
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metry and price impact as signiﬁcant explanatory factors for activity clustering. Price
informativeness during the afterhours has a stable and strong positive relationship with
the distribution of trading activity. Information asymmetry generates adverse selection
costs pushing liquidity traders away and its eﬀect is particularly strong in the crisis period.
Price impact costs, on the other hand, have a negative eﬀect on trading activity until the
second half of 2007, but cease to be a signiﬁcant factor afterwards. We attribute this
change to the improvements in algorithmic execution systems in the same period which
have a documented diminishing eﬀect on trade sizes with the introduction of the Globex
Platform.
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Appendix: The state space representation of the structural
model
In the state space form, the structural model of Section 3.2.3 model given in Eq. (3.5)
and (3.6) can be represented by these two equations:
pt = δtqt + [1 1 1 ψ1,j]
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t−1
t−1
et−1,j
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+Gεt, where G = [1 1] and εt =
⎡
⎢⎣ t
et
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t
t
et,j
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ θt (qt − E[qt|qt−1])
0(1+J)×1
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
0
0
0J×1
0
0
0
0J×1
01×J
01×J
01×J
IJ
0
0
0
0J×1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p∗t−1
t−1
et−1,j
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+Hεt,
where H =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0
1 0
0 1
0J×1 0J×1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
with ψn,m a stacked row vector of ψj coeﬃcients from the n
th to the mth, et−n,m a stacked
column vector of disturbances ej from time t−n to time t−n−m, 0n×m an n×m matrix
of zeros, In is an n× n identity matrix. The variance parameters are uniquely identiﬁed
using the covariance matrix of the stacked disturbances
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦ εt, which comprises the
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innovation and noise variances:
E
⎡
⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦ εtε′t
⎡
⎢⎣ H
G
⎤
⎥⎦
′⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2t σ
2
t 0 01×J σ
2
t
σ2t σ
2
t 0 01×J σ
2
t
0 0 ω2t 01×J ω
2
t
0J×1 0J×1 0J×1 0J×J 0J×1
σ2t σ
2
t ω
2
t 01×J σ
2
t + ω
2
t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
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Chapter 4
Momentum Ignition?
HFT Activity During Transitory
Extreme Price Moves
This chapter is a joint project with Prof. Bruce Mizrach of Rutgers University.
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4.1 Introduction
The increasing role of technology in the contemporary ﬁnancial markets heightens
concerns about the predatory use of speed via high frequency trading (HFT). Large price
moves, especially when they revert substantially in a matter of minutes if not seconds, fre-
quently attract comments concerning the use of the so-called momentum ignition strategy.
The Concept Release on Equity Market Structure by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which has been open for comments since 2010, mentions momentum
ignition as one of the two main “directional strategies that may present serious problems
in today’s market structure” and deﬁnes it as initiating “a series of orders and trades [...]
in an attempt to ignite a rapid price move either up or down” (SEC, 2010). Similarly, the
recent European Commission Regulation No 596/2014 on market abuse explicitly men-
tions this strategy in its supplementary annexes and uses a comparable deﬁnition based
on the use of trade activity to instigate a price change.
Only a small portion of the overall HFT activity is generated by ﬁrms mainly em-
ploying liquidity-taking tactics required for the application of directional strategies such
as momentum ignition. Smart liquidity providers, called as ‘the new market makers’,
comprise the majority of the HFT activity, which directly relates to the observed posi-
tive eﬀects of HFT ﬁrms on market quality measures such as liquidity (Menkveld, 2013;
Hagstromer and Norden, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2014). However, the liquidity provided by
market-making HFT ﬁrms is more likely to be consumed by opportunistic HFT ﬁrms in-
stead of traditional liquidity traders, imposing higher adverse selection costs and spreads
on the market (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2015; Menkveld and Zoican, 2014).
This aggressive minority of HFT ﬁrms specialized in liquidity-taking also enjoys a larger
share in proﬁts than their passive counterparts dedicated to market-making, the prof-
itability of which may even depend on the fee rebates provided by stock exchanges for
their liquidity provision (Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko, 2012; Brogaard et al., 2014).
A recent literature of studies looks into the sources of this success by investigating
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speciﬁc strategies employed by HFT ﬁrms and evaluating their eﬀects on market quality.
Particularly, the practice of placing and then immediately cancelling a large number of
orders, namely quote stuﬃng, has been attracting a variety of studies (Conrad, Wahal,
and Xiang, 2015; Egginton, van Ness, and van Ness, 2013; Gai, Yao, and Ye, 2013). The
ongoing debate over the explanation of this phenomenon questions whether it constitutes
one part of a larger aggressive HFT tactic or can be explained by the risk management of
liquidity providers, experimentations with HFT machinery and algorithms or competitive
Edgeworth cycles (Baruch and Glosten, 2013; Gao and Mizrach, 2015; Hasbrouck, 2015).
More directly related to liquidity-taking strategies, Clark-Joseph (2013) documents the
practice of exploratory trading, the execution of small-sized trades at a loss in order to
discern information on the market conditions. Similarly, Hirschey (2013) argues that
the frequent lead of HFT sales and purchases over similar non-HFT trades can best be
explained by the use of order anticipation strategies.
The strategy of momentum ignition has drawn the attention of academics as well as
practitioners. A large but temporary price change comprises the characteristic feature
of this strategy, although a consensus is lacking over its details. Such changes are usual
suspects for market fraud since the use of ‘pump-and-dump’ tactics by lower frequency
traders. Hitting one side on the market with trades for a short period constitutes a
frequently mentioned method to generate such temporary price moves. Theoretically, the
HFT technology can aid the precise timing and the optimal execution of such a wave of
market orders. The size of the move also makes it economically sensible to be exploited by
HFT ﬁrms specialized in directional trading. Unlike the HFT market-making strategies
beneﬁtting from the wideness of the bid-ask spread, liquidity-taking strategies need to
cross the spread and still remain proﬁtable, which is easier to ensure for large moves.
Also, regardless of the proﬁts some parties may enjoy during these events, large moves
tend to deteriorate market quality harming unprepared market participants and raising
concerns of regulators.
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In the literature, potential cases of momentum ignition have been captured using
two main approaches: ﬁlters for various components of the strategy and jump-detection
methods. Tse, Lin, and Vincent (2012) adopt a multi-stage ﬁlter to capture momentum
ignition patterns and deﬁne the tactic by a premove period of high trade volume with at
most small price ﬂuctuations and a following rapid move and reversal. Sokolov (2014)
and the related study of Brogaard, Carrion, Moyaert, Riordan, Shkilko, and Sokolov
(2015) employ jump-detection methods to ﬁnd extreme move patterns and examine the
activity of HFT ﬁrms during these events. We use a series of ﬁlters ensuring the existence
of trade activity during the event and looking for a premove period with stable prices
followed by an extreme price move relative to the past volatility of the stock. Compared
to jump-detection methods, these ﬁlters can capture events of a variety of time lengths
for the move and reversal periods. The use of jump-detection methods also generate a
large amount of data, marking each unit interval for the existence or the absence a jump,
which is infeasible to process for estimation in large data sets.
We analyze a message-level data set of 8,000 stocks trading on NASDAQ from July
2007 to December 2013. The resulting data set of extreme move events consists of
1,675,100 observations, corresponding to about 3.40 events per month for each stock.1
About half of these moves end with a reversal of more than two-thirds of the magnitude
of the initial move, which we deem as transitory and focus as suspects for the application
of the momentum ignition strategy. Moves with less than one-third reversal and those
with one-third to two-thirds reversal each constitute about a quarter of the total.
We adopt the speed of order changes as a ﬁlter for the HFT activity. This choice
suits to our focus on market orders immediately resulting in trades, because many studies
consider the execution or cancellation of a new addition to the order book within a very
1As a point of comparison, Brogaard et al. (2015) ﬁnd an average of 4.75 extreme move events using
the jump-detection method of Lee and Mykland (2012). Tse et al. (2012) discover 1.6 momentum ignition
patterns with an average move size of 38 basis points per day for each stock of the STOXX600 Index. By
contrast, we set a lower bound of 100 basis points for the price moves to ensure the economic signiﬁcance
of the captured events, giving an average move size of 207 basis points.
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small amount of time, usually in 50-100 milliseconds to be precise, as a sign of the HFT
activity (Scholtus, van Dijk, and Frijns, 2014; Hasbrouck, 2015). By contrast, among
the limit orders managed by HFT ﬁrms, only the ones targeted with rapid replacement
messages can be identiﬁed with this time-based ﬁlter, e.g., Hasbrouck and Saar (2013).
The ability to use extensive data sets constitutes another advantage of this identiﬁcation
choice. So far only a few publicly available data sets, generally limited in terms of their
stock and time coverage, provide explicit identiﬁcation of the HFT activity.
We formalize the accounts of momentum ignition into two testable hypotheses. Firstly,
the HFT activity in the premove, i.e., the minute before the move, should be in line with
the move direction, implying both a correct positioning and potentially an instigative
power over the move. And secondly, the premove HFT activity should relate positively
with the magnitude of the reversal after the move event. Besides testing for these hy-
potheses, we also consider the eﬀect of the HFT activity before and during the event on
three market quality measures: the quoted spreads, market volatility and the execution-
to-cancellation ratios. To test these relationships, we use a series of regressions of the
move size, the degree of reversal and the market quality change on the HFT trade volume
and the HFT share in the trade volume, scaled by their past averages.
We also control for the two other market conditions which can cause a temporary
extreme move: ﬂeeting liquidity imbalances and the overreactions driven by non-HFT
parties. In both cases, the price move would revert considerably, once the market attracts
arbitrageurs bringing in liquidity or when the overreaction subsides. Moreover, the HFT
activity can precede the price moves in both events giving a false sign of causation: Due to
their ability to swiftly generate trading signals from data on market conditions and asset
fundamentals, HFT ﬁrms would be the ﬁrst to react to and exploit liquidity imbalances
and news announcements. We use the premove depth on both sides of the market relative
to its past average to control for the eﬀects of liquidity imbalances. Non-HFT trade
activity is added to account for events initiated and driven by non-HFT parties, including
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market overreaction.
We estimate ﬁxed eﬀects models with an unbalanced panel of data and a three-way
error component, which controls for the variation across ﬁrms, months and three intra-
day periods of open, midday and close. Due to the high dimensionality of our data set
comprising 8,000 stocks observed over 78 months, we implement the Within estimator of
Davis (2002), who extended on the one- and two-way error component models for unbal-
anced data developed by, respectively, Baltagi (1985) and Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989).
In order to avoid endogeneity issues caused by stock-speciﬁc events or cross-stock trading
strategies based on stocks of the same industry or index, we adopt the instrumental vari-
able approach of Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) to our variables capturing the HFT activity.
We test for structural breaks in the estimated coeﬃcients using the poolability test of
Han and Park (1989).
Controlling for the premove HFT activity, we ﬁnd that the HFT activity during the
move and its reversal alleviates the post-event deterioration of market quality. We inter-
pret this as the eﬀect of HFT market-makers, given the premove HFT activity controls
for the inﬂuence of HFTs using predatory tactics like momentum ignition. Hasbrouck
and Saar (2013) also ﬁnd a positive relationship between the HFT activity and market
quality measures such as spreads, depth and volatility, even at times of falling prices and
anxiety in the market. Using a smaller data set with explicit identiﬁcation for HFT liq-
uidity provision, Brogaard et al. (2015) show that HFT ﬁrms act as net liquidity suppliers
around jumps, whereby they absorb the order ﬂow and lead to smaller and more durable
price moves. We ﬁnd that even the liquidity-taking HFT activity during the move and
the reversal is far less aligned with the move or the reversal compared to the non-HFT
activity, signalling a higher prevalence to bet on mean-reversal strategies. Thus the HFT
activity during the move events may tend to soften the magnitude of extreme moves.
The regression results aﬃrm our main hypotheses concerning the use of the momen-
tum ignition strategy. Firstly, the premove HFT activity has a statistically signiﬁcant
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predictive power over transitory extreme moves. A 1% increase of the HFT share in trade
volume in line with (against) the move relative to its past average causes a 0.49 (0.46)
basis points increase (decrease) in the move size. The eﬀect sizes for the changes in HFT
trade volume itself are about ten-times smaller, but they still nearly equal that of the
percentage changes in the far larger non-HFT activity. The non-HFT trade volume in
the premove has been on average more than 10-times higher than the HFT trade volume,
although the share of the HFT activity in the premove trade volume more than doubles
from 2007 to 2013 following a monotonic trend across the years.
Secondly, the premove HFT activity on both sides on the market are associated with
larger reversals, especially during the subinterval from October 2011 to December 2013.
Increases in the HFT activity on both sides of the market lead to stronger reversals: A
1% change in the HFT trade volume against (in line with) the move direction increases
the degree of reversal by 0.44 (0.46) basis points.
Thirdly, again during the subinterval from October 2011 to December 2013, we ﬁnd
some evidence for a negative relationship between the premove HFT activity and the
market quality change caused by the extreme move event. We estimate a statistically
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect for half of the 12 coeﬃcients belonging to the premove HFT
activity, whereas only one in the remaining half captures a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
On average a 1% increase in the HFT trade volume (in the HFT share in the trade
volume) during the premove deteriorates the market quality change by 0.20%, 0.02% and
0.10% (0.48%, 0.56% and 0.06%) for quoted spreads, market volatility and execution-to-
cancellation ratios, respectively.
The subinterval with signiﬁcant supportive evidence for the use of the momentum
ignition strategy is situated in the aftermath of the peaks of the ﬁnancial crisis. This
coincides with the reported drops in HFT proﬁtability due to a number of factors such
as the reduction of especially market-making proﬁts due to lower market volatility and
the overcrowding of the HFT ﬁeld. This timing also casts doubt on the external validity
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of the frequently-used NASDAQ data set of 2008-2009, in which the trading activity of
HFT ﬁrms are explicitly identiﬁed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the data set
and our methodology for the detection of extreme move events. Section 4.3 presents our
hypotheses concerning the existence of the momentum ignition strategy and how to test
them. Section 4.4 evaluates the eﬀect of the HFT activity on the move size, the degree
of reversal and the change in market quality.
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we ﬁrstly introduce how we use the NASDAQ data set. Then, we
elaborate on our detection algorithm for extreme price moves. Lastly, we provide summary
statistics for the move events.
4.2.1 The ITCH data set
We construct the full order book using data from the ITCH message feed of the NAS-
DAQ TotalView database. The data span from July 2007 to December 2013 and consist
of 8,000 randomly selected stocks out of 11,341 available ones.2 Each message in the
TotalView-ITCH data feed is time-stamped to the nanosecond and messages have three
main categories: additions of displayed orders, order cancellations and order executions.
The message data contain two types of new quote additions to the order book. Market
participants can choose whether to enter their limit orders into the book with their market
participant ID or to trade anonymously. The additions of anonymous traders have the
code A, while new limit orders with a market participant ID have the code F.
Messages can leave the order book in ﬁve ways. An E message indicates the partial
or full execution of a limit order at the quoted price. If the execution happens at a price
other than the original quoted price, the data set records this as a C message. Three other
2The use of just a subset of the whole stock universe is a temporary measure taken due to the
momentary unavailability of the whole data set.
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types of messages denote the cancellation of an order: Orders that are partially cancelled
are designated with an X and full cancellations are reported with a D message. Lastly, a
market participant can cancel an order and replace it with another order and these are
denoted with a U message.3
We aggregate these messages in 1-second-long intervals to generate three market vari-
ables: new quote volume (A and F messages), cancellation volume (D, U and X messages)
and trade volume (C and E messages). We distinguish the HFT component in the latter
two variables by ﬁltering new quote additions cancelled or executed within 50 milliseconds
after their placement. Given that the average reaction time of a human to visual stimuli
is around 180-200 ms (Brebner and Welford, 1980), cut-oﬀ values of 50 ms or 100 ms are
frequently employed by researchers as a ﬁlter for the HFT activity (e.g., Hasbrouck and
Saar, 2013; Scholtus et al., 2014; Hasbrouck, 2015).
4.2.2 The Detection Algorithm for Extreme Price Moves
The oﬃcial documents as well as the accounts of practitioners generally deﬁne the
momentum ignition strategy in broad strokes, without providing much speciﬁcity. As we
have mentioned in the introduction, a common feature of these deﬁnitions is the use of
trades to generate a rapid and large price move. As this price move is not based on new
information or actual demand and supply dynamics, popular accounts also add a reversal
soon after the move. We aim to capture constituents of the universe of extreme price
moves to evaluate whether the trade activity of HFT ﬁrms indeed leads to the expected
consequences of a momentum ignition strategy.
We detect extreme price moves by processing the order book data with a set of ﬁlters
and a volatility benchmark based on the past data. As a measure of volatility, we use the
3For a more complete description, we refer to the documentation with the releases of the Nasdaq
ITCH Total View data set available at: http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=itch.
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high-low range for each minute, deﬁned as
HLi,t =
phighi,t − plowi,t
phighi,t + p
low
i,t
, (4.1)
where phight and p
low
t are the highest and the lowest midquote of stock i at minute t,
respectively.
We use three ﬁlters to ﬁnd extreme price moves:
1. Premove stability ﬁlter: The high-low range in the premove, i.e. the minute before
the start of the move, should be at most the average high-low range of the same minute
in the prior 22 days. This ﬁlter makes sure that the starting point is not deep into an
ongoing price move, but the terminal point of a period of stable prices.
2. Large move ﬁlter: The move size, scaled by the square root of move length, should be
at least 1% of the stock price and also at least 10 times the average high-low range of the
same minute in the prior 22 days.
3. Trade activity ﬁlter: There should be at least one trade during the move and the
reversal. This ﬁlter aims to choose only the events, during which a market participant
may have proﬁtted from the changed prices.
We restrict our study to the 380 minutes from 9:35 to 15:55, in order to avoid the
high volatility and other problems associated with the market open and close, which may
distort our measures. At each second, we look into the following 3 minutes in 5 second
increments for a move length satisfying the large move ﬁlter. After ﬁnding the move
length with the largest change scaled by time, we look into the 3 minutes following the
peak/bottom in 5 second increments for the largest reversal scaled by the square root of
reversal length.
This algorithm diﬀers from the ﬁlter-based methodology of Tse et al. (2012) in two
main aspects: the volatility benchmark and the premove trade activity. Tse et al. (2012)
use the volatility in the recent minutes as a benchmark to evaluate the stability in the
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premove and the relative magnitude of the move. However intraday volatility does not
necessarily follow a smooth pattern: A temporary increase in volatility may disqualify an
upcoming large move, while a drop in volatility may make a following small move look
like an extreme price change. We use the 22-day past average of volatility during the
corresponding minute as a more reliable benchmark. Secondly, Tse et al. (2012) look for
short-term increases in trading activity during the premove. We ﬁnd this too restrictive as
it does not represent a feature commonly mentioned in the public accounts of momentum
ignition patterns.
This multi-stage ﬁlter enables us to capture a wide range of extreme move patterns.
Unlike many jump-detection methods, we can pick up moves and reversals with variable
time lengths. Our benchmark volatility, the minutely moving average of past high-low
ranges, is by construction sensitive to the intraday volatility patterns, which usually follow
a U-shape. This benchmark also relies on the past data instead of considering the whole
data set and thus the recognized events coincide with those cases, which the market
participants would consider as extreme moves at their occurrence.
4.2.3 Summary Statistics of Move Events
Our detection algorithm captures 1,675,100 extreme move events, corresponding to
about 3.40 events per month for each stock. We diﬀerentiate three degrees of reversal
after a move: The transitory moves revert more than two-thirds of the move, while the
permanent ones revert less than one-third of the move. The intermediary category of
reversals between one-third and two-thirds comprises the mid moves. Figure 4.1 displays
the distribution of events across time. The number of extreme moves tends to decrease
over time, probably due to the drop of volatility relative to the peaks of the crisis. The
period of 2008-2010 has about 2.5 times more events than the period of 2011-2013.
The volatility swings during the crisis also lead to dramatic drops in the number of
recognized events, such as the drops to zero for March 2008 and the period from October
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Fig. 4.1. The Distribution of Extreme Move Events Across Time
The ﬁgures shows the monthly distribution of extreme move events disaggregated according to the degree
of reversal. The upper ﬁgure shows the absolute numbers, while the lower plot displays the percentage
shares in the total number of events. The transitory moves revert back more than two thirds of the move.
The permanent moves revert back less than a third of the move. The mid moves revert back a third to
two thirds.
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2008 to March 2009. Especially the second period contains a sizable upwards swing in
volatility followed by a substantial drop in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. Such swings trigger the ﬁrst two ﬁlters disqualifying most of the potential cases:
Large volatility increases make the premove periods more volatile than the past average,
thereby no potential premove period seems to have stable prices, and large volatility drops
make the move sizes small compared to the past average, recorded during higher volatility
levels.
Figure 4.2 displays the distribution of the extreme move events across the trading
day, disaggregated by the degree of their reversals. Although the volatility benchmark
depends on the time of the day, the more volatile periods of the market open and close
exhibit larger numbers of extreme move events. The relative shares of the three groups
corresponding to diﬀerent degrees of reversal remain relatively stable, just like in their
distribution across time depicted in Figure 4.1. 53.6% of the extreme moves are transitory,
compared to the 22.8% share of the permanent moves.
The move sizes as a percentage of the stock price tend to increase over time, as shown
in Figure 4.3. For the transitory (permanent) moves, the share of the smallest move size
group containing sizes of 1% to 2% decreases from 71.9% (63.7%) in the period of 2008-
2010 to 64.9% (56.7%) in the period of 2011-2013, while all other groups increase their
shares. This move size increase coincides with the increasing share of stocks with lower
market capitalization and lower trade volumes, as depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Thus
the decline of market volatility reduces especially the number of extreme move events at
large-cap stocks, which experience smaller moves due to their higher liquidity.
Figure 4.6 depicts the swings in the trade volume during ﬁve periods of an event: the
premove, the two halves of the move and those of the reversal. The trading activity in the
direction of the move, i.e., the volume of buyer/seller-initiated trades for up/down moves,
tends to surpass the trades with the opposite direction at the premove. This asymmetry
heightens during both halves of the move. During the reversal, we observe the mirror
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Fig. 4.2. The Distribution of Extreme Move Events Within the Day
The ﬁgure shows the number of extreme move events per 5-minute interval disaggregated according to
the degree of reversal. The moves are allocated to each interval according to their stating points. The
upper ﬁgure shows the absolute numbers, while the lower plot displays the percentage shares in the total
number of events. The transitory moves revert back more than two-thirds of the move. The permanent
moves revert back less than one-third of the move. The mid moves revert back one-third to two-thirds.
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Fig. 4.3. The Move Size Distribution of Extreme Move Events Across Time
The ﬁgure shows the monthly shares of 7 move size groups in the number of extreme move events. The
upper (lower) ﬁgure shows the distribution of the transitory (permanent) moves. Move size increases
from blue to yellow. The groups consist of move size intervals of 1% to 2%, 2% to 3%, 3% to 4%, 4% to
5%, 5% to 10% and 10% to 50%.
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Fig. 4.4. The Market Cap Distribution of Extreme Move Events Across Time
The ﬁgure shows the monthly distribution of extreme move events disaggregated according to the market
capitalization decile of the stock. The upper (lower) ﬁgure shows the distribution of the transitory
(permanent) moves. Market capitalization decreases from yellow to blue.
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Fig. 4.5. The Trade Volume Distribution of Extreme Move Events Across Time
The ﬁgure shows the monthly distribution of extreme move events disaggregated according to the trade
volume decile of the stock. The upper (lower) ﬁgure shows the distribution of the transitory (permanent)
moves. Market capitalization decreases from yellow to blue.
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image of this asymmetry: The trade volume in the opposite direction outnumbers that in
the move direction. As expected, the transitory moves which experience a higher degree
of reversal also experience a far larger trade volume in the reversal direction.
HFT trade activity also tends to follow the aforementioned asymmetries throughout
the event periods. However, Figure 4.7 shows that the share of the HFT activity in the
total trade volume is larger in the direction opposite to the market move: During the
move, HFT trades constitute a clearly larger share of trades against the move direction
than those in line with it and, to a weaker degree, the HFT share against the reversal
direction increases during the reversal. This shows that although the net HFT trade
volume is in line with the move (reversal) during the move (reversal), during the move
HFT ﬁrms bet in favor of the reversal of the move stronger than the non-HFT market
participants.
4.3 Methodology
In this section, we present hypotheses for the existence of the momentum ignition
strategy and the estimation methods to test their validity. These center around the pre-
dictive power of the premove HFT activity on the move and its reversal. We also look into
the eﬀects of the HFT activity on market quality. Our analysis focusses on the universe of
transitory moves, because they are the primary suspects of the momentum ignition strat-
egy in public accounts. Inclusion of other move types would introduce diﬀerent dynamics,
potentially disassociating our hypotheses from identiﬁcation of the usage of this strategy.
For example, the inclusion of permanent moves would bring in a clear price discovery role
to the relation between the premove activity and the move size, weakening the possibility
to interpret this relation as the instigation of a non-informative and thus temporary price
change.
The oﬃcial documents as well as the accounts of practitioners generally deﬁne the
momentum ignition strategy in broad strokes, without providing much speciﬁcity. As we
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Fig. 4.6. The Mean Trade Volume During the Events
The ﬁgure shows the mean HFT and non-HFT trade volumes at ﬁve event periods: the premove, and
the ﬁrst and second halves of the move and reversal. The two upper ﬁgures report the statistics for the
permanent moves and the two lower ﬁgures for the transitory moves. The ﬁgures on the left report the
volume of trades in the direction of the move, i.e. buyer/seller-initiated trades for up/down moves, and
the ﬁgures on the right report the trade volume in the opposite direction.
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Fig. 4.7. The HFT Share in the Trade Volume During the Events
The ﬁgure shows the mean HFT and non-HFT trade volumes at ﬁve event periods: the premove, and
the ﬁrst and second halves of the move and reversal. The two upper ﬁgures report the statistics for the
permanent moves and the two lower ﬁgures for the transitory moves. The ﬁgures on the left report the
volume of trades in the direction of the move, i.e. buyer/seller-initiated trades for up/down moves, and
the ﬁgures on the right report the trade volume in the opposite direction.
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have mentioned in the introduction, a common feature of these deﬁnitions is the use of
trades to generate a rapid and large price move. As this price move is not based on new
information or actual demand and supply dynamics, popular accounts also add a reversal
soon after the move. Based on these claims, we formulate two hypotheses required for the
existence of the momentum ignition strategy:
1. The HFT trading in the premove has predictive power over the move. The HFT
activity before the move event should be able to take a correct position before the move,
potentially also leading the initial price movement.
2. The HFT trading in the premove has predictive power over the degree of reversal.
Increasing HFT activity, especially in line with the move direction should be associated
with a larger degree of reversal.
Testing for these hypotheses should also include controls for observationally equivalent
alternatives to momentum ignition, which can generate these relationships. In particular
we control for two alternative market scenarios: ﬂeeting liquidity imbalances and the price
movements driven by non-HFT parties. The HFT activity can precede the price moves in
both types of events giving a false sign of causation. Due to their ability to swiftly generate
trading signals from data on market conditions and asset fundamentals, HFT ﬁrms would
be the ﬁrst to react and to exploit liquidity imbalances and news announcements. Also
in both cases, the initial price move would revert considerably, once the market attracts
arbitrageurs bringing in liquidity or correcting the overreaction. We use the premove
depth on both sides of the market to control for the eﬀects of liquidity imbalances. The
non-HFT trade activity is added to account for events initiated and driven by non-HFT
parties.
We examine the eﬀects of the HFT and non-HFT trading activity on three types
of variables, denoted as the dependent variable Changei,p,t in the following estimation
equations (4.2) and (4.3): The signed move size in percentages, the degree of reversal
relative to the move size in percentages and the change in the three market quality vari-
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ables in percentages. The subscripts denote that the dependent variable belongs to stock
i observed in the pth intraday period of month t. We divide the trading day to three
intraday periods, namely the open (9:30h-11:00h), the midday (11:00h-14:30h) and the
close (14:30h-15:00h), and assign each event to these periods depending on the starting
time of the move.
As the main explanatory variables related to the testing of the hypotheses, we use the
percentage diﬀerence of the HFT trade volume and the HFT share in the trade volume
from their 22-day averages, in order to make these ﬁgures comparable across stocks. To
account for the observationally equivalent alternatives, we use two sets of control variables.
We add the change in the premove new quote additions on both sides of the market relative
to their 22-day averages as a control for the ﬁrst scenario concerning liquidity imbalances.
To control for the second scenario of events driven by the non-HFT activity, we include
the percentage diﬀerence of the non-HFT trade volume from its 22-day average.
We deﬁne the estimation equation for the eﬀect of the HFT trade volume as
Changei,p,t =α +
nHFT,HFT∑
h
J∑
j=1
Pro,Anti∑
s
βh,j,sTrV olh,j,s,i,p,t +
Pro,Anti∑
s
γsQV olPMs,i,p,t
+
K∑
k=1
γkxi,p,t + εi,p,t,
(4.2)
where TrV olh,j,s,i,p,t is the percentage diﬀerence of the trade volume from its 22-day av-
erage for the same minute of the day, belonging to the market participant type h, h =
nHFT,HFT , at the jth subinterval of the event i on the market side s, s = Pro,Anti,HLi
is the 22-day average of the high-low range at the minute of the move start, QV olPMs,i,p,t
is the change in the new quote additions in the premove of the event i on the market
side s, s = Pro,Anti, relative to their 22-day average for the same minute of the day
and xi,p,t are K explanatory variables depending on the choice of Changei,p,t: For the
market quality variables it includes the 22-day average level of the concerning variable
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and, for all variables, it includes the past high-low range to capture the eﬀect of the recent
volatility of the stock. The new quote additions on the bid (ask) side and buyer-initiated
(seller-initiated) trades are denoted as Pro (Anti) for up and Anti (Pro) for down moves.
The eﬀect of the HFT share in the trade volume is evaluated by the similar regression
equation of
Changei,p,t =α +
J∑
j=1
Pro,Anti∑
s
βj,sHFTsharej,s,i,p,t +
Pro,Anti∑
s
γsQV olPMs,i,p,t +
K∑
k=1
γkxi,p,t + εi,p,t,
(4.3)
where HFTsharej,s,i,p,t is the HFT share in the trade volume, scaled by its 22-day average
for the same minute of the day, at the jth subinterval of the event i on the market side s,
s = Pro,Anti.
We model the disturbances εi,p,t as a three-way error component
εi,p,t = μi + ζp + λt + i,p,t, (4.4)
where μi captures the stock-speciﬁc eﬀect, ζp the eﬀect speciﬁc to the intraday period,
λt the month-speciﬁc eﬀect and i,p,t acts as ordinary disturbances. Direct estimation
of this ﬁxed eﬀects model would require the addition of a huge amount of dummies
for each stock, month and intraday period. We circumvent this problem by a Within
transformation wiping out the variation speciﬁc to the stock, month and intraday period
from the regressors. Baltagi (1985) and Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989) provide the Within
estimators of, respectively, one- and two-way error component models for unbalanced data
and we use the generalization of their work to multi-way error components by Davis (2002).
The possibility of omitted variables leading to changes in both the HFT activity and
the dependent variables causes endogeneity concerns. Such omitted variables may be
stock-speciﬁc as well as spread-out across a series of closely related stocks such as cross-
stock trading strategies taking positions on the components of the same industry or the
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same stock index. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) propose the market-wide component of the
HFT activity excluding the activity in the possibly related stocks as an instrument. This
market-wide component would correlate with the HFT activity but not with the omitted
variables speciﬁc to a stock or a group of stocks.
The market-wide components consist of the averages of the relevant variables, exclud-
ing the stock itself, the stocks in the same industry deﬁned by its SIC code and the stocks
in the S&P 500 or NASDAQ 100, if the concerning stock is listed in either of them. In Eq.
(4.2), we instrument the HFT (non-HFT) variables in each period of the event with the
market-wide average of the HFT (non-HFT) variables of the same event period for both
trade directions. In Eq. (4.3), the instruments for the HFT share variables in each period
of the event similarly consist of the market-wide averages of the HFT share variables in
the same period.
As a ﬁnal consideration, we examine the possible changes in the relationship between
the HFT activity and the dependent variables over time. Our data set exhibits at least
the vast transformation extending from the depths of the ﬁnancial crisis to the ongoing
recovery and HFT ﬁrms have to evolve according to these changing market conditions.
As our hypotheses are mainly concerned with the predictive power of the premove HFT
activity, we focus on the changes of its eﬀect. The poolability test of Han and Park
(1989) provides a method to look for structural breaks in the estimated coeﬃcients. This
amounts to an F-test for the diﬀerence of the coeﬃcient estimates between two subsamples
of the data.
We can reject the hypothesis of a constant eﬀect of the premove HFT activity for a
number of cases. These structural breaks cluster around the second half of 2011. Although
the most likely break points are not identical, we report the results of a second set of
regressions with a reduced data set, starting with October 2011. All regressions admitting
a break also cannot reject the hypothesis of a break in October 2011, although another
time in the second half of 2011 may be more probable.
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The regression results are provided under diﬀerent statistical signiﬁcance levels and
we interpret them using the 5% signiﬁcance level. We do not diﬀerentiate between the
two halves of the move and reversal periods, as we did in Section 4.2.3, in order to ease
the presentation of the results. Thus the number of event periods J can be at most three.
4.4 Analysis of Results
In this section, we investigate the eﬀects of the HFT trading activity on transitory
extreme price moves, both in terms of the existence of the momentum ignition strategy
and in terms of market quality. We examine the trading activity of the HFT ﬁrms
in connection with their explanatory power on the price move and on the magnitude
of the reversal following the move. And lastly, we use three market quality measures,
namely volatility measured by the high-low range, quoted spreads and the execution-to-
cancellation ratios, and estimate how they are aﬀected by the HFT activity before and
during the move events.
4.4.1 Predicting the Move
We measure the predictive power of HFT trading on the move direction and size by
estimating Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3) using the trade activity data for only the premove
period, i.e. J = 1. Table 4.1 reports the coeﬃcient estimates.
The HFT and non-HFT trade activity in the premove display a comparable predictive
power on the move size. For both of them, increases in the selling (buying) activity
rise the chance of an upcoming down (up) move. Although the eﬀects are statistically
signiﬁcant, they remain economically small. A 1% increase in the HFT (non-HFT) trade
volume in line with the move relative to its past average causes a 0.04 (0.03 to 0.04)
basis points rise in the move size. The magnitudes are similar for the change in the HFT
and non-HFT activity against the move direction. The similar sizes of these eﬀects are
particularly striking considering that a 1% increase in the HFT trade volume compared
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Table 4.1. The Move Size
The table reports how changes in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT ’) and the HFT share in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT%’)
relative to their 22-day average aﬀect the move size. The estimation equations are given in Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3).
Besides trade volumes, the regression also includes the change in the new quote additions in the premove relative to
their 22-day average (‘QVol’) and the 22-day average of the high-low range at the minute of the move start (‘HL’).
The eﬀect of the activity in line with the move direction is reported under ‘Pro’ and the eﬀect of the activity
against the move direction under ‘Anti’. The move size is in basis points, while the changes in trade volumes
and the shares in the trade volume are in decimal points to ease the exposition of the coeﬃcient estimates. The
estimation is done using both the whole data set spanning from July 2007 to December 2013 and the subinterval
of October 2011 to December 2013. The superscript ∗∗∗ marks statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at
10% level using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) extension of the Newey-West estimator.
Jul 2007 - Dec 2013 Oct 2011 - Dec 2013
ΔHFT ΔHFT% ΔHFT ΔHFT%
PM nHFT Anti −4.8∗∗∗ −4.3∗∗∗ −3.3∗∗∗ −2.9∗∗∗
Pro 3.9∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ 3.2∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗
HFT Anti −4.8∗∗∗ −45.8∗∗∗ −5.4∗∗∗ −36.2∗∗∗
Pro 4.1∗∗∗ 49.2∗∗∗ 4.3∗∗ 35.9∗∗
QVol Anti −5.8∗ −5.3∗∗ −3.9∗ −4.7∗
Pro 4.3∗∗ 5.1∗∗ 4.1∗∗ 4.8∗∗
HL 6.9∗∗∗ 7.3∗∗∗ 4.3∗∗∗ 5.0∗∗∗
N.obs. 853,838 859,267 172,438 173,233
to its past average corresponds to a far smaller magnitude of the trade volume compared
to the same increase in the non-HFT trade volume. HFT trades amount to only 7.8% of
the premove trade volume.4
The regressions estimating the eﬀect of the HFT share in the trade volume provide
further evidence for the predictive power of the HFT activity. Increases of the HFT share
in the buying (selling) volume tends to move prices up (down), checking the signs of the
coeﬃcient estimates. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant and economically larger than
the eﬀect of changes in the trade volume, albeit remaining relatively small. A 1% increase
of the HFT share in trade volume in line with (against) the move relative to its past
average causes a 0.49 (0.46) basis points increase (decrease) in the move size.
Figure 4.8 displays the plots of the cumulative sums of errors between forecasts and
realizations (CUSUM) and squared errors (CUSUMSQ) for regressions. The sum of fore-
cast errors for the regressions with the change in the HFT trade volume as well as the
4To give a context for this ﬁgure, the annual averages of the share of HFT trades in the premove trade
volume increase monotonically from 4.9% in 2007 to 10.3% in 2013.
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change in the HFT share of the trade volume stay within the 5% signiﬁcance bounds and
diverge from the zero line far less than the other regressions. However, as with the other
plots, the second half of 2011 exhibits a trend for divergence. The sum of squared errors
crosses the 5% signiﬁcance line multiple times with all other regressions mainly during
the three peaks of the crisis, signalling a larger standard deviation at these episodes: the
aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008-2009, the European debt crisis
in mid-2010 and the S&P downgrade of U.S. debt in August 2011. Although these plots
provide some evidence for a structural break, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a con-
stant eﬀect of the premove HFT activity across the sample using the methodology of Han
and Park (1989).
The coeﬃcient estimates for the subsample of October 2011 - December 2013 qualita-
tively resemble the aforementioned results for the whole sample, except for a weakening
of the eﬀects for most cases possibly due to the smaller move sizes caused by the reduced
market volatility. Increases in the premove HFT and non-HFT activity as well as the
HFT share in the premove trade volume against (in line with) the move direction lead to
smaller (larger) price moves.
This regression analysis conﬁrms our ﬁrst hypothesis postulating a positive relationship
between net HFT trade activity before the event and the magnitude of the transitory
extreme move, even after controlling for the eﬀect of the non-HFT trade volume and
liquidity imbalances. The eﬀect size of the changes in the premove HFT activity even
rivals that of the non-HFT activity, which accounts for a far larger magnitude in the trade
volume. We cannot reject the hypothesis of a constant eﬀect across the whole sample and
ﬁnd qualitative similar results for the subsample of October 2011 - December 2013.
4.4.2 Predicting the Degree of Reversal
In this section, we examine the second hypothesis proposing a relationship between the
HFT trade activity before the extreme move events and the degree of reversal following
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Fig. 4.8. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ Plots for the Eﬀect of the Premove HFT Activity
The ﬁgure displays the cumulative sums of forecast errors (CUSUM) and squared errors (CUSUMSQ) for
the regression equations (4.2) and Eq. (4.3) using the July 2007 - December 2013 data. Each regression
equation is estimated for ﬁve dependent variables: The move size (‘Move Size’), the degree of reversal
(‘Deg. of Reversal’), the quoted spread (‘Q.Spread’), market volatility (‘Volatility’) and the execution-to-
cancellation ratio (‘Exec.-to-Canc.’). In order to present ﬁve diﬀerent regressions with diﬀerent amounts
of total number of observations and diﬀerent amounts of monthly data, we scaled the cumulative sums
to a data set of 70 months, each with 100,000 observations.
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the moves. We estimate Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3) using the trade activity data for both
the premove and the move, i.e. J = 2. Table 4.2 reports the estimation results.
Table 4.2. The Degree of Reversal
The table reports how changes in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT ’) and the HFT share in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT%’)
relative to their 22-day average aﬀect the degree of reversal. The estimation equations are given in Eq. (4.2) and
Eq. (4.3). Besides trade volumes, the regression also includes the change in the new quote additions in the premove
relative to their 22-day average (‘QVol’) and the 22-day average of the high-low range at the minute of the move
start (‘HL’). The eﬀect of the activity in line with the move direction is reported under ‘Pro’ and the eﬀect of the
activity against the move direction under ‘Anti’. The degree of reversal is in basis points, while the changes in
trade volumes and the shares in the trade volume are in decimal points to ease the exposition of the coeﬃcient
estimates. The estimation is done using both the whole data set spanning from July 2007 to December 2013 and
the subinterval of October 2011 to December 2013. The superscript ∗∗∗ marks statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at
5% and ∗ at 10% level using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) extension of the Newey-West estimator.
Jul 2007 - Dec 2013 Oct 2011 - Dec 2013
ΔHFT ΔHFT% ΔHFT ΔHFT%
PM nHFT Anti −82.9∗∗ −89.6∗ −34.1∗∗ −41.0∗∗
Pro 91.2∗∗ 94.7∗∗ 56.2∗∗ 53.9∗∗
HFT Anti −102.8∗ −1034.3 43.5∗∗ 634.3∗
Pro 95.2∗∗∗ 1098.2 45.9∗∗∗ 464.1∗∗
QVol Anti −18.4∗ −19.2∗ −9.1∗ −10.2∗∗
Pro 23.1∗∗ 19.6∗∗ 12.3∗∗∗ 10.4∗∗∗
Move nHFT Anti 209.3∗∗∗ 193.4∗∗∗ 239.1∗∗ 231.9∗∗∗
Pro −302.7∗∗∗ −287.2∗∗∗ −123.9∗∗ −198.2∗∗
HFT Anti 199.0∗∗ 842.2∗∗ 158.9∗∗∗ 582.0∗∗∗
Pro −234.9∗∗ −908.2∗ −206.4∗∗ −683.5∗∗
HL 18.9∗∗∗ 20.3∗∗∗ 18.1∗∗∗ 17.4∗∗∗
N.obs. 631,309 748,533 127,942 150,128
The most statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects belong to the variables of
the move period, most probably due to the temporal proximity of this period to the
upcoming reversal. All non-HFT and three out of four HFT coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant for this period. A 1% increase in the non-HFT trades against (in line with)
the move direction reduce (increase) the degree of reversal by 1.93 to 2.09 (2.87 to 3.03)
basis points. For the HFT activity, the eﬀect of changes in the HFT selling and buying
trade volume relative to their past average are statistically signiﬁcant, although only the
change of the HFT share against the move direction is similarly signiﬁcant. A 1% increase
in the HFT trades against (in line with) the move direction reduce (increase) the degree
of reversal by 1.99 (2.35) basis points. As in the eﬀect on move sizes, the same increase
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in the HFT share of the trade volume against the move direction causes a larger increase
of 8.42 basis points.
As for the premove period, only the non-HFT activity contains coeﬃcients with con-
sistent signs and a high degree of statistical signiﬁcance. Three out of four non-HFT
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant with eﬀect sizes about one-third to one-ﬁfth of the
move variables. The non-HFT trade activity against (in line with) the move direction
increases (reduces) the degree of reversal. We estimate the premove HFT activity to be
statistically insigniﬁcant in most cases.
The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ analyses presented in Figure 4.8 provides the strongest
evidence for a structural break in the case of the regressions on the degree of reversal. For
both the HFT trade volume and the HFT share regressions, the sum of forecast errors
crosses the 5% signiﬁcance line in early 2013. The trend of divergence from the zero
line starts arguably as early as in the last months of 2010, but the second half of 2011
presents a more robust starting point, especially for the HFT share regressions. Indeed,
the hypothesis of constant coeﬃcients is rejected for both regressions given the alternative
of a structural break in October 2011.
The regressions for the subsample of October 2011 - December 2013, presented in
Table 4.2, estimate a stronger positive relationship between HFT trade activity during
the premove and the degree of reversal. Whereas only one out of four coeﬃcients is
statistically signiﬁcant for the regressions using the whole sample period, the subsample
hosts three signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the premove HFT activity. The eﬀect of changes in
non-HFT trade activity diﬀer by trade direction, where a 1% increase in the trades against
(in line with) the move direction reduce (increase) the degree of reversal by 0.34 (0.41)
basis points. By contrast, increases in the HFT activity on both sides lead to stronger
reversals, although only one of the two coeﬃcients for trades against the move direction
is statistically signiﬁcant: A 1% change in the HFT trade volume against (in line with)
the move direction increases the degree of reversal by 0.44 (0.46) basis points.
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The move period continues to be the most economically and statistically signiﬁcant
factor determining the degree of reversal during the subsample. A 1% increase in the
non-HFT trades against (in line with) the move direction reduces (increases) the degree
of reversal by 2.32 to 2.39 (1.24 to 1.98) basis points and the same ﬁgure for HFT trades
is 1.59 (2.06).
These regressions of the degree of reversal on the HFT activity, among other explana-
tory variables, provide evidence for the validity of the second hypothesis concerning the
momentum ignition strategy. Especially for the subsample from October 2011 to Decem-
ber 2013, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the premove HFT activity
and the magnitude of the reversal following the move. It is telling that we observe a
strong statistically signiﬁcant relationship only in the aftermath of the peaks of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. This coincides with the reported drops in HFT proﬁtability due to a number
of factors such as the reduction of especially market-making proﬁts due to lower market
volatility and the overcrowding of the HFT ﬁeld.
4.4.3 Eﬀects on Market Quality
We measure the eﬀects of these move and reversal events on market quality with three
variables: quoted spreads, volatility measured by the high-low range and the execution-to-
cancellation ratios. We present summary statistics for the change in these market quality
variables. Afterwards we discern on the relationship between the HFT trade activity and
the market quality change after extreme moves by estimating Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3)
using the market activity data for all of the three event subperiods, i.e. J = 3.
The transitory extreme move events lead to dramatic drops in market quality. Com-
paring their level at the end of the minute after the end of the reversal to their average
level in the ﬁve minutes before the premove, quoted spreads have increased by 233.4%,
volatility by 664.5% and the execution-to-cancellation ratio has dropped by 33.5%. After
ﬁve minutes, the volatility increase and the drop in the execution-to-cancellation ratio par-
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tially recovers to 343.3% above and 7.6% below the level before the premove, respectively.
By contrast, quoted spreads further widen to 241.3% of their initial level.
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the estimates of Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3) for quoted
spreads, volatility and execution-to-cancellation ratios, respectively. The trade activity
during the move and reversal periods creates a distinct pattern in its relationship with
the market quality change: Almost always, increasing trade volume against (in line with)
the ongoing price direction, i.e. selling (buying) during the move and buying (selling)
during the reversal, alleviates (exacerbates) the market quality deterioration. Across
move types, out of 36 coeﬃcients of changes in HFT and non-HFT trade volumes during
the move and reversal, 27 are statistically signiﬁcant and out of those only 3 do not follow
this pattern. Their eﬀect is also sizable, probably owing to the magnitude of the market
quality deteriorations: On average a 1% increase in the non-HFT trade volume against (in
line with) the ongoing move direction improves (deteriorates) the market quality change by
1.20%, 2.60% and 0.10% (0.84%, 2.65% and 0.15%) for quoted spreads, market volatility
and execution-to-cancellation ratios, respectively. The same ﬁgures for the eﬀect of HFT
trade volume are respectively 0.54%, 1.47% and 0.12% (0.69%, 1.95% and 0.13%).
The presence of a larger HFT share in the trade volume improves the market qual-
ity change, regardless of on which side of the market it happens. Nearly all coeﬃcient
estimates related to changes in the HFT share are statistically signiﬁcant and all of the
signiﬁcant ones imply an improvement on market quality with increasing values. On av-
erage a 1% increase of the HFT share in the trade volume improves the market quality
change by 2.56%, 5.58% and 0.44% for quoted spreads, market volatility and execution-
to-cancellation ratios, respectively. This may be related to the higher share of activity
against the direction of the price move for the HFT ﬁrms compared to the non-HFT mar-
ket participants, depicted in Figure 4.7, which can be interpreted as a stronger tendency
to follow a mean-reversion strategy leading to softer price movements.
The results for the premove activity are statistically weaker and less signiﬁcant in terms
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Table 4.3. The Change in the Quoted Spreads
The table reports how percentage changes in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT ’) and the HFT share in the trade volume
(‘ΔHFT%’) relative to their 22-day average aﬀect the percentage change of the quoted spreads before and after
the extreme move event. The estimation equations are given in Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3). Besides trade volumes,
the regression also includes the change in the new quote additions in the premove relative to their 22-day average
(‘QVol’), the 22-day averages of the high-low range (‘HL’) and the quoted spread (‘Level’) at the minute of the
move start. The eﬀect of the activity in line with the move direction is reported under ‘Pro’ and the eﬀect of the
activity against the move direction under ‘Anti’. The estimation is done using both the whole data set spanning
from July 2007 to December 2013 and the subinterval of October 2011 to December 2013. The superscript ∗∗∗
marks statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) extension of
the Newey-West estimator.
Jul 2007 - Dec 2013 Oct 2011 - Dec 2013
ΔHFT ΔHFT% ΔHFT ΔHFT%
PM nHFT Anti −0.47∗ 0.26 −0.25 0.61∗
Pro 0.28∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.10∗
HFT Anti 0.41∗ −0.39 0.38∗∗ −0.06
Pro 0.43∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.48∗∗
QVol Anti −0.39∗∗ −0.01∗ 0.02∗ −0.08∗
Pro −0.44∗∗ −0.26∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.07∗∗
Move nHFT Anti −0.97∗∗ −0.48∗∗ −0.53∗ −0.64∗∗
Pro 0.67∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗ 1.26∗∗
HFT Anti −0.04∗∗∗ −4.34∗∗ −0.22∗ −3.29∗∗
Pro 0.10∗∗ −0.59∗∗ 0.54∗ −2.98∗∗
Rev. nHFT Anti 1.14∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 0.09∗∗
Pro −1.22∗∗ −1.15∗∗ −0.84∗∗ −0.41∗∗
HFT Anti 0.60∗∗ −3.03∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗ −4.15∗∗
Pro −0.41∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −3.80∗∗
Level 1.56∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗ 1.37∗∗
HL 2.28∗∗ 2.56∗∗ 2.09∗∗ 2.09∗∗
N.obs. 606,100 747,045 123,937 148,743
of the eﬀect size. Each of the regression sets for three market quality variables contains
in total 8 coeﬃcients for the HFT and non-HFT premove activity and, in sum, only four
coeﬃcients of the non-HFT premove activity and three coeﬃcients of the HFT premove
activity are statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect sizes across market quality variables are
also one-fourth to one-half of those during the move and the reversal.
The CUSUM analysis depicted in Figure 4.8 presents some evidence for a structural
break in the last months of 2011. Although none of the market quality variables crosses
the 5% signiﬁcance line, all tend to diverge from the zero line especially in the last two
years of the sample. Given the alternative hypothesis of a structural break on October
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Table 4.4. The Change in the Market Volatility
The table reports how percentage changes in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT ’) and the HFT share in the trade volume
(‘ΔHFT%’) relative to their 22-day average aﬀect the percentage change of the market volatility, measured by
the high-low range deﬁned in Eq. (4.1), before and after the extreme move event. The estimation equations are
given in Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3). Besides trade volumes, the regression also includes the change in the new quote
additions in the premove relative to their 22-day average (‘QVol’) and the 22-day average of the high-low range at
the minute of the move start (‘Level’). The eﬀect of the activity in line with the move direction is reported under
‘Pro’ and the eﬀect of the activity against the move direction under ‘Anti’. The estimation is done using both
the whole data set spanning from July 2007 to December 2013 and the subinterval of October 2011 to December
2013. The superscript ∗∗∗ marks statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level using the Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) extension of the Newey-West estimator.
Jul 2007 - Dec 2013 Oct 2011 - Dec 2013
ΔHFT ΔHFT% ΔHFT ΔHFT%
PM nHFT Anti −0.68∗ −1.95 −0.39∗∗ −3.00
Pro 2.05∗∗ 1.02∗ 3.26 1.61∗∗
HFT Anti −0.91∗ −1.60 0.80∗ 0.56∗∗
Pro 0.49∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.56∗∗
QVol Anti −0.68∗∗ −1.76 −0.57∗∗ −0.18∗∗
Pro −0.70∗∗ −1.94∗ −0.47 −0.40∗
Move nHFT Anti −1.68∗∗∗ −4.47∗∗ −2.09∗∗ −2.07∗∗
Pro 4.46∗ 0.47∗∗ 6.01∗∗ 3.10∗∗
HFT Anti −0.58∗ −2.76∗∗∗ −2.31∗∗ −4.68∗∗
Pro 4.18∗ −9.43∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.03∗∗
Rev. nHFT Anti 2.96∗∗ 5.20∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 5.30∗∗
Pro −2.38∗∗∗ −3.92∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −2.45∗∗
HFT Anti 0.75∗ −10.47∗∗∗ 3.79∗∗ −0.34∗∗
Pro −2.21∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −4.32∗∗ −15.85∗∗
Level 6.01∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 5.36∗∗ 5.91∗∗
N.obs. 419,947 529,526 85,238 105,838
2011, The poolability test of Han and Park (1989) rejects the hypothesis of a constant
eﬀect of the premove HFT activity on quoted spreads and market volatility, but not for
the execution-to-cancellation ratios.
We ﬁnd a relatively stronger and generally adverse eﬀect of the premove HFT activity
on the market quality change for the subsample of October 2011 - December 2013. 7
out of 12 coeﬃcients of the premove HFT activity on both sides of the order book are
statistically signiﬁcant and all but one indicate a negative eﬀect on the market quality
change. On average, a 1% increase in the HFT trade volume (in the HFT share in
the trade volume) during the premove deteriorates the market quality change by 0.20%,
0.02% and 0.10% (0.48%, 0.56% and 0.06%) for quoted spreads, market volatility and
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Table 4.5. The Change in the Execution-to-Cancellation Ratios
The table reports how percentage changes in the trade volume (‘ΔHFT ’) and the HFT share in the trade volume
(‘ΔHFT%’) relative to their 22-day average aﬀect the percentage change of the execution-to-cancellation ratios
before and after the extreme move event. The estimation equations are given in Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.3). Besides
trade volumes, the regression also includes the change in the new quote additions in the premove relative to their
22-day average (‘QVol’), the 22-day averages of the high-low range (‘HL’) and the execution-to-cancellation ratio
(‘Level’) at the minute of the move start. The eﬀect of the activity in line with the move direction is reported under
‘Pro’ and the eﬀect of the activity against the move direction under ‘Anti’. The estimation is done using both
the whole data set spanning from July 2007 to December 2013 and the subinterval of October 2011 to December
2013. The superscript ∗∗∗ marks statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level using the Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) extension of the Newey-West estimator.
Jul 2007 - Dec 2013 Oct 2011 - Dec 2013
ΔHFT ΔHFT% ΔHFT ΔHFT%
PM nHFT Anti 0.14 0.11∗ 0.05∗ 0.14
Pro −0.06∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.11∗
HFT Anti 0.08∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗
Pro −0.13∗ −0.15∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.06∗∗
QVol Anti −0.08∗∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.08
Pro 0.07∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.01∗∗
Move nHFT Anti 0.08∗ 0.09∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.02∗∗
Pro 0.25∗∗∗ −0.20∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.30∗∗
HFT Anti 0.08∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.74∗∗
Pro −0.07∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.09
Rev. nHFT Anti −0.04∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.14∗∗
Pro 0.00∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.17∗∗
HFT Anti −0.21∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.19∗∗
Pro 0.21∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗
Level 0.26∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.47∗∗
HL 0.64∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.63∗∗
N.obs. 489,546 674,865 98,893 132,397
execution-to-cancellation ratios, respectively.
We reach two seemingly contradictory results for the eﬀect of the HFT activity on the
market quality change caused by transitory extreme move events. While higher shares
of HFT trades in the total trade volume during the move and the reversal have a strong
tendency to soften the drop in market quality, we ﬁnd some evidence for the premove HFT
activity to have a negative eﬀect, especially in the later years of our sample. The users
of the HFT technology considerably vary in terms of their market strategies, the usual
contrast being between passive market makers and aggressive directional traders (Baron
et al., 2012; Brogaard et al., 2014; Menkveld and Zoican, 2014). We would expect the
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HFT activity within the legal bounds and related to market making activity to improve
market quality and contribute to price discovery, given the evidence in the literature
(Brogaard et al., 2014; Carrion, 2013; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). Taking the conﬁrmation
of the hypotheses relating the HFT activity before transitory extreme move events to the
momentum ignition strategy into consideration, the higher premove HFT activity may be
capturing such incidents of market fraud, whereas the HFT activity during the event is
dominated by the market makers, which comprise the bulk of the HFT activity in ﬁnancial
markets (Menkveld, 2013; Hagstromer and Norden, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2014). Thus,
we capture the eﬀects of two diﬀerent types of HFT strategies on market quality.
4.5 Conclusion
We investigate an extensive NASDAQ data set of 8,000 stocks spanning from July
2007 to December 2013 for extreme move events. About half of 1,675,100 such events
are followed by a reversal more than two-thirds of the move size, which we categorize as
the transitory moves. The remaining half is about equally divided between those with
less than one-third reversal and those reverting from one-third to two-thirds. Although
the number of events are in a trend of reduction since the ﬁnancial crisis years, the ratio
between these three degrees of reversal remains quite stable.
We formalize the use of the momentum ignition strategy with two hypotheses relating
the HFT activity before transitory extreme move events to the magnitudes of the move
and the reversal. We use two main types of regressions to evaluate the eﬀect of the HFT
activity on the move, the degree of reversal and the market quality changes caused by
an event. The ﬁrst regression uses the percentage diﬀerence of the volumes of HFT and
non-HFT trades from their 22-day average and the second regression computes the same
percentage diﬀerence for the HFT share in the total trade volume. These transformations
as well as the implementation of a ﬁxed eﬀects model controlling for factors speciﬁc for
each stock, month and intraday period make the HFT activity variables more comparable
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across stocks. We also control for alternative market conditions which can generate rapid
price moves with signiﬁcant reversals, namely price movements initiated and driven by
non-HFT trade activity such as market overreaction and temporary liquidity imbalances
attracting both HFT and non-HFT parties.
The regressions of the move size on market variables ﬁnd evidence for the predictive
power of the premove HFT activity on the upcoming extreme move, conﬁrming our ﬁrst
hypothesis. The trade activity of HFT ﬁrms nearly match the predictive power of non-
HFT market participants. Non-HFT trades constitute the vast majority of the trade
volume, i.e., 92.2% of the premove trade volume, and therefore are able to move the
midquote far easily. In spite of this asymmetry, changes in the HFT trade volume relative
to its past level have only a 13.3% smaller eﬀect on the move size compared to those for
the non-HFT market participants.
Particularly the October 2011 - December 2013 subsample presents strong evidence for
our second hypothesis relating the premove HFT activity to the magnitude of the reversal
following the move. Although the evidence is stronger for HFT trades in line with the
upcoming move, increases in the HFT activity on both sides lead to stronger reversals: A
1% change in the HFT trade volume increases the degree of reversal by 0.45 basis points.
This timing coincides with the public reports about the proﬁtability concerns of HFT
ﬁrms due to lower market volatility and tougher competition in a more crowded market.
We also examine the eﬀect of transitory extreme move events on market quality and
how it is inﬂuenced by the HFT activity. Across our three market quality measures,
we ﬁnd that extreme price moves aﬀect market quality negatively. Comparing their
magnitudes one minute after the end of the event to their levels before the premove,
quoted spreads and volatility have risen on average by 233.4% and 664.5% respectively
and the execution-to-cancellation ratios have dropped by 33.5%. During the move and the
reversal, higher HFT share in the trade activity on both sides of the order book improves
particularly the change in quoted spreads and volatility. The premove HFT activity, by
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contrast, gives some evidence for a negative eﬀect on market quality, particularly during
the subsample spanning from October 2011 to December 2013.
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Summary
The last decade has seen a series of dramatic transformations in the ﬁnancial markets.
Electronic exchanges now dominate the trading processes of a vast array of ﬁnancial
instruments, while trading pits, if they still exist, are transformed to specialist shops or
TV studios for ﬁnancial news, as reminders of a bygone era. Securities do not merely
trade in various exchanges scattered across diﬀerent countries, but also in many of them
simultaneously in the same country. The temporary price diﬀerences generated by this
market fragmentation and countless other market ineﬃciencies are arbitraged out by a
new set of market participants, well-adjusted to the new electronic trading mediums:
high frequency traders. Their secretive and growing arsenal of automatized algorithmic
trading strategies will surely continue to provide much food for thought and concern for
regulators, researchers as well as the general public.
This dissertation address a number of open questions in this rapidly changing world
of intraday trading. The ﬁrst project proposes a novel methodology to measure intraday
changes in price informativeness for ﬁnancial instruments trading simultaneously in mul-
tiple venues. We estimate a structural model based on Hasbrouck (1993) and De Jong and
Schotman (2010) using Kalman ﬁltering. This framework decomposes the price variation
into permanent price innovations of the underlying eﬃcient price process and transitory
noise. We use the ﬂexible Fourier form to model time-variation in these two variances.
We provide simulation evidence for the accuracy of this methodology over a wide range
of parameter conﬁgurations and examine 50 S&P 500 stocks during the second half of
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2013. These stocks trade simultaneously in four main exchange groups, namely NYSE,
NASDAQ, BATS and Direct Edge. Although NYSE and NASDAQ tend to be the most
informative venues, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant variation across the trading day de-
pending on the changes in variables such as trade volume, bid-ask spreads, volatility and
time-of-the-day.
The second project examines why the trading in electronic markets continues to be
concentrated in the hours when the trading pit is open, even after the heyday of pits have
passed. We examine two hypotheses providing potential explanations for this activity
clustering in the context of a data set of U.S. Treasury futures spanning from 2004 to
2013. The ﬁrst hypothesis argues that the pit hours attract trading due to the price
informativeness and liquidity provided by the trading pit. We ﬁnd that the contribution
of the trading pit to price discovery indeed surpasses its share in the trading activity.
However, after the introduction of a new electronic trading platform called Globex in
2008, both the number of trades and the informativeness of the trading pit plummet and
this does not cause much change in the activity clustering around the pit hours.
The second hypothesis postulates a feedback mechanism between trading activity,
price informativeness, information asymmetry and price impact of trades, which keeps
afterhours trading at a low level. We estimate these market variables using a structural
market microstructure model and ﬁnd statistically and economically signiﬁcant relation-
ships between these variables across the sample period. From 2008 on we observe that the
eﬀect of the price impact of trades becomes statistically insigniﬁcant and average trade
sizes both considerable decrease and become more similar across the trading day. We
attribute this to the sophistication of algorithmic trade execution strategies, facilitated
by the introduction of the Globex Platform.
The third project investigates the existence and prevalence of a predatory trading
tactic aimed at generating transitory price trends, allegedly employed by high frequency
traders. We ﬁnd 1,675,100 extreme price move events in a NASDAQ data set of 8,000
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stocks from July 2007 to December 2013. This ﬁgure corresponds to a monthly average
of 3.4 extreme moves for each stock. About half of these events are transitory, i.e. the
price move is followed by a reversal of more than two-thirds, and nearly a quarter are
permanent, i.e. the price reverts by less than one-third of the initial move.
We use a ﬁxed eﬀects model controlling for factors speciﬁc for each stock, month and
intraday period. We also consider other scenarios which may lead to an extreme move
and reversal pattern such as temporary liquidity imbalances and the overreaction of non-
HFT parties. In line with the documented positive eﬀects of HFT market making, the
HFT activity during the move and the reversal tend to alleviate the market quality drop
caused by the extreme move event. However the HFT activity before the event shows
signs of market manipulation from October 2011 on: The premove HFT activity during
the transitory moves becomes more predictive of the move size and direction, correlates
with larger subsequent price reversals and exacerbates the deterioration in market quality
variables namely quoted spreads, market volatility and execution-to-cancellation ratios.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Tijdens het laatste decennium hebben er een reeks dramatische transformaties plaats-
gevonden binnen de ﬁnancie¨le markten. Elektronische beurzen zijn het handelsproces
van een breed scala aan ﬁnancie¨le instrumenten gaan domineren. Handelsvloeren, voor
zover ze nog bestaan, zijn veranderd zijn in speciaalzaken of televisie studio’s die gebruikt
worden voor het uitzenden van het ﬁnancie¨le nieuws, ter nagedachtenis aan een vroeger
tijdperk. Eﬀecten worden niet alleen verhandeld op verschillende beurzen verspreidt over
verschillende landen, maar ook op verschillende beurzen tegelijk in hetzelfde land. De
tijdelijke prijsverschillen die gegenereerd worden door de marktfragmentatie en talloze
andere markt ineﬃcie¨nties, verdwijnen snel door een nieuwe groep marktdeelnemers, ﬂit-
shandeleren, die goed aangepast zijn aan de nieuwe elektronische handelsmechanismen.
Hun geheime en groeiende arsenaal aan geautomatiseerde, algoritmische handelsstrate-
giee¨n leiden tot nadenken en bezorgdheid bij de marktautoriteiten, onderzoekers en de
maatschappij in het algemeen.
Deze dissertatie beschouwt een aantal open vragen in de snel veranderende wereld
van handelen op ﬁnancie¨le markten. Het eerste essay stelt een nieuwe methodologie voor
om veranderingen in het informatiegehalte van eﬀectenprijzen op verschillende locaties
te meten. Dit model schat een structureel model gebaseerd op Hasbrouck (1993) en De
Jong en Schotman (2010), door middel van het Kalman ﬁlter. Dit raamwerk ontbindt
de prijsvariatie in permanente prijsveranderingen van het onderliggende eﬃcie¨nte prijs
proces en tijdelijke ruis. Er wordt gebruik gemaakt van de ﬂexibele Fourier vorm om
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de tijdsvariatie te modelleren in deze twee varianties. Door middel van simulaties wordt
de nauwkeurigheid van de methodologie gegeven voor een wijde reeks aan parameter in-
stellingen, en als toepassing worden 50 S&P 500 aandelen tijdens de tweede helft van 2013
bekeken die op vier beurzen tegelijkertijd verhandeld worden (namelijk NYSE, NASDAQ,
BATS en Direct Edge). Alhoewel de NYSE en NASDAQ over het algemeen het meest
informatief zijn, vinden we statistisch signiﬁcante variatie over de handelsdag afhanke-
lijk van veranderingen in variabelen zoals handelsvolume, het verschil tussen bied- en
laatprijzen (’spread’), volatiliteit en tijd van de dag.
Het tweede essay bestudeert waarom het handelen in elektronische beurzen vooral
plaatsvindt in de uren dat de handelsvloer open is, ook na de hoogtijdagen van han-
delsvloeren. Ik onderzoek twee hypotheses die een verklaring zouden kunnen geven voor
deze clustering van activiteit in de context van een dataset van U.S. Treasury futures
met data van 2004 tot en met 2013. De eerste hypothese stelt dat de openingstijden
van handelsvloeren handelsactiviteit aantrekken door de informatiewaarde van de prijs
en liquiditeit verstrekt door de handelsvloer. De resultaten geven aan dat de contributie
van de handelsvloer tot prijsontdekking inderdaad sterker is dan het aandeel in han-
delsactiviteit. Echter, na de introductie van het nieuwe elektronische handelsplatform
genaamd Globex in 2008, daalde zowel het aantal transacties als de informatiewaarde van
de handelsvloer sterk en dit verandert weinig aan het clusteren van de handelsactiviteit
tijdens de handelsvloer uren.De tweede hypothese postuleert een terugkoppelingsmech-
anisme tussen handelsactiviteit, informatiewaarde van de prijs, informatie asymmetrie
en invloed van transacties op de prijs, die handel buiten de openingstijden van de han-
delsvloer laag houdt. Deze marktvariabelen worden geschat met behulp van een struc-
tureel model, en de resultaten tonen statistisch en economisch signiﬁcante relaties aan
tussen deze variabelen over de schattingsperiode. Vanaf 2008 is te zien dat het eﬀect van
invloed van transacties op de prijs statistisch insigniﬁcant wordt en gemiddelde transactie
volumes zowel kleiner worden als meer op elkaar gaan lijken over de handelsdag. Dit valt
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toe te schrijven aan het raﬃnement van de op algoritmes gebaseerde handelsstrategiee¨n,
gefaciliteerd door de introductie van het Globex Platform.
Het derde essay onderzoekt het bestaan en de invloed van roofzuchtige tactieken gericht
op het genereren van kortstondige prijstrends, die naar verluid worden toegepast door
ﬂitshandelaren. In een NASDAQ dataset van 8.000 aandelen van juli 2007 tot en met
december 2013 zijn er 1.675.100 extreme prijsveranderingen. Dit komt neer op een maan-
delijks gemiddelde van 3,4 extreme veranderingen voor elk aandeel. Ongeveer de helft
van de veranderingen is tijdelijk, d.w.z. de prijsverandering is gevolgd door een terugval
van meer dan twee derde, en bijna een kwart is permanent, d.w.z. de prijs valt voor
minder dan een derde terug ten opzichte van de initie¨le verandering. Het derde essay
maaktgebruik van een ﬁxed eﬀects model zodat gecontroleerd kan worden voor factoren
die speciﬁek zijn aan het aandeel, de maand en periode van de dag. Ookook andere sce-
nario’s die kunnen leiden tot een extreme prijsverandering en terugval worden beschouwd,
zoals een tijdelijke afwijking van liquiditeit en een overreactie van niet-ﬂitshandelaren. In
lijn met de gedocumenteerde positieve eﬀecten van ﬂitshandelaren market making, heeft
de activiteit van ﬂitshandelaren tijdens prijsverandering en terugval de neiging om de
verslechtering van de marktkwaliteit door de extreme prijsverandering te verminderen.
De activiteit van ﬂitshandelaren voor de prijsverandering vertoont tekenen van markt-
manipulatie vanaf oktober 2011: De grootte en richting van de prijsverandering valt nog
tijdens deze verandering te voorspellen met activiteit van ﬂitshandelaren, correleert met
een grotere opvolgende prijs terugval en verergert de verslechtering van markt kwaliteit
variabelen, namelijk spread, markt volatiliteit en ratio’s van uitgevoerde tot gecancelde
transacties.
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